CHANG-CHEN LUN

KARATALARATNA

OR

THE JEWEL IN HAND

(A Logico-Philosophical Treatise of The Madhyamaka School)

BY

ĀCĀRYA BHĀVAVIVEKA

Translated into Sanskrit
from
The Chinese version of HSUEN TSANG
(A. D 602—664)

BY

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI
Professor, Visva-Bharati—Cheena Bhavana



VISVA-BHARATI
SANTINIKETAN

TO BE HAD OF
THE VISVA-BHARATI PUBLISHING DEPARTMENT
6/3, DWARKANATH TAGORE LANE, CALCUTTA

Price Rupees Five

(*Reprinted from the Visva Bharati Annals II*)

Published by The Visva Bharati
Printed by Prabhatkumar Mukerjee at the Santiniketan
Press, Santiniketan, Birbhum

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha s preaching is characterised as moderate path avoiding the two extremes viz indulgence in sensual pleasures and taking to the habitual practice of self mortification When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master s teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have struck at the depth of the Master s utterances and styled his interpretation as moderate *Madhyamaka* and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated Madhyamakaśāstra or kārikā Nāgārjuna s main *contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought is an emphasis on* Prajñā the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true *nature of things in their real perspective viz Śūnyatā This Śūnyatā in his opinion is only a synonym for dependant origination Pratītya samutpāda* The Śunyatā doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists They take it for *nairātmya* Śūnyatā as an *equivalent for dependant origination is quite an innovation of* Nāgārjuna

The Śūnyatā doctrine he says has been introduced by Buddhas as an antidote *for all* wrong views and beliefs (M K XIII 8) It appears that Nāgārjuna is quite right in so saying since it can appropriately corroborated from some earlier utterances of the Buddha When Dighanakha a Parivrājaka e g conveys his conviction to the Buddha not to entertain any view the latter remarks that many persons professing not to entertain any view instead of giving up that view entertain a new one and there are a few persons who having given up that view do not at all entertain a new one The Buddha further points out that a man sticking himself to any one of the three views

(1 सब्ब मे न खमति 2 सब्ब मे खमति, 3 एकच्च मे खमति एकच्च मे न खमति)

would give rise to a quarrel and in order to avoid any quarrel he should give up that view and not entertain a new one Note the passage in conclusion

विमुत्तचित्तो न केन चि सवदति न केन चि विवदति। यं च लोके वुत्त तेन वोहरति अपरामस ति। M I p 500

INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha's preaching is characterised as "moderate path" avoiding the two extremes, viz, indulgence in sensual pleasures and *taking to the habitual practice of self mortification* When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master's teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have *struck at the depth of the Master's utterances* and styled his interpretation as 'moderate' *Madhyamaka*, and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated "Madhyamakaśāstra" or kārikā Nāgārjuna's main *contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought* is an *emphasis* on Prajñā the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true nature of things in their real perspective viz *Śūnyatā* This *Śūnyatā*, in his opinion, is only a synonym for "dependant origination", *Pratītya samutpāda*. The Śunyatā doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists They take it for *nairātmya* Śūnyatā as an equivalent for "dependant origination" is quite an innovation of Nāgārjuna

The Śūnyatā doctrine, he says, has been introduced by Buddhas as an antidote for all wrong views and beliefs (M K XIII, 8) It appears that Nāgārjuna is quite right in so saying since it can appropriately corroborated from some earlier utterances of the Buddha When Dighanakha a Parivrājaka e g conveys his conviction to the Buddha not to entertain any view the latter remarks that many persons professing not to entertain any view instead of giving up that view entertain a new one and there are a few persons who having given up that view do not at all entertain a new one The Buddha further points out that a *man sticking himself* to any one of the three views

(१ सब्ब मे न खमति, २ सब्ब मे खमति, ३ एकच्च मे खमति एकच्च मे न खमति)

would give rise to a quarrel, and in order to avoid any quarrel he should give up that view, and not entertain a new one. Note the passage in conclusion ·

विमुत्तचित्तो न केन चि संवदति न केन चि विवदति । य च लोके वुत्तं तेन वोहरति अपरामसं ति । M. I. p. 500

Here we may rest fully convinced of the fact that Nāgārjuna's stand is fittingly and antecedently endorsed by the Master The instance of Dīghanakha is also cited by Bhāvaviveka on p 48

Moreover we find many verses collected in the Suttanipāta which beyond any shadow of doubt lend support to the negative attitude advocated by Nāgārjuna Some of such verses are deserved to be cited here

न कप्पयन्ति न पुरेक्खरन्ति अच्चन्तसुद्धीति न ते वदन्ति ।
आदानगन्थ गथित विसज्ज आस न कुब्बन्ति कुहिं चि लोके ॥ 794

ञाणे पि सो निस्सय नो करोति । . 800

न कप्पयन्ति न पुरेक्खरन्ति धम्मा पि तेस न पटिच्छितासे ।
न ब्राह्मणो सीलब्बतेन नेय्यो पारगतो न पच्चेति तादीति ॥ 803

सब्बत्थ मुनि अनिस्सितो न पिय कुब्बति नो पि अप्पियम् । ॥ 811
विसेनिकत्वा पन ये चरन्ति दिट्ठीहि दिट्ठि अविरुज्झमाना । 833

The conversation between the Buddha and Māgandiya is very interesting where the Master says

न दिट्ठिया न सुतिया न ञाणेन सीलब्बतेनापि न सुद्धिमाह ।
अदिट्ठिया अस्सुतिया अञ्ञाणा असीलता अब्बता नो पि तेन ।
एते च निस्सज्ज अनुग्गहाय सन्तो अनिस्साय भवं न जप्पे ॥ 839

स सब्बधम्मेसु विसेनिभूतो य किं चि दिट्ठि व सुत सुत वा ।
स पन्नभारो मुनि विप्पयुत्तो न कप्पियो नूपरतो न पत्तियो ॥ 914

From these citations it appears that Nāgārjuna's absolute negativism is not without its counterpart in the earlier canonical literature According to the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgikas a man of spiritual career should not adhere to any proposition of his own but may refute the other's one reducing it to an absurdity The non adherence to any view by an ascetic is sufficiently stressed in the verses of the same book Read e g verses 832 874 876 883 892 894 903 904 913 It may incidentally be pointed out that he should not engage himself on debate

with any body with a view to establishing any thesis of his own The reason for this is fully demonstrated in verses 824—832, cp Dighanakhasutta M I 74 p 499 Almost the same attitude is advocated by the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgikas Absolute negativism therefore is not a whimsical creation of Nāgārjuna though he has made it into a grand system that would stand every scrutiny of critics

A candidate for Bodhi should view things as devoid of any substantiality and get himself detached from all sorts of discriminative thoughts and assertions When the mind is thus made completely aloof, then it is stated that the non dualistic and undivided principle shines forth Thus the doctrine of Śūnyatā helps a canditate to achieve that goal Hence it is only a means to the end and not the end itself, cf M K XIII, 8 c d, as also well stressed in the present treatise This position of the system quite accords with the Buddha's repeated warning in different discourses :

कुल्लोपम धम्म......नित्थरणत्थाय, न गहणत्थाय ..धम्मा पि पहातब्बा पागेव अधम्मा ।

(Maj. I, 22 Agaluddūpamasutta 38 Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta)
It is interesting to note that some such idea is also stressed in the other school of thought, cp Suvarṇasaptati, pp 26, 101

येन लङ्घति तत्यज ॥

2 There are two methods to uphold the non substantiality of things as advocated by Nāgārjuna The first method, viz *prasaṅga* was started by Ācārya Buddhapālita in the first half of the 6th century A D. and successfully maintained by Ācārya Candrakīrti in the first half of the 7th century A D The Second one namely the *svatantra anumāna* method was founded by Bhāvaviveka, 550 600 A D. the author of the present treatise The advocates of the former method maintain that Śūnyatā could be established only by means of *prasaṅga*, ie *reductio ad absurdum* of all theses arguments and examples of the opponents, and hold that no thesis argument or example of their own is possible (M. Vṛtti, pp 16, 18, 34) for the reason that absolute truth could not be asserted by any of the discursive thoughts. The latter school, on the other hand, criticising the *prasaṅga* method, pleads that *Śūnyatā* may also be established by means of an independant inference in spite of the indescribable character of the absolute truth , hence the school goes under the name of *Svātantrika* This method of inference has not won

favour with Candrakirti, the celebrated interpretor of Nāgārjuna who attacks vehemently Bhāvaviveka and upholds Buddhapālita's standpoint.

3 Buddhist logicians claim that their logical theories have, of course in a caricature form, been endorsed by their Master himself. In support of this some scriptural passages are also cited and elucidated.[1] The logical tradition, preserved in Chinese Buddhist literature also supports the above claim[2] It is well-known that the Buddha was a Hetuvādin. One of his foremost disciples chanted a song in his praise

---

1. See Dharmakirti, Pramāṇavārtika, I, 286, d

वृत्तिः—"नीलसमङ्गी पुरुषो नीलं जानाति नो तु नीलमिति । इति ब्रुवता प्रत्यक्षं दर्शितम् । अनुमानं नोक्तम् ।..अन्याः परप्रवादा इत्यादिना शब्दादेरेव निषेधात् प्रयोगस्य परार्थानुमानरूपस्य दर्शनाद्यागमेऽप्यनुमानस्य निर्देशः कृत एव भगवता । तमेव प्रयोगमाह ।

......यत्किञ्चिदुदयात्मकम् ।
निरोधधर्मकं सर्वं तदित्यादावनेकधा । 287 a-b.
अनुमानाश्रयो लिङ्गमविनाभावलक्षणम् ।
व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनात् हेतोः साध्येनोक्तं तत् स्फुटम् ॥ 287 c-f.

वृ......हेतोरुदयधर्मकत्वस्य साध्येन निरोधधर्मकत्वेन व्याप्तेः प्रदर्शनात् यत्किञ्चिदुदयधर्मकं तत् सर्वं निरोधधर्मक- (महावग्ग I, 1.8) मित्यादिना स्फुटः प्रयोगो दर्शितः ।

The first passage quoted above is attributed to some Abhidharma book cf. Pram vārtika, Pariśiṣṭa, p 518 (J. B O R S Vol XXVI).

The definition of *kāryānumāna* is given in this āgamaic verse :

धूमेन ज्ञायते वह्निः सलिलं च बलाकया ।
निमित्तैर्ज्ञायते गोत्रं बोधिसत्त्वस्य धीमतः ॥ *Ibid*

The Bodhisattvanimittas are given by Candrakirti, see Madhyamakāvatāra VI 4-5 with references thereto The following āgama gives the definition of Svabhāvahetu

अनित्या बत संस्कारा उत्पादव्ययधर्मिणः ।
उत्पद्य हि निरुध्यन्ते तेषां व्युपशमः सुखम् ॥ *Ibid*

Some similar treatment is also made by Kamalaśīla, see Tattvas Panjikā

proclaiming to the world that his Master s unique contribution lies in his discovery of an ultimate *hetu* cause for all evil things (*dharmāh*) that are produced by causes The universe in his view is merely a series of causes and effects (*idampaccayatā*) One may witness in all his Discourses the argumentative and persuasive character of his speech His art of debate and logical thinking are fully exhibited when his opponents are equally equippe l Once Saccaka a follower of Nighan ta doctrine comes to conduct a debate[3] (*vāda*) with the Buddha to combat the latter s views on impermanence and non substantiality of things (*sabbe samkhārā anicca sabbe dhammā anattā* Ma; 1, 35 p 227) He is reported to have held the view that *rūpa* is the soul and so also *vedanā* *viññāna* The Buddha refutes it by pointing out its glaring fallacies and sequences with his usual method of illustrations and similes Again Upāli a house holder disciple of Nighanṭa goes to the Buddha for debate on relative strength of the bodily vocal and mental actions Nighanṭa s contention is that the bodily action is more sinful than the others two Upāli wanted to establish it refuting the Buddha's view The Buddha remarkably vindicates the obvious inconsistencies with Nighanṭa s standpoint and makes Upāli convinced of them A

---

2 From the Buddha downward broadly speaking five stages may be men tioned in the evolution of Buddhist logical theories

1 Buddha—Aśvaghoṣa upto 600 A N (=after Nirvāṇa) Works Four Āgamas and Hīnayāna Śāstras
2 Nāgārjuna—Piṅgala upto 800 A N
   Works Madhyamaka Śāstra (Vigrahavyāvartanī) Śataśāstra and Dvādasamukha (or—N kāya)
3 Maitreya—Vasubandhu—Guṇamati upto 1000 A N
   Works Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra Upāyahṛdaya and Tarkaśāstra
4 Diṅnāga—Bandhuprabha Agotra (? upto 1100 A N
   Works Nyāyamukha Nyāyapravesa Vaipulya Śataśāstravyākhyā and Prajñāpradīpa (of Bhāvaviveka)
5 Dharmakīrti—Devananda (?) upto 1500 A N
   Numerous works
   (Cited from Lu Chang s work on Hetuvidyā as supplied by Mr Hsu Hu a devoted Chinese scholar Chinabhavan)

3 Saccaka s pride in debate is nicely described at the beginning of the Sutta p 227 ll 5—17 and on p 228 l 30—p 229 l 6 *evam evāham Samanam Gotamam vādena vādam ākaḍḍhissāmi* *seyyathā* with three similes

man cannot destroy with a sword the whole population of Nālandā within a moment, but a Śramaṇa can do so with *manodaṇḍa* mental deed Then the Buddha proves that *manodaṇḍa* is greater in effect than *kāyadaṇḍa*, bodily deed (Maj. S 56). Similarly a prince, Abhaya by name was urged by Nighaṇṭa Nāthaputta to conduct a debate with the Buddha on whether or not the Tathāgata would utter unpleasant word If the Buddha replies to this question in negative, ask : why did Devaputta become enraged ? The prince carried out the plot by inviting the Buddha to his house The question was really crucial The Buddha won over him by giving an example of the child who hurts himself foolishly (Maj S 58).

All the above and other conversations would certainly testify to us the Buddha's acquaintance with the art of debate, of course, in a time-honoured fashion His theory of *dharmacakṣus* is always put in a *form of concomitance*

यत्किंचि समुदयधम्म, सब्बं त निरोधधम्म ति ।

Much more interesting point is that the concomitance is used together with *upanaya* sentence :

सो इदि पटिसचिक्खति : इदं पि खो पन अभिसखत अभिसंचेतयित्त, य खो पन किंचि अभिसखतं, अभिसंचेतयित्त, तदनिच्च , निरोधधम्म ति पजानाति ।

Idam in the first sentence refers to four dhyānas, four Brahmavihāras and three ārūpyadhyānas One may note that *vyāpti* and *upanaya* sentences are used in an order just reverse of the later days' usage Or it may be a *pratijñā* sentence expressing the presence of *probans* in the *pakṣa* and suggesting thereby the necessary presence of *probandum* by showing the positive concomitance afterwards (Maj' 1, S 52) A Bhikhu named Sāti entertained a wrong view of *vijñāna* and thought that only one *vijñāna* runs and transmigrates from one birth to another The Buddha having heard it from his disciples persuaded Sāti to give it up and exhorted his disciples that vijñāna is *paṭiccasamuppanna*, i e produced due to causes and conditions He further elucidates the idea by saying that when *vijñāna* arises depending on the eye, etc it is styled as eye consciousness, and so also the other, ear consciousness etc The fire, e g being produced on account of wood, it is termed wood fire (*kaṭṭhaggi*), so also *sakalaggi*, *tiṇaggi*, *thusaggi*, *sankāraggi* Then this concomitance is also shown : *bhūtam*

idam āhārasambhavam, ..āhāranirodhā nirodhadhammam He further exhorts one should not cling to this statement because dhamma has been preached as a boat to reach the goal and not the goal by itself. It is quite probable that the later logicians like Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga *taking* the above example as a specimen explain the term *pratyakṣa* with more appropriate examples.

Therefore it appears that the days of Buddha were fully rife with logical, philosophical speculations and debates. It has also been recognised that there were many other philosophical schools, such as Ājīvakas, Nighantas and Parivrājakas, etc who were fully adept in such an art I may add one more instance in this period, viz Yāska, the renowned author of the Nirukta (c 500 B C) He uses a formal logic just like a good logician of later days to disprove the whole structure of the argument set out by Kautsa, who argues that the Vedic hymns are meaningless with sufficient proofs Yāska refutes all one by one putting his own view in a syllogistic form : *Mantrā arthavantah, śabdasāmānyāt* etc. So it is not proper to contend that the period of Buddha was not familiar with formal logic or some such method of logic

Now it becomes evident that the tradition fathering upon the Buddha the logical theories of Buddhists is not without foundation It is also *stated that until the time of* Vasubandhu *logical theories* and *rules* of debate were uncertain (cf Kwei-ci, Comment on N Praveśa, p 2b) Then Diṅnāga systematized every thing connected with logic and made it a scientific system Of course he took his stand on *Vijñāna* as the basic principle so much so his school came to be known as Nyāyānusārī Vijñānavāda *It does not, however follow that he propounded that* system for the first time because we have already in Vasubandhu's Vimśikā the system, ably discussed and established.

4. What Diṅnāga did for the Vijñānavāda Bhāvaviveka did in the cause of the Madhyamaka doctrine He is as much reputed in the field of logic as Diṅnāga Little is known about his personal history except what the *Chinese travellers speak of him* Yuang Chuang tells us that he was a native of South India and a junior contemporary *of* Dharmapāla (Watters, II, p 222) According to Hual's Life, in a great stone mountain not far to the South of the capital of the Dhanakaṭaka kingdom Bhāvaviveka rests in the palace of Asuras awaiting

the time when Maitreya Bodhisattva shall reach perfect wisdom and explain some difficulties in his way (Life of Yuang Chuang Beal, *trans p 137*) *I ching also mentions him as one of the Ācāryas in the* middle age (Record, p 181) His name is variously pronounced He is known in Chinese as Po pi fi-cia—Bhāvaviveka and in Tibetan as Bhavya or Bhavyakara The following informations are gathered by Prof L V Poussin —

a Divākara Indian monk translator in the convent of Ta-Yuan, gives this account Recently in India in the convent of Nālandā, there are two masters Silabhadra and Jñānaprabha by name The first follows the tradition of Maitreya and Assaṅga at distance and of Dharmapāla and Nanda immediately which asserts that only the Dharmalakṣana Mahāyāna is the ultimate and definite teaching[4] (*nītārtha*) The second tradition supports the views of Mañjughoṣa and Nāgārjuna at distance and of Pingala and Bhāvaviveka directly It considers the *nirlakṣana Mahāyāna* as *nītārtha*[5] (This view is fully demonstrated in the M vṛtti Prajñāpradipa of Jñānaprabha Note the same title as that of Bhāvaviveka's comment)

---

4 According to Sūtras like the Sandhinirmocana and Sāstras like the Yoga sāstra of Asaṅga Silabhadra establishes three teachings 1 Little Vehicle, against Ātmam of Tirthikas , 2 Prajña school recognises that the imaginary is void of its proper nature but does not pose the being of dependent perfect 3 Sandhinirmocana etc real doctrine of Mahāyāna three lakṣaṇas three absences of proper nature To affirm reality of things produced by causes is to fall in the extremity of existence to say that all things are void is to fall in the extremity of the void In fine to say at the same time vacuity of imaginary and the existence of dependent and perfect is the middle path is *tārtha*

5 *Jñānaprabha establishes three teachings in this order* —

1 For those gazelles , thought and object are real , 2 Dharmalakṣaṇa Mahāyana the object is void but thought is real the system of Vijñānavāda , because hearers of still feeble faculty are not capable entering into equal true void 3 in the third period Mahāyāna without Lakṣaṇas thought and object all the two are void equally of the same savour In other words the Buddha broke at first the proper nature', substantialism of Tirthikas in teaching the existence of things produced by causes Then he broke adhesion to the existence of these things teaching that they have only existence of designation (*praj˜aptisattā*) In fine he says these things are void of proper nature equal of unique savour The second system admits one perceptible (*upalabhya*) It is not really of definite sense

b According to Fa tsang treatise on Laṅkāvatāra Taisho 1790 p 430 3 7 24 there have been four systems Dharmatrāta Nāgārjuna and Deva Asaṅga and Vasubandhu Aśvaghoṣa and Sāramati These masters of the South and the North of the country admit some things void and others existance and are not capable to harmonize In the country of West the master Bhāvaviveka according to the Sūtras of Prajñā supports himself on the system of Nāgārjuna etc and makes treatise Prajñāpradīpa and Karatalaratna, and establishes one reasoning showing the *paratantra* void The master Dharmapāla relying upon the system of Asaṅga etc makes the treatise Vijñaptimātrā [siddhi] and establishes one reasoning showing the dependent (*paratantra*) not void Their disciples Jñānaprabha and Śīlabhadra adopt these systems and the tradition is not interrupted The account goes further that there is no conflict in fact between the two systems because Asaṅga has interpreted Nāgārjuna (Nanjio 1243) and Vasu (= Vasubandhu) has commented on Āryadeva's Śataśāstra (Nanjio 1188) But men of posterior days do not understand the intention and they attach themselves to these words and contradict themselves (v Joyau Introductory)

5 As previously stated Bhāvaviveka has pleaded for a new method the method of independent reasoning to prove vocuity as against the prasaṅga method of Buddhapālita which falls well in line with Nāgārjuna s thinking For the reason of this innovation he is put above the Mādhyamikas by certain Tibetan authors It is stated that the Svātantrikas are classified by certain Tibetan writers into two branches the Svātantrika Sautrāntika and Svātantrika Yogācāras Bhāvaviveka is said to be of the former group and Śāntarakṣita of the latter The distinction[7] rests not on the conception of absolute truth but on the theories of relative truth The first branch adopts in relative truth the position of Sautrāntikas (the existence of the exterior world and the negation of asaṃskṛtas) while the second the Yogācara position (inexistence of exterior world) (v Obermiller Sublime Science p 83 Stcherbatsky Short treatise 31 84 293 328 370 cited by L V

6 However he sometimes criticises that the Mādhyamika ill comprehends vacuity

7 This distinction though it is claimed to be highly authoritative cannot be taken to be an accurate one

Poussin *op cit*) Poussin in support of the statement says that Bhāvaviveka teaches the doctrine of intellect receptacle reservoir of seeds (cf. below, text p 75) which doctrine distinguishes the Yogacāras from the Sautrāntikas So his metaphysics is Mādhyamika and his psychology is Yogācāra. Poussin is wrong in saying that his psychology is Yogācāra It may not be far from truth if Bhāvaviveka is styled as Svātantrika Sautrāntika For the Sautrāntikas are *credited to have* postulated a subtle consciousness which survives in Nirvāṇa (Th Stcherbatsky Nirvāṇa p 30 J Masuda Vasumitra s Bud Sects p 63 No 3 of the Sautrāntika school and n 1) The author of the present treatise seems to echo the same view when he says (on pp 29 87) that after effecting the elimination process in a prescribed manner the Yogin enters finally into the flow of knowledge which is now in its own self nature ' It may be evident from this passage that the author distinctly sides with the view that there is a pure knowledge flowing inwardly and immune from contamination of any sort and which shines forth in *the ultimate state of Yogic Career* So *it is quite apt to call him a* Sautrāntika in his psychology

I may incidentally add here that the forerunners of the subtle knowledge theory of the Sautrāntikas are the Mahāsanghikas who have likewise entertained some ' original consciousness (*Mūlavijñāna*) The Sautrāntikas have given it the designation of *ekarasaskandha* which is more or less similar to the purified Jñānasvalakṣaṇa of Bhāvaviveka According to the Sautrāntikas it is the substance of transmigration from which the current five skandhas are evolved (Masuda Vasumitra p 68 n 1) The same view is held by Sāti Bhikkhu amongst the earlier Buddhists He professes that the Master has taught that one consciousness runs from birth to birth There are very many clear indications in the Pali Nikāya works to prove that the Master has assigned some prominence to Vijñāna though it is placed on a par with other skandhas In his discourse to Kassapa the Master speaks of three possessions (*sampadā*) in order *sīlasampadā cittas* (= samā-*dhis on later occasions*) *and paññās* *This last possession is* explained thus :

माण्दस्सनाय चित्त अभिनीहरति, अभिनिन्नामेति। सो एव पजानाति 'अय मे कायो रूपी चातुम्महाभूतिको.... इद पन मे विञ्ञाण एत्थ सित एत्थ पटिबद्ध ति।

The passage goes further that this is *paññā*, and there is nothing more to gain in this life. According to this discourse, *ñāṇadassana*, insight into knowledge is the final *sampadā* for monkhood, i. e. *Sāmañña*. This *ñāṇadassana* has been gradually relegated to the background, and *cetovimutti*, mind-deliverance has instead come to the forefront, cp. Maj. I, Sutta 29, p. 197 :

इद ब्रह्मचरिय न लाभसक्कारसिलोकानिसंसं, न सीलसम्पदानिसंसं, न समाधिसम्पदानिसंसं, न ञाणदस्सनानिसंसं, या च खो अयं भिक्खवे अकुप्पा चेतोविमुत्ति, एतदत्थ......... ।

Sometimes four dhyānas and four ārūpyadhyānas are said to be of greater importance than *ñāṇadassana*. So this insight into knowledge, which has been eclipsed in the course of centuries is duly insisted on several times and the precise process to retrace it is also prescribed by Bhāvaviveka by devoting his present entire work to this subject. He *is even inclined to remark that if a yogin* attains a perfect insight (*samyakdarśana*) into adamantine knowledge in its true perspective, he may be taken to have fulfilled all other six perfections and eight constituents of the Āryan path, even though he is not engaged in their actual performances, see p. 98 where he relies for this view on the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and Brahmaparipṛcchā. The attitude of our author is quite in contrast with some perhaps later *Mādhyamika Ācāryas like Maitreyanātha who emphasise both* prajñā and pāramitās as equally important (v. Bhavasaṅkrānti, Introduction XXV, XXXVI). Some similar balanced attitude appears to have been maintained by earlier Buddhists. Soṇadaṇḍa, for example argues on behalf of the Master Sīla and Paññā are mutually purifying and make one a true Brāhman. Dig. Soṇadaṇḍasutta :

सेय्यथा पि गोतम हत्थेन वा हत्थं धोवेय्य पादेन वा पादं धोवेय्य एवमेव सीलपरिधोता पञ्ञा, पञ्ञापरिधोतं सीलं .... ।

to which position the Master accords his consent. One may take notice here of a Brahmanical parallelism in the idea of *jñānakarmasamuccaya* in Pre Saṅkara Vedantic thought. We should not however, mistake that Bhāvaviveka desires there to discord all the preliminary acts. What he seems to hint is that a correct grasping of things in accordance with the true ultimate knowledge is more fundamental than anything else.

has succumbed to the error condemned by the Laṅkāvatāra (154, 155) of taking to the letters (*yathāruta*) this declaration "which does not wish to say what it says" He has created Mahāyāna alakṣaṇa (devoid of three lakṣaṇas) admitting *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna* in the relative truth, considering them void in the absolute truth . (Siddhi, 188 189) He is "a total negator', he mistakes Śūnyatā and destroyed scripture and reason (Siddhi, 432) He thinks that all dharmas are *only one existence of designation* (*prajñaptisat*)—*an untenable opinion* (Siddhi, 554 555). *However his doctrine is not in contradiction with* "Middle Path", for he admits existence in relative truth (Siddhi, 4). Yogācāras' middle path on p 419 of the Siddhi Koue ki condemns that Bhāvaviveka has pushed Mādhyamika towards Nihilism which Nāgārjuna ignored (Joyau, Introductory)

7. There are numerous works claiming Bhāvaviveka's authorship, of which the following are noteworthy .

1 Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti, comm on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, Chinese translation, Nanjio, 1185 , Tibetan, Mdo 18 Cordier 399 The first part of Tib version is published by Walleser, Biblio Indica 1913

2 Jewel in Hand, Karatalaratna Nanjio, 1237 No Tibetan translation is known

3 Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā with auto comment, Tarkajvālā Mdo 19, Cordier 300 is an independent work, very valuable for historical studies of his contemporary philosophical thoughts Its Sanskṛt original is recently brought from Tibet by Rahula Sankṛtyayana

4 Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Mdo 18 Cordier 299

5 Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyā is a description of the 18 schools of Buddhism translated into English from the Tibetan, Mdo 90 Cordier 414 by Rockhill in his *life of Buddha* Its authenticity is doubted by L V Poussin

6 Madhyamakārthasangraha is a short treatise in 10 verses on double truth and its sub truths translated into Sanskrit and *English and published with Tibetan version by* N Aiyaswami Sastri *in the Journal of* Or Reas Madras *Vol* V *pp 41 ff*

7. Tattvāmṛtāvatāra *twice referred to* in the present treatise,

pp 58 76, and the Siddhānta of Mañjughoṣahāsavajra speaks of it as the comment on Madhyamakahṛdaya (v p 58, n 112)

The exact title of the present treatise is not ascertained it has been translated into Chinese *Chang Cheng lun*, *Chang* means 'palm' and *Cheng* jewel', 'gem', etc So I have put into Sanskrit *Karatalaratna* Karatala for palm is quite familiar in the expression like *Karatalāmalaka*, etc The simple word *kara* is also sometimes used for palm for the sake of metre in the expression like *karabadara samānam* etc I have, however, retained the form *Karatala* having in view the Sūtra passages like *Karatalasamsthum* cited in the M vṛtti p 476 ll 11, 13 Cp also the expression *arāmalakam karatalagatam* in the Kalpa nāmaṇḍatikā p 149 (xxvii)

The *raison* d'etre of the treatise as the author says, is to provide persons of keen intellect with proper guidesto enter into the Truth(Dharmatā) for which purpose some persons persistently take to the codes of traditional interpretations of much complicated scriptures Listening reasoning and concentrating are the three main factors to achieve the goal After listening to the scripture one should concentrate on the true nature of things with the aid of proper reasoning *yuktinidhyapti* which is the same as *anumāna* according to Bhavya He has also instructed the man of Bodhi career how he should reply to all objections he may confront with in the course of his reasoning This gives the author an opportunity to review all the possible arguments that his opponents both contemporary and ancient could offer against the proposition The treatise is therefore doubly interesting to us Almost all philosophers of his opposite camp are given a place in it to pronounce their views on the proposition A majority of them are mentioned by name Yet there are many others who are mentioned in vague terms as *anye kecit*, etc whom we can hardly identify The most interesting one of such references is that he distinguishes the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa from proper classical Sankhyas Their main differences appear to be that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are imperceptible for the latter while they are otherwise for the former We know that Aśvaghoṣa has described a form of Sankhya system which may be very nearer to the Prakṛti-Puruṣavāda of Bhavya Prakṛti of Aśvaghoṣa's account (Bud carita XII, 18) is the same as the five great elements,

etc and hence it is perceptible . It has been well pointed out elsewhere that the Suvarnasaptati the standard text of the classical Sāṅkhya system must have been familiar with Bhāvaviveka (v pp 79 80 nn 77 79 80 and my Further Notes on the Suvarṇasaptati in the Jour of S V O Institute Tirupati Vol VI No 2 p 84 85)

8 It was in 1938 1939 when I was appointed Professor of Buddhist Studies Chinabhavana that I undertook to study this work of Bhavya a brief account of which I presented to All India Oriental Conference Tirupati 1939 under the title Bhāvaviveka and his Method of Exposition When I was again appointed in 1945 Chinese Research Fellow under a new scheme of studies sponsored by the National Government of China I took opportunity to revise and publish the work in the Visvabharati Annals newly started under aforementioned scheme . Meanwhile I came to know that the work has been translated into French and published by Prof Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his Mélanges Chinois et Buddhique Vol II a copy of which I procured on loan from the University of Bombay by the kind office of the Director Chinabhavana In revising I compared Poussin s French translation with my Sanskrit rendering and improved where he left doubtful The work being of technical character requires a handling specially trained in the technical branch of Indian Studies I have also made an endeavour to incorporate all his useful references and notes into my present publication in order that mine may serve to be an uptodate one Besides I have also consulted an anonymous commentary in Chinese which is unfortunately incomplete and available only on the second chapter My foot notes and additional notes will testify to what extent I have improved and interpreted the text and succeeded in my task I hope that the learned readers will themselves see how lucid and elucidative Bhavya s method of argument is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar language as Chinese and how much more useful purpose would have been served if the Sanskrit original of the work were recovered The Chinese text I have made use of for my Sanskrit rendering is that published along with incomplete commentary aforementioned by The Sūtra engraving Institute Nanking 9th year of the Chinese Republic gan shen first month of autumn preserved in the Chinese Library of Chinabhavana, Santiniketan

Now it behoves me to offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Visvabharati, more specially to Sj Rathindranath Tagore, General Secretary, Visvabharati and Prof Tan Yun Shan Director Cheenabhavana who were responsible for giving me an opportunity to make my work complete and accessible to the learned public My thanks are due to Dr P C Bagchi Director, Research Studies, Visvabharati for his kind suggestion to issue the book separately as *Visvabharati Memoir*. Our Press at Santiniketan also deserves our thanks *for speedy execution of the printing work of the book* As no Chinese types are available in our Press I have all the Chinese words cited in the foot notes printed elsewhere and added as Appendix for the convenience of Scholars' references I have also prepared a Chinese Index of all the technical and other authorized terms with their Sanskṛt equivalents, with a hope that I may have occasion to publish it in future

1st Feb 1948 — N Aiyaswami Sastri

Santiniketan

KARATALARATNA OF BHAVYA

SUMMARY OF THE TREATISE

CHAPTER I

The author, at the outset of his treatise, narrates the main purpose of his composition as follows. When one (Bodhisattva) realises the supermundane and undiscriminating knowledge, he can conceive the moral faculties of all living beings which are varied in regard to aspiration, temperament and conduct, and can destroy all the passions that are operating either in one's own self or in the self of others which may be latent or potent, and which would cause a great number of miseries And he can take up for the benefit of others the vow of practising the secret duties of a holy man In order to realise such supermundane knowledge, one ought to apply constantly the collyrium of unperverted view of *Śūnyata* which destroys the film (or eye disease) of all the wrong views In order to have it one should resort to Prajñā, supreme knowledge consisting of learning which expels the objective nature of all objects

Now some persons by dint of right interpretation determining the sense of the wider and complicated texts, enter into the Truth (*dharmata*), and practise constantly and diligently the meditation followed by progress, but in such interpretation they get very much tired mentally There are other persons who are of very keen intellect, although they have not entered into the Truth In order to offer facilities to the latter for entering into the Truth by realising the *śūnyatā*, the author says that he composed in brief this Śāstra, *Karatalaratna*

As this treatise ■ intended for the most part to prove the validity of inference for establishing the Madhyamaka Truth, *śunyatā* independently, and to reply to all objections to it put forth by opponents, the author sets forth in this verse his main thesis in a formal syllogism

I a Thesis The composite (*saṃskṛta*) elements are void from the standpoint of Absolute Truth

b Reason Because they are originated through causes and conditions

c Example Just like things magically created (*mayavat*)

II a Thesis Uncomposite (*asaṃskṛta*) elements are unreal from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth

b Reason Because they are non products

c Example Just like flower in the sky

Now the author offers the following remarks by way of explaining the first thesis

I There are number of speculations regarding the classification of things both in the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems, they are to be divided in brief into two categories, viz composite and non composite The worldlings without understanding their real nature attribute some reality to them and entertain manifold wrong views An ignorant painter, for example, paints some terrible forms of Yakṣas and Piśacas, or paints an image of a beautiful lady or person and imagining that those forms exist in reality becomes either terrified or attracted But when men realise the real nature of the composite and uncomposite things according to Absolute Truth, they just like a wise painter do not imagine that the objects so painted do really exist, and not being caught into the net of wrong views like a silk worm which is envelopped itself in

its cocoon, are capable of entering into the supermundane knowledge

In order to elucidate this meaning (the real nature) of the composite element which is already disputed, the author sets forth the first thesis Further, he says that all men in the world equally accept it as *bhava*, he also admits it as such empirically In the worldly experience the origination through causes and conditions is accepted as real and hence all the people including shepherd and cowherd know that the composite elements, eye, etc that are brought under category of the Empirical Truth are ■ substantially existant (*dravyasat*) The author therefore qualifies his proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth", lest it should contradict the actual experience of the world What is real and proper character is called real nature (*tattva*), it is only the Absolute Truth The above proposition is made from the viewpoint of this Absolute Truth, not of the Empirical Truth

Things that are produced through concatenation of conditions are called composite elements, i ■ twelve bases omitting some parts of the *dharmāyatana* Things magically created and illusory in appearance are also accepted ■ such by opponents, the author says that if his proposition relates to those illusory things, it will incur a logical defect called *siddha-sadhana* So his proposition is directed to those composite things which are accepted by opponents ■s really and substantially existent, e g the composite element, in regard to the base of eye it is discussed whether it is really substantial or void It is void The term void is a synonym of what is bereft of its own nature and is 'illusory in appearance' such ■ the proposition of the author

Things that originate through causes and conditions,

which are empirically true, my statement does not go against the experiences current amongst common people

Again three kinds of contradiction are raised and answered (3) It does not contradict our sacred texts, because it has been accepted by our scriptures (4) It does not contradict the sacred text of other philosophers since all the systems of thought are intended to criticise others' systems and to establish their own (5) Nor does it contradict the experiences of the ordinary folk because no philosophical discussions and investigations will follow closely the experiences of the worldlings in determining the true natures of things, e g Buddhists hold things to be momentary and of no soul, Vaiśesikas, *rupa*, etc are other than *dravya* etc , and Sānkhyas, *buddhi* is *acetana*, what is extinguished and what is not yet originated are all real This is why I qualified my proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth"

2 To an objection that there is no subject (*dharmin*) for him who maintains that the eye basis is really void and hence it is a logical defect called *paksadosa*, and also it is *hetudosa*, there being no receptacle of the reason, the author replies that the eye, etc in general as current amongst common people are accepted as subject, and some attribute pertaining to it as reason , so the defect that you stated is only an apparent and fallacious one

3 The crooked (Brahmanic) logicians raise an objection of mutual contradiction of the proposition and reason in this syllogism If eye, etc are void, how can they be produced by causes and conditions ? If they are so produced, how can they be void? If however that objection is removed, then your proposition involves either absence of a parallel example or unproving of the reason , e g sound is eternal,

because all things are non-eternal. This syllogism exhibits the reason 'because the sound is not all things' and hence indicates the defect of the reason since the sound is also included in the category of all things. There is no parallel example. How can a thing be eternal and non-all? The author replies that the reason and example are well proved as they are very well understood by every ordinary man.

4. Svabhāvavādins say: the organ of eye is endowed with its own nature, because it discharges its own function. Things devoid of *svabhāva* do not discharge the function just like a son of barren woman. Bhavya says: If you establish thereby the apparent nature of the eye, etc. known to all common people, conventionally, then it will incur the defect of *siddhasādhana*. If you do so from the view-point of reality, there will be no parallel example. Nor may your object be proved from the absence of non-parallel example; e. g. the advocate of the eternal sound says: sound is eternal, because it is audible; pot, etc. are non-eternal and not audible; sound on the other hand is audible and hence eternal. Your reason has been contradicted by its opposite reason, viz. *krtakatva*, being a product, which exists in all parallel examples known to the world. This contradictory reason proves that all things, eye, etc. including sound are to be brought under the category of common parlance of the world; because they all possess the same false nature. So far the author replies to some fallacies relating the subject (*paksa*).

III. Now some fallacies relating to the reason are met with. 1. Some (logicians) object that the proposition: all composite elements are void, includes also your reason and example, as they all are of the same category; so your inference is imperfect. The author replies that if his propo-

which are empirically true, my statement does not go against the experiences current amongst common people

Again three kinds of contradiction are raised and answered (3) It does not contradict our sacred texts, because it has been accepted by our scriptures (4) It does not contradict the sacred text of other philosophers since all the systems of thought are intended to criticise others' systems and to establish their own (5) Nor does it contradict the experiences of the ordinary folk because no philosophical discussions and investigations will follow closely the experiences of the worldlings in determining the true natures of things, e g Buddhists hold things to be momentary and of no soul, Vaiśesikas, *rupa*, etc are other than *dravya* etc , and Sankhyas, *buddhi* is *acetana*, what is extinguished and what is not yet originated are all real This is why I qualified my proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth'

2 To an objection that there is no subject (*dharmin*) for him who maintains that the eye basis is really void and hence it is a logical defect called *paksadosa*, and also it is *hetudosa*, there being no receptacle of the reason, the author replies that the eye, etc in general as current amongst common people are accepted as subject, and some attribute pertaining to it as reason , so the defect that you stated is only an apparent and fallacious one

3 The crooked (Brahmanic) logicians raise an objec tion of mutual contradiction of the proposition and reason in this syllogism If eye, etc are void, how can they be pro duced by causes and conditions ? If they are so produced, how can they be void? If however that objection is removed, then your proposition involves either absence of a parallel example or unproving of the reason , e g sound is eternal,

because all things are non eternal This syllogism exhibits the reason 'because the sound is not all things' and hence indicates the defect of the reason since the sound is also included in the category of all things There is no parallel example How can a thing be eternal and non all ? The author replies that the reason and example are well proved as they are very well understood by every ordinary man

4 Svabhavavadins say the organ of eye is endowed with its own nature, because it discharges its own function Things devoid of *svabhāva* do not discharge the function just like a son of barren woman Bhavya says If you establish thereby the apparent nature of the eye, etc known to all common people, conventionally, then it will incur the defect of *siddhasadhana* If you do so from the view point of reality, there will be no parallel example Nor may your object be proved from the absence of non parallel example, e g the advocate of the eternal sound says sound is eternal, because it is audible, pot, etc are non eternal and not audible, sound on the other hand is audible and hence eternal Your reason has been contradicted by its opposite reason, viz *krtakatva*, being a product, which exists in all parallel examples known to the world This contradictory reason proves that all things, eye, etc including sound are to be brought under the category of common parlance of the world, because they all possess the same false nature So far the author replies to some fallacies relating the subject (*paksa*)

III *Now some fallacies relating to the reason are met with* 1 Some (logicians) object that the proposition all composite elements are void, includes also your reason and example, as they all are of the same category, so your inference is imperfect The author replies that if his propo-

sition goes : the eye is void because it is void of its nature, then it may entail an *asiddhidoṣa* for reason. Māyā, etc. are given as example, not as subject for demonstrating therein our *probandum* in which case there will be an unnecessary attempt on author's part of proving a thing which is already admitted (*siddhasādhanagaurava*).

2. Some low-witted (logicians) pass the following criticism : The proposition proving non-substantiality of the composite things also proves the same for the reason which becomes therefore *asiddha*, non-existent. This criticism, says the author, is only apparent and not valid ; because similar defect may be pointed out with all other logicians. For example, (ancient) followers of Jina establish that all *saṃskāras* are of no soul, because they are products of causes (*sahetuka*). Though this reason also comes under *saṃskāra*, yet it was admitted as a valid reason. Sāṅkhyas hold the evolutes (*vyakta*) as constituted of three guṇas, because they are different from *cetana*. This reason too is *vyakta*, but not considered to be invalid. Vaiśesikas also maintain that the sound is non-eternal, because it is produced. The formulation of this reason is constituted of words and so it becomes non-eternal. No dialectician would admit this kind of objection as valid. If they do so, nobody can establish any proposition.

3. Some other (logicians) say that your reason, *pratītyasamutpannatva*, will not prove your *probandum*, as it is itself devoid of its own nature just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. The author answers : The reason in your syllogism is *asiddha* for you ; if you formulate it as accepted by your opponent, you should explain it in more definite terms. If it means total non-existence, there will be no reason at all. Or if it means a false appearance, then

it lacks a parallel example ; since the word uttered by the son of barren woman is absolutely non-existent. Further it becomes inconclusive with *nirmitaśabda*, word of Buddha's created persons because it educates and does benefit to innumerable beings even if it lacks its own nature. And a reason that is accepted only by one party will not at all prove *probandum*. And again your reason is made invalid by contradictory reference, and involves also a logical defect called *atiprasanga*. Here the author gives some illustrations to demonstrate that reason would be valid only when it is accepted by both parties.

4. Some crooked logician again says : If *svabhāva śūnya* is *probandum*, no *probans* will be established just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. *Probans* is also included into the saṃskṛta category, so it becomes *sādhyasama*, equal to *probandum*, i. e. devoid of its own nature. Author's reply goes : This so-called defect in thesis has been pointed out by the implied argument of the previous opponent the futility of which has been fully demonstrated.

IV. Some more fallacies of proposition are answered : some (ancient Buddhist logicians) say, that the meaning of your proposition is not clear. (1) All the composite elements are in reality non-existent substance ; if that is the sense of the thesis, this sentence itself destroys your *probandum*, and incurs a defect of *pakṣa*, called *svavacananirodha*, contradiction by one's own word, just like a proposition establishing that all words are false. (2) If the sense of your proposition is that all composite elements are totally non-existent, then you, denying every thing completely, fall into the wrong view of *apavāda*.

(1) With regard to the first alternative, the author

remarks that Buddha has freely used in the verse, e. g. *ātmā hi ātmano nātha*, etc. the word ātmā, soul, which is nothing but mind, *citta*. However, in reality no-soul theory is established; his utterences are not blamed as *svavacananirodha*. Similarly I also accept the eye etc. as existent in the worldly activities; however I establish it as void from the view-angle of reality of saints. The author has cited some three more utterances of the Buddha which may be charged with similar logical fallacy; yet they are accepted by our opponents as quite valid and logical. The Sāṅkhyas also have to adopt the same procedure. They maintain that the evolutes are endowed with three guṇas. This formulation of proposition too falls into the category of *vyakta* and is constituted of three guṇas. If it is not of three guṇas, *vyakta* also will not be of that nature. Though there is such defect, yet their proposition is not at all regarded as blame-worthy.

Our disputant, without making his own thesis free from the said fallacy, tries to frame some more charges, such as: all the composite elements being in reality non-substances, the sentence of this proposition becomes non-substance. The disputant who directs such charge against other's proposition without removing his own defect is just like a man who, when he is charged by you as a thief, replies that you are also a thief. This procedure of discussion should not be adopted in a critical and logical investigation.

(2) As to the second alternative, my meaning of the proposition has already been explained; void does not mean a total non-existence, but it is only a synonym of non-substantial, and illusory appearance. And I do not deny that all things never exist in all aspects. So your objection is no more valid.

2. Some other Ācāryas raise this objection : If things as you said, are non-substantial like the māyā, etc. they are non-existent, hence you fall into the wrong idea of non-existence. This objection, says the author, is raised lest only the desired object of the Śūnyavāda should be accomplished, though both parties are confronted with the same fallacy. To deny the Absolute Truth evolves a greater sin. This negative expressiond enies what is current in the world. However you attach greater importance to its injunctional aspect. But I stress more on its negative aspect. This negative expression could indicate only one idea—the negation of the existences ; its force of expressing the idea is fulfilled and nothing more comes out into operation to express another idea, e. g. the expression "there does not exist a piece of white cloth" would denote only the absence of white cloth and not necessarily the existence of red cloth, or blue cloth.

In this branch of science we disprove the supposed real nature of all things in order to remove the wrong idea of Eternalism ; we also deny the unreal nature in order to shun the wrong belief of Nihilism. Again both these natures, real and unreal combined, are also disproved so that these two beliefs combined may be avoided. With a view to put an end to all other false beliefs, all the mental phenomena are negated. All such phenomena being stopped, the mind automatically ceases to operate any longer. An utterence of Buddha has been cited to this effect.

3. Somebody else says that the advocate of the Śūnyatā doctrine, although he is desirous of acquiring discriminative wisdom, always discriminates things composite and uncomposite as void, and thus he nullifies this cherished object. This objection too is not valid as I have already replied to it fully and fittingly.

V. One more objection relating to the argument. Some other (logicians) say : the reason for proving śūnyatā is unproved either conventionally or in reality both from the viewpoint of one's own system or that of others'. The author meets this remark thus : All the logicians have agreed on the fact that a reason is to be employed which is valid for both parties and with general attributes, not taking into account all other particulars. For example, (1) The Vaiśesikas prove that sound is non-eternal because it is product of effort. The advocate of the eternal sound with a view to disprove the reason, questions whether it is produced by throat, etc. or by stick, etc. (2) So also the Sāṅkhyas prove that five organs of living beings are not products of matter, because they are faculties (*indriyatvāt*) like the faculty of mind. The opponent who advocates that human organs are material products, criticises whether the reason (*indriyatva*) is endowed with the nature of great elements, or with three gunas. All such criticisms are futile and indicate only a false disproving of reasons. The same is the case with your criticism.

VI (1) Some objections on the example are met with. Some Ācāryas who are self-posed as very intelligent, blind of love for their own system, and incapable of assessing the value of the gem, like scriptures—raise objection as to the example : Things such as flower, fruit, lump of clay, etc. which by force of magic power turn into different objects like elephant, house, etc. are devoid of their own natures. This we do not accept. There is no parallel example, because your example lacks *probandum*. If you say that those magically created things are spoken of as void in so far as they lack the nature of the real elephant, etc. then the eye, etc. are said to be void only in the sense they lack the

nature of others. In this case your thesis becomes *siddha-sādhana* proving what is already proved.

The author replies : The objects like elephant, etc. which are created depending upon things like lump of clay, etc. are devoid of their natures, as accepted even by you, hence my example is proved and *probandum* also proved. If you say again that those magically created things, though they are devoid of the nature of such other real things, are not however devoid of their own nature, you must then explain satisfactorily why they lack the form and character in which they appear. But you have accepted that things like fruits, flower, and others do not lack the form and character in which they appear. So you must admit that those magically created things, elephant, etc. are also possessed of the nature of such real things, since they appear in such forms. But in fact they are not real. So it follows that all magically created things are devoid of their own nature. Thus my example is proved correct and my *probandum* is also accomplished.

(2) Some others having a different view of *Śūnya*, argue that the magically created persons are not real persons and are hence void ; yet they are not devoid of their own nature since they exist in the form of a person of illusory appearance. So your example is again unproved. The author retorts whether those illusory persons are dependent products or otherwise ; if they are dependent products, why do you call them illusory ? Is it for the reason that they do not exist as they appear to us ? Do you not see that the eye etc. are dependent products not existing as they appear to us ? Therefore they are proved as devoid of their nature.

Again they argue that it is alright with illusory persons, but the case with eye, etc. is different. Because there is no

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting (hiding) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

(3) You also must admit that the place where the *manifestation of illusory-person* is at work, is devoid of the manifestation of real person. Therefore my example is proved and my proposition is also established. Your theory of omnipresence of sense organs is not admissible, because each of them is always assigned to and associated with a fixed place.

VIII. The Yogācāras argue the following : (1) If your proposition is meant to express that all composite elements are void in as much as they originate through causes and conditions, not by selves, and hence are devoid of the nature of origination, we do not dispute it and it falls in line with our opinion. (2) So says our Master—"that aspect of which a thing is devoid is unreal ; this aspect which serves as a receptacle of the false imputation is real". Intention of the saying is this : the imputed aspect of the dependent aspect is non-existent. There is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches and there is no speech corresponding to the speakable. Therefore the imputed aspect that abides in the dependent aspect is originally unreal. What is void (of the imputed aspect) and is of dependent origination is existent in its nature. All the worldly conventional talks as to the matter, feeling, ideation and others are based upon and emanated from this *paratantra* aspect. If this aspect also is said to be non-existent, all the said conventional talks would be baseless and senseless. You will then deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co-religionists.

other real eye, in contrast with which you may say this eye is illusory Bhavya says—Yes, it is so , yet we experience in the world that the absence of one's own nature and dependent origination—always behave as *probandum* and *probans* This fact has been illustrated by the said example simply as a sort of pointer to the general principle If you again analyse the particulars of example and argue on that basis, you will fall into the pit of a logical fallacy called *vikalpasamajati*, which shows clearly your light mindedness This fallacy is further illustrated by some disputes between Vaiśesikas and Mimamsakas regarding eternity of the sound

VII The Sankhyas object to the validity of the reason and example They hold (1) that things are evolved and transformed from Mahat, etc and so the reason the dependent of origination is unproved , (2) that everything may be possessed the nature (*triguna*) of everything, and (3) that the sense organs may be present everywhere , even in the illusory person its nature is present and so your example also is unproved Bhavya replies (1) You must admit that a cognition of visual object is produced by causes, but not manifested Things like pot, etc are produced by different causes, lump of clay, wheel etc Manifesting factors are not material causes , e g a lamp, etc are not the material causes for the ornaments like bangle, etc just as the cognition is produced by different causes not manifested so also are the eye, etc Hence there is no question of reason being unproved

(2) Your second proposition that everything is in the nature of everything is untenable It cannot be possible by way of manifesting process for the following reason Since there is present a manifesting process of pot in a place where a basin exists Again one and the same pot may extend to so many leagues of space A pot and a basin would

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting (hiding) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

(3) You also must admit that the place where the manifestation of illusory person is at work, is devoid of the manifestation of real person. Therefore my example is proved and my proposition is also established. Your theory of omnipresence of sense organs is not admissible, because each of them is always assigned to and associated with a fixed place.

VIII. The Yogācāras argue the following: (1) If your proposition is meant to express that all composite elements are void in as much as they originate through causes and conditions, not by selves, and hence are devoid of the nature of origination, we do not dispute it and it falls in line with our opinion. (2) So says our Master—"that aspect of which a thing is devoid is unreal; this aspect which serves as a receptacle of the false imputation is real". Intention of the saying is this: the imputed aspect of the dependent aspect is non-existent. There is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches and there is no speech corresponding to the speakable. Therefore the imputed aspect that abides in the dependent aspect is originally unreal. What is void (of the imputed aspect) and is of dependent origination is existent in its nature. *All the worldly conventional talks as* to the matter, feeling, ideation and others are based upon and emanated from this *paratantra* aspect. If this aspect also is said to be non-existent, all the said conventional talks would be baseless and senseless. You will then deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co-religionists.

Now the author retorts on the above remarks : (1) If you hold that composite elements like the eye, etc. are void because there does not exist in the *paratantra* any nature like the eye, etc. which is not originated by causes and remains always unextinguished, then you are proving what is already proved. You are no better theorists than the Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśesikas who also maintain similar theories (viz. absence of the nature that we actually perceive). You said that the eye etc. are non-products and devoid of their natures, because they are void by themselve. So you must state that they are void by absence of the nature of non-origination (*anutpattinihsvabhāvatah*), not by absence of the nature of origination as you stated. If composite things while in the process of origination, have really the nature of origination, how can you say that they are devoid of the nature of origination ? If they do not have it really, their nature does not at all exist ; so you need not proclaim that there is nothing but mind. If you however adhere to it, you will have a defect of proposition. If the *paratantra* aspect is devoid by itself of the nature of origination and in non-existent, it is said to be void ; then you will be proving what is already proved. Similarly what is originated through causes and conditions is in reality not void for you and it will be deprived of the term *Śūnya*. As regards my contention, you cannot frame any such charge. Therefore your remark that my proposition falls in line with your (Yogācāra) opinion is only a delusion.

(2) As to the passage above quoted, *yena śūnyam*, etc. I may say that if you accept as real entity things like the eye, etc. which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions and which all people know as such, even ordinary men will be in possession of knowledge of the enlightened men

(Buddha) Worldly things appear to us as if they are created, from the viewpoint of knowledge of the enlightened persons who have realised the Absolute Truth Therefore it is declared that, that which is devoid of this dependent aspect is unreal in order to guard against falling into extremity of eternalism Similarly this dependent aspect *is said to be real in order to guard against falling into* another extremity of Nihilism Things like the eye, etc which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions, and which are included into the category of the empirical truth, *are real and not totally unreal like the flower in the sky* We, however, *prove them to be void only from the standpoint* of the Absolute Truth It is therefore said that this aspect which serves as basis of false imputation is real In this *manner non substantiality of things has been proclaimed in* conformity with Truth by the Leader of men and gods Being granted that the dependent aspect is real in this sense, your words become a good doctrine and I also accept this kind of reality As two kinds of accumulations of virtue and wisdom are brought under the principle of *lokānuvartana*, following the world, and as the basic principle upon which all false things are imagined is estab lished to be real by way of worldly convention (*samvṛty-upacāra*), all things that are talked of in the world (*prajñaptidharma*) are empirically real That I do not dispute Therefore there is no room for the charge you made against me that I deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co religionists

If you say that the magically created things are of indescribable nature, they cannot prove your thesis, I do not see any reason why they should be of indescribable nature If you adhere to it again, no intelligent person can

disprove the soul and others that are styled to be of indescribable nature by Tirthikas

If you accept all dependently originated things as real, objects like magically created persons will be all real Nor is it possible to say that one thing is in the possession of the nature of some thing else, e g a cow does not possess the characteristics of an ass

Nor do we dispute with you with regard to your remark that there is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches, etc, so your negation on this account incurs a *siddhasadhanadosa* If you insist that the negation is necessary because many defilements become operative by virtue of one's attachment towards the aspects imagined on account of speeches and the speakable, you are thoroughly mistaken No animal kingdom is in the possession of speeches The main factor for defilement is only the absence of correctly grasping things in their right aspects There are many arguments and principles that may be quite pleasing and satisfactory and there are many varied, holy and subtle teachings Amongst them the teaching relating to the imputed aspect is only partly profitable, not universally Therefore there is no need of further arguing the imputed aspect as void

IX Some other Ācaryas offer the following criticism If the eye is for you real substantially, then follows a loss of your proposition and the reasoning becomes inconclusive If it is unreal, it would be devoid of its nature and your negation becomes baseless The author observes in replying It is not so According to Buddha's saying there is nothing that is true and there is nothing that is false I have nothing in reality to establish whether true or untrue As there is nothing to be denied in your opinion by the said reasoning there is no necessity for negation But my

negation points out after investigation *pros* and *cons* that the thing to be negated is originally devoid of its own nature, but does not destroy its nature into pieces. It is not proper to argue that because there do not exist things to be illuminated, the illuminating factor also does not exist. Nor is it possible to state that things that are illuminated are created by illuminating factor. Therefore even in the absence of things that are to be negated, my own negation may exist. According to my conception *probandum*, *probans*, deniable, denial, criticism and all other means of logic may exist empirically. I accept the inference as a proving factor because you have accepted its validity. I for one admit that every thing is possible empirically. Thus my proposition has been proved quite logical and reasonable as there is no room for any criticism against my syllogism stated above.

Then the author in conclusion points out that the *pratītyasamutpannatva* is not the only reason to prove our proposition. There are also other reasons, such as perishability, etc. and they are to be employed as the case may require. After meeting an objection raised by somebody that the eye is substantially real on account of its having definite function and profit, by saying that such reasoning could not be provided with parallel example, the author instructs a yogin as follows:

X. Yogin should meditate that all the other eleven bases, ear, etc. are devoid of their own nature just like the eye-basis and penetrate and enter into the non-substantially of all their natures. Then he should repeat the same process of meditation over all other dharmas, skandha, dhātu, doctrine of dependent origination, *smṛtyupasthāna*, *samyak-pradhāna*, *ṛdhipāda* upto *sarvajñajñāna*, and enter into the non-

substantiality of their natures By virtue of meditation in this manner, the meditator, though entered into non substantiality of all natures, is still deficient in Bhavana, force of meditation So he should repeatedly practice it and acquire the power of meditation Having acquired it in a short time he dispells all impurities, doubts, and ill conceived ideas about the composite elements

A yogin, at the moment of entering into *Adhi mukti*, the sixth of ten stages of a Bodhisattva, feels immense joy As he is far away from any attachment towards the characteristic marks of all the separate composite elements of existence and as he is far from conceiving any idea, during the performance of charity, (1) of the object, donor and receiver, and also (2) of the donor, receiver and the result of charity, he becomes purified in respect of two fold three spheres and acquires immeasurable accumulations of virtues and wisdom Furthermore not being resolved towards any fruit of this world or of that world, worshipping his desired, virtuous and honoured gods, not having any wrong ideas regarding agency of gunas, Ātman, Maheśvara or atoms, he performs charities on a grand scale. It has been pointed out here by giving citations that only the person that is absolutely free from any wrong idea of entities (*bhavadharma*) is capable of walking along the path of Bodhisattvas

Now he should meditate that what is devoid of its own nature is unborn what is unborn is not bound by three limitations of past, present and future, having meditated in a manner that is pure for all three times, and being pure in respect of two fold three spheres, he walks into the Maha Bodhi which is not bound by any limitations of past, present and future

CHAPTER II

I. The author in this chapter seeks to establish non-substantiality of uncomposite things, ether, etc. and therefore takes up the discussion of the second proposition set forth in the second half of the first verse, viz. ·

· Thesis . Uncomposite (*asamskrta*) things are unreal (from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth).

Reason : Because they are non-products,

Example · Just like flower in the sky

After explaining the import of each term in this proposition, the author points out that the above-mentioned argument is not only one ; there are also many others, *akrtakatva*, *akāritratva*, etc ; but the *anutpāda* 'non production' is mentioned as argument by way of particularisation (*upalaksana*)—just as one says 'Guard these curds from crows' with the intention that it should be guarded also from others, cats, rats, etc , because the curds are to be protected in all events.

II. Now Bhāvaviveka commences to meet one by one the objections raised by his opponents, the Vaibhāsikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras, Sānkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas and others

1. The following is the objection made by the Vaibhāsikas : The uncomposite thing is non-substantial, i e a non-entity ; such being your proposition, the ether-base-attainment (*ākāśāyatanasamāpatti*) becomes objectless , in the absence of its object, the ether, how is it possible to say that it exists ? And it has been defined as *anāvrti*, absence of any obstructing element.

The author replies · If you formulate this syllogism : the ether-base-attainment is endowed with a real object, or with a substantial entity, because of this attainment, or

because this attainment has something as its object, just like other attainments or their objects. This syllogism is defective in respect of the homogeneous example, because all other attainments and their objects are declared to be void in as much as they are composite things.

We examined the nature of ether from the standpoint of Absolute Truth. My proposition can be established empirically also. Therefore the positive character of the ether held by the opponent cannot be maintained, since the argument : 'because the attainment has something as the object' has invariably been met with its opposite argument just mentioned.

2. The followers of our sect and of others' sect say this : It follows from your syllogism that whichever is originated is substance. If you contend that a thing originated is also non-substance, then your argument loses its value, as it does not pervade all the homogeneous subjects. This is only an apparent objection, says the author. It may be taken for certain that all non-originated things are non-substances, and not that all the non-substances are non-originated. The reason, *prayatnānantarīyakatva*, is accepted as a valid argument, though it is not present in all homogeneous subjects.

3. Some realistic thinker argues : The ether and flower are both well-known in the world ; hence they are not non-substances though they are not experienced as being associated together. So the proposition cannot be proved with the aid of the example, sky-flower. The author replies that the word, *khapuspa*, should be taken as, a genitive compound, meaning 'a flower pertaining to the ether'. The flower as such being non-existent, the example is not lacking.

The Yogin, by these reasonings, should enter into the

non-substantiality of the ether. The same method of reasoning is to be applied to the non-substantiality of other three uncomposite things, *Pratisankhyānirodha*, etc.

4. The Vaibhāṣikas say : Buddha has declared that there is a destruction by means of knowledge which serves as antedote to the removal of the idea of composite things. If you deny that, you will fall in the contradiction to your own doctrine. The author says : This is not right. The Master has declared so empirically in order to instil in the mind of disciples a feeling of disgust for the composite things and also to kindle a feeling of joy for the uncomposite things. The Master stated the unconditioned Nirvāṇa as existent just in the same manner as he stated that apparitional beings exist. The denial of *Pratisankhyānirodha* is made from the absolute standpoint. The Master has also declared to this effect : I declare as ignorant those who consier the Nirvāṇa as something of a real entity. Thus my denial does not incur any contradiction.

5. The wicked logicians put the objection : Because an uncomposite thing is non-entity, your proposition lacks the subject ; because the sky-flower is also a non-entity, there is no parallel example. Thus your *probandum*, *probans* and instance become defective. This objection is not admissible ; for, the uncomposite things, ether, etc. are empirically accepted as existent by virtue of their talks current in the world.

6. The Vaibhāṣikas again say that *Pratisankhyānirodha* is a real entity, as it serves as object for the path and an antedote to defiling things. No non-entity would do this act. This is also not admissible. If you hold that having a function and being a real entity are concomittant, that concomittance is vitiated in the case

of an apparitional being which possesess some specific function even though it is a non-entity.

7. The Sautrāntikas remark that this syllogism is defective and proving what is already proved. If we say that it is characterised by the absence of some obstructing elements, the said defect will be removed because this character is disputed as such. However, my proposition disproves not only the current notion of its substantiality, but its non-substantiality also.

8. The Tāmraśāṭīyas say that the ether is constituted of some matter in the intermediate space, and it is a composite thing. So your denial of uncomposite thing evolves the defect called *Siddhasādhana*. This theory is incorrect and has already been refuted in the previous chapter.

9. The Vātsīputrīyas agree in many points with the Vaibhāsikas and need not be taken for refutation.

10. The Yogācaras remark that there does not exist another truth upon one truth. Suchness is only the ultimate truth of all things (*dharma*), hence it is proper to say that suchness is trully void, but it is improper to say that it is non-substantial. How can the supramundane and undiscriminative knowledge be reasonably stated to be endowed with an object which is non-substantial? It is not indeed reasonable, says the author. Just as you hold that the supramundane knowledge cannot be stated to be endowed with a non-composite object, so also it cannot be of a composite object. Nor is it logical to conceive suchness as substance. It is hard to prove the substantiality of suchness If you adhere to it, knowledge with it as object cannot be supramundane, because it becomes conditioned in as much as it is endowed with some object just like any other ordinary knowledge. The author cites passages to this effect from some sūtras.

He further points out that suchness is not an ultimate truth in so far as it becomes an object of some knowledge. If you explain it as Sūnya, because it is devoid of something else, its knowledge will be only an ordinary one. So suchness is an end to and suppression of all discriminations, and it is not substantially existing. If you say that suchness is substantially existing, even though it is beyond our common parlance, then you are advocating only the soul theory of Tīrthikas in the modified name of suchness.

II. Some co-religionists and followers of the Small Vehicle remark that all the elements that are brought under twelve bases, both composite and non-composite are indeed substances; because a man realising the four noble truths with sixteen aspects and training himself in the two paths of *darśana* and *bhāvanā*, removes all the defiling elements of three spheres of existence that are removable by means of the path of insight and the path of meditation, and thus becomes free from all kinds of ills. If one does not elucidate that all the elements of existence are only non-substantial, who would give up this delusion and gain this benefit. If you do not accept non-substantiality of all the separate elements of existence, there will be no scope for removing the veil of knowable things, and then our master would have been only partly released.

III. Thus a yogin should penetrate and enter into the non-substantiality of other uncomposite things postulated by Tīrthikas, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, atoms, Supreme Lord, time, quarter, some living beings and others,

1. Now the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa put this objection: According to our conception, three elements are transformed into sky-flower, so it is not a non-entity. In that case you are denied a homogeneous example because

the sky-flower, a real entity goes in contrast with your *probandum*. The author meets the objection by putting these counter-questions : Do you accept the sky-flower as existent or non-existent? If you accept the first alternative, your thesis contradicts the common sense. If you accept the latter, your contention that there is no homogeneous example for my thesis is wrong. Nor is it proper to say that because the three elements are real entities, their product, sky-flower is also a real entity. This will show your low-wittedness !

2. The Sāṅkhyas advocate the following : We do not try to prove that Prakṛti or Puruṣa is experienced by senses; yet we can prove it by means of inference thus : The evolutes are caused by some substance, e. g. some pieces of sandal wood. Similarly they are intended for some enjoyer, because they are enjoyable things. All the enjoyable things are intended for some enjoyer, e. g. prepared food and drink. Thus your proposition goes in contradiction to our common experience.

Now the author replies : If you try to establish your proposition in a general manner, and do not particularise that substance, then it evolves a fallacy of *Siddhasādhana*. If you particularise it and say that it is pleasure-element, etc. there will be no homogeneous example for your proposition. And your argument is also constituted of different matters. So your acceptance of Puruṣa as argument falls to the ground.

3. The Vaiśesikas argue that the signs, breathing etc. are always concomittant with the possessor of signs, because they are signs, just like the sight of smoke. The author meets this in the same manner as in the previous case. He says : If it is meant to prove the possessor in a general way, it incurs *Siddhasādhana*, and if the possessor is qualified as eternal, pervader, etc., there is the absence of homogeneous example.

By the same method of reasoning time, quarter, ether and others are to be disproved

4 Again the Vaiśesikas plead that atoms and mind are uncomposite things Your argument—the lack of origination, cannot be proved by itself If you say that these two things are included in the category of composite things, then the reason to prove non substantiality of things, because of their origination through causes and conditions, becomes unproved for us, your opponent, and hence the sphere for applying non substantiality will be limited The author retorts to these remarks that such defects may be removed, if we accept the mind and atoms as uncomposite things even in the sphere of empirical experience You may prove the mind but not as an uncomposite thing, because it serves as a factor for effecting knowledge just like the material things There are also other reasons to prove its composite nature Similarly atoms are not uncomposite elements, because they serve as productive factors just like any other material cause, e g threads

5 Just as the categories postulated by the Sankhyas and Vaiśesikas are refuted, so also those of the Naked-bodied Tirthikas, etc are to be understood as non substantial by appropriate reasonings

IV Thus Yogin should refute all the objections, and by the aid of rightful inference should penetrate and enter into non substantiality of the uncomposite elements postulated by one's own school of thought as well as by others

Though he has in this manner entered into the principle of non substantiality by virtue of knowledge acquired through learning, he is unable to cut at root the veil of the removables (i e *jñeyavarana*), so he should try to develop the strength of meditation of higher type

1 Then the author explains the method of acquiring the wisdom constituted of meditation

When, again the image of the composite and uncomposite things appears as one aspect before the mind's eye of the yogin, he should suppress it by looking upon it as void of its nature, and thus he enters into its original non substantiality on the plea that all elements of existence are aloof from any nature, and then he gradually enters into the principle of non-duality by dwelling upon things as bereft of any aspect By process of meditation on this model he is able to suppress the image of either composite or uncomposite things in such a way as it will never arise again

Though the yogin does not dwell on it, he *is not yet* absolutely free from flow of consciousness which is stained with a tendency of running towards an object in as much as the discriminative thought of non substantiality, etc are still operating As he is yet not in the possession of unshakable knowledge, he is removed from supramundane undiscriminative knowledge by persistence of discriminative thought In order to remove this handicap he should reason thus when things are void of their own nature, the thought discriminative of non substantiality is also not a real entity, as it has been conditioned by causes like the magically created things Meditating in this manner, he suppresses the thought which discriminates non substantiality etc By suppressing it he avoids the two extreme points of 'void' and 'non void', and no more looks at things in the aspect of voidness etc Then a long passage is cited from the *Sata sahasrika pramaparamita* in support of this statement.

The yogin, when he avoids the two extreme points, moves in the path of moderation This path is termed 'form

less' as it is free from the grasp of composite and non-composite things ; 'matchless' as there is nothing that may be compared with it, 'supportless' because there is neither supporter nor supported, 'imageless', because there persists no image whatever of either composite things or uncomposite things, etc , and it is named also 'consciousless' since no consciousness of any kind is at work there Then follow two citations which reveal the true character of this middle path

Yogin who is trained in avoiding the twin extremes and is walking in the concept of non duality, entertains the thought of non-duality concept Being aware of this also as an obstacle to acquire supramundane undiscriminative knowledge, he suppresses that concept also Therefore he enters into the realisation of never functioning and running-towards an object, and stays in the flow of knowledge which is now in its own nature

2 Though he practises meditation on unperverted non substantiality he should not do it with the sole aim of perceiving it with his mind's eye, now his meditation is called 'absolute object meditation' Then a long passage is cited to substantiate the above idea

3 The Yogācāras determine that the supramundane undiscriminative knowledge is aloof from the grasper and the grasped Yogin keeping up the idea of reality (*dhatu*) in it, should take to meditation

Others critically analysing it declare that such type of knowledge cannot be called extra supramundane knowledge in as much as it is still coloured with the thought of some discrimination A passage is here cited to elicit the true nature of Absolute Truth which forms the wisdom eye, and by this wisdom eye he acquires neither composite nor

uncomposite things. On account of reasoning and scripture yogin should put a stop even to such determination.

The wise men again declare that extra-supramundane knowledge is not in reality an entity, as it is caused by causes like some magically created things. So he should suppress that knowledge too. So also he should suppress that knowledge which destroys the said determination as it is similarly yet defective of its being caught into the idea of an entity.

4. When all such notions are stopped, there arises no further intellection (*pratipatti*) as to the imageless objectivity because of the absence of causes and conditions. No other notion whatever can possibly arise in the absence of intellection. That is called knowledge in accordance with Truth. Some scriptural passages are cited to make the said premises further clear. Then yogin, abiding neither in heart or mind, nor in consciousness or knowledge, is spoken of as a good farer in undiscriminating wisdom. When he fares not being caught in any sphere (of mental activity), he obtains from Tathāgata, well-awakened, the instruction regarding the Truth. A citation from some Sūtra goes to strengthen the statement. Thus wisdom-faring is termed a status of Āryan silence. To make further clear that silence a quotation has been drawn from a Sūtra.

5. (a) When examined through these reasonings and scriptures, all the composite and uncomposite things do not constitute either the mind or wisdom, and again either discriminative thought or undiscriminative thought in its objective nature. For him who knows things in this manner, rays of wisdom-sun dispel all the darkness of ignorance.

(b) The wise, by not grasping the object images of the mind and wisdom, fares in a wisdom undiscriminating, and lacks any sphere of faring, but fares

6 Having explained the above verse in detail, the author describes the nature of the wisdom result : yogin, because of his faring in an undiscriminating wisdom, though not faring fares, and though faring, does not fare He is aloof from thoughts of all objects whatever and abides in an absolute negation of all things just like the ether He, just like one entered into the *samādhi* (or *samapatti*) of complete suppression, views all things in their original nature

Dharma body of Buddhas is unthinkable, unlimited, non dual, abodeless, imageless, unperceivable, etc Thus yogin viewing it, though he sees, does not see in fact ; and though he does not see anything, he sees , and though he is seeing does not see

7 Yogin having taken to a rightful view of things accumulates immense store of merits, and increases the unlimited resultant happiness He is intent solely on self-purification and puts an end to all unhappiness of all beings, and like the *Bhaiṣajyaraja* he abounds in multifarious rightful aspirations

Then the author furnishes in the light of above discussion an interpretation of the Aryan eightfold path It is the rightful view which is correct insight into the norm body of Tathagatas, having no image of *ens* and *non-ens* To suppress all discursive thoughts is rightful thought Rightful speech is to realise inwardly saying that all things are beyond speeches Rightful act is not to commence any act bodily, vocally and mentally To live on that all things are bereft of origination and destruction which are also devoid of

their nature is rightful living. Not to commit oneself to any effort and device on the plea that all things are not brought up by efforts is rightful effort. The rightful memory is an absence of any brooding or reflection of *ens* or *non-ens*, and that all things lack any objectivity for any intellectual perception. The rightful meditation is not to make any resolve this or that way by not grasping all things in all aspects. The man who views in this manner is said to practise the eightfold Aryan Path.

The man who views things thus fulfils also six perfections. Perfection in charity consists in doing away with all objects (*nimitta*) in all aspects, and in removing all defiling elements. Perfection in observing is to suppress all the supporting things of knowledge, and an attention to the attitude of nonperceiving. Non-forbearing any feeling of the knowledge-supporting things is perfection in forbearence. Perfection in energy consists in expelling all movements by not taking or giving up anything. Perfection in meditation is constituted of an absolute negation of abiding anywhere by virtue of lack of attention whatever towards anything. Perfection in wisdom lies in aloofness from the twin images (of *ens* and *non-ens*) and not giving rise to any description of anything. Further detailed exposition of these six perfections is to be found in the Discourse of *Brahmaparipṛcchā*.

The author then concludes : Well abiding in the manner just described becomes the source of 'unbound things' (*apramāna*) as has been stated by Buddha in the Discourse of Unbound Things : These are a great goal, great benefit and immense advantages. So the wise man knowing things in accordance with Truth and being attentive, should take to the course of training.*

* The arrangement into different sections and subsections in this chapter is based on the commentary which will be studied later on in full.

महायानकरतलरत्नम्

[संस्कृतपरीक्षा]

सर्वसत्त्वानामर्थाय समारब्धानुत्तरमहाबोधिप्रणिधानः सन्तत-कृतविविधसद्धितकार्यचारसंक्षुभ्यदुद्धेजन्मतरङ्गमालासंक्षुभितचित्तसन्तानान् मिथ्यादृष्टिजालजटिलतान् संसारपञ्जरपञ्जरितानप्रमाणदुःखदौर्मनस्यविषदिग्धशल्यव्यथितान् लोकान् समवलोक्य भवचरितानि[1] सर्वाणि महाविनिर्मुक्तानि इत्यतः विशुद्धाकाशवत् शान्तसर्वप्रपञ्चं शिवं शान्तं सूक्ष्मं परमार्थसत्यनयमाश्रये[2]। करुणाप्रणिधानपर्यवस्थितचित्तः तद्दुःखसमुदयं द्रष्टुं न क्षमे। स्वपरसन्तानक्लेशहृदयग्रन्थिमुमुक्षया अनिवृत्तिपरिभूते अतिक्रान्तरजोघनचक्रवाले[3] अभ्याशयसुखे विहरन् अपारसंसारमहार्णवे वस्तुं प्रणिहितचेतना [f 16] प्रमाणदुःखस्कन्धनिवृत्तिपरुषवेदनोपनिर्मोक्षे वज्र-सदृशमभङ्गुरं घोषमारभे।

सम्बोधप्रतिवेधाय ईदृशो परीक्षा। लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षात्कारे[4] यत्र हि अनधिगतपूर्वान् सर्वसत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाधिमुक्तिधातुचर्याभेदान् प्रजानाति। स्वपरसन्तानोत्पन्नसर्ववासनानिर्वासनाति दुःखसमुदय-मूलानि क्लेशजालानि ■ भिनत्ति। परार्थञ्च महापुरुषव्रतचर्यादृढसमा-दानप्रणिधानञ्चोत्पादयति। एवं लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षात्काराय सर्व-

---

1 = *Chu yu so hing* Poussin takes the phrase to mean *bhāvacaritas* and compares *Kośa* 1 47 See also Mad vṛtti ■ 523, 8-10

2 Is *naya* "principle", law' etc = *Tathāgatagarbhakāya*, cf Bod. Pañjikā ■ 316 15 This is *phalabhūtā prajñā* Ibid

3 *Yu* 'to pass over', 'get over' "exceed" etc

4 Lit —*jñānam sākṣāt karoti tadā* etc

मिथ्यादृष्टि कामलध्वंसस्य विपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनौषधमवश्यं[5] सञ्चिन्त्य प्रयुञ्ज्यात्। एवमविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनौषधप्रयोगाय सर्वालम्बन-स्वभावापसारिणीं श्रुतमयीं[6] प्रज्ञामाश्रयेत्।

ततः[7] केचित् विपुलग्रन्थार्थनिर्धारिव्याख्याद्वारसमाश्रयेण धर्मता प्रविश्य[8] पुनः पुनः विशिष्ट[9] प्रयोगभावनामारभन्ते। विपुलग्रन्थार्थनिर्धारिव्याख्यायां प्रत्युपस्थमहाश्रमकौसीद्यचित्ता भवन्ति। केचित् पुनः अप्रविष्टधर्मता अपि तीक्ष्णेन्द्रियाः। तेषां [f 2a] सुखेन शून्यतासाक्षात्कारेणाशुधर्मताप्रवेशाय इदं करतलरत्नशास्त्रं संक्षिप्तं विरच्यते॥

तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्या मायावत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात्।
असंस्कृतास्त्वसद्भूता अनुत्पादाः खपुष्पवत्॥

स्वपरपक्षयोस्तर्कविशेषयो यद्यपि बहव परिकल्पिता वादा भवन्ति। तथापि प्रमेया विषयाः संक्षिप्य द्विविधाः संस्कृता असंस्कृता इति। मूढाः परमार्थसत्त्वनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानामविपरीतस्वभावं सम्यगप्रजानन्तो धर्माणां स्वभावविशेषान् मृषा गृहीत्वा विविधमिथ्यादृष्टिजालानि संवर्धयन्ति। यथा लोके पामरश्चित्रकारः[10] भयानकं यक्षपिशाचबिम्बं स्त्रीपुरुषबिम्बं वा रचयित्वा व्याकीर्णनेत्रः [सन्] वस्तुत अस्तीति संक्षुभितमनस्को भवति। वस्तुत्वेन ग्रहणात् स्वयं चकितो भवति। संत्रस्य वा तेषु विषयेषु बहूनि गणनातीतानि विपुलानि विकल्प-

---

5 Or *kāca* = Eye disease

6 The first of three aspects of prajñā effected by *āptopadeśa*, see Sthiramati Triṃśikābhāṣya, p 26 and Haribhadra Abh Āloka, p 392 3

7 Lit *anena-asmāt*

8. *pra viś* "Having entered"

9 Or *viśeṣaprayogabhāvanā* as Poussin suggested

10 Lit *citrācārya* Abh Āloka p 392 · *māyākāra iva* Vigrahavyāvartanī 23 27 with vṛtti : the same simile, *māyākāra* Poussin compares Mahāyānaviṃśaka, (Eastern Bud 1926, 56, 1927, 169).

दृष्टिजालानि उत्पादयति। यदा परमार्थसत्यनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानाम-विपरीतस्वभावं सम्यक् जानन्ति। [f. 2 b] तदा लोके पण्डितचित्रकार-वत् तान् वस्तुस्वभावतोऽस्तीति न गृह्णन्ति। नापि यथोक्तैः संस्कृता-संस्कृतविषयैः विभिन्नमिथ्यादृष्टिजालैः स्वबन्धनेन कौशेयकृमिवत्[11] बध्यन्ते। तदभावात् निर्विकल्पप्रज्ञाप्रवेशः[12] सिध्यति।

इममर्थं विशदतरं संस्कृतं प्रकाशयितुं लौकिकैः विषयेऽस्मिन् विकल्पस्य बहुशः उत्थापितत्वाद् इदं वचनमाह।

तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्या मायावत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात्। इति।

तत्र लौकिकाः सर्वं भावमभ्युपगच्छन्ति। अहमपि संवृतिसदभ्युप-गच्छामि। सांवृतप्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य चाभ्युपगमात् संवृति-सत्यान्तर्गतं चक्षुरादि संस्कृतं गोपालाङ्गनाद्याः सर्वे साधारणं जानन्ति चक्षुरादि संस्कृतं द्रव्यसदिति। अत एवं स्वपक्षाभ्युपगमः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-साधारणज्ञानं मा विरोधीद् इति तत्त्वावच्छिन्ना[13] प्रतिज्ञा। तात्त्विकार्थ-स्वभावस्तत्त्वमुच्यते। तदेव परमार्थसत्यम्। परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्या न संवृतित इति प्रतिज्ञा॥

प्रत्ययसामग्रीसिद्धा भावाः कृतकत्वात्[14] संस्कृता इत्याख्यायन्ते [तानि] एव द्वादशायतनानि विहाय [f 3 a] धर्मायतनैकदेशमात्रम्। आकाशः प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ तथता चात्र पुनर्बहिष्कृताः। परसंमतो मिथ्याप्रतिभासो मायादिसंस्कृतः स शून्य इति चेत् प्रतिज्ञा, सिद्धसाधन-

---

11. Cf. Laṅkāvatāra, 163 (L V P)
12. Lit *aśupraveśacaryā*
13. So also by Haribhadra, Abh Āloka, p 386
14. Or *abhisaṃskṛtatvāt.*

दोषः[15] । यः[16] परपरिकल्पितः संस्कृतः परमार्थतः[17] सत्स्वभावः [स] पक्षः[18] स्थाप्यते । तद्यथा चक्षुरायतनमेकः संस्कृतः परमार्थतो वस्तु वा शून्यं वेति विचार्यते ।

शून्यः निःस्वभावःमिथ्याप्रतिभास[19] इति पर्यायाः । इयं प्रतिज्ञा ।

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः स्त्रीपुरुषाजमृगा मायावस्त्वादयोऽप्रकटिततात्त्विकस्वभावा मायाभासाः ।

[प्रसिद्ध] साध्यसाधनधर्माणः[20] सर्वे संस्कृता साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताः । अतो मायावदिति[21] इत्युच्यते [दृष्टान्तः]। यथासंभवं[22] साध्यसाधनधर्मसाम्यं[23]

---

15 Lit *doṣāt*

16 Lit *yadi*

17. Or, *dravyasan*.

18 Vig vyāvartinī, 29, vṛtti : *yathā tvayoktam bhāvāḥ, tathā mama syāt | na mama kācid asti pratijñā |* So also Dharmapāla comment on Śataśāstravaipulya, VIII, 6 : *bhavatā abhyupagatatvāt sidhyati mama pakṣaḥ.*

19 Or, *vitatha-* or *abhūtapratibhāsa* . Dharmapāla also takes *śūnya, nissvabhāva* and *nairātmya* as synonyms by using expression *nairātmyaśūnya* frequently. Ibid, VIII

20 Here the author seems to hint at the definition of *dṛṣṭānta*, viz. *prasiddhasādhyasādhanadharmavatva* which agrees with one given by a later Naiyāyika Dinakara : *anvayadṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyasādhanobhayavattāniścaya* v Nyāyakośa Cf Abh Āloka p 395 : *dṛṣṭāntaḥ ubhayadharmānugataḥ* Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, V, 26 : *Sādhyasādhanadharmābhyām siddho dṛṣṭānta ucyate |* N Vārtika, 139 (Cal ed.) : *Siddho dṛṣṭānta iṣyate |*

21 Dharmapāla also uses māyā as example in this connection. (Śata vaipu comm ad2) A more logical explanation of *māyopama* is given by Haribhadra Abh Āloka, p 143

22 Lit *yathāyogam*

23 —dṛṣṭānta See Upāyahṛdaya Tucci, [illegible] 5 *dṛṣṭānto dvividhaḥ | sampūrṇo dṛṣṭāntaḥ āṁśikaḍ* The author seems to mean the latter variety here, cp Bhāmaha, V, 24 . . . . *sāmānyād upacaryate |* N. Vārtika, p 122 (Cal. ed.). . . *tat tulyaḥ sa eva iṣyucyate |*

प्रज्ञाप्यते । प्रकृतिसाम्यात्[24] न सर्वे सदृशदृष्टान्तधर्मा दुःसंभवाः[25] संभवेयुः । तद्यथा वदन्ति चन्द्रवत् स्त्रीमुखं चारु इति । न सर्वे दुःसंभवाश्चन्द्रधर्मा मुखे संभवेयुः । श्लोकबन्धमनुसृत्य[26] एतत्सदृशदृष्टान्तकथनस्य एष क्रमः । अनेन श्लोकार्धे संक्षिप्य[27] [कथन] मूलकमित्यतो न दोषः ॥

---

24. *Kia shao tong ku*—Poussin remarks : Je ne vois pas le sense des quatre mots que je saute · *kia chouo tong kou* · parce que nous parlons conventionallement de similitude . ?? Now as I rendered them, there is no difficulty with regard to these characters.

25. =*nan ling na* | *sambhaveyuḥ. pu ko yu* The same repeated in the next sentence. Cf Nyāyabindu II. 9 with Tīkā, where *sapakṣa* is explained almost to this effect.

26 Here Poussin remarks thus : Ici une ligne et demie qui présente des difficultés On peut traduire: *Ślokānubandhārtham sādharmyadṛṣṭanta ucyate* | *evam kramena ślokārdhena mūlasthānasamkṣepa iti na doṣah* | "Pour des raisons metriques, l'exemple pareil est dit [avant l'argument] C'est dans cet ordre [anormal] que, par la demi-strophe, l'essential est résumé , il n'y a donc pas faute"—Le régle est de dire l'argument d'abord, l'exemple ensuite, mais la metrique exige un autre ordre

According to the N Sūtra V. 2, 11 (*avayavaviparyāso vacanam aprāptakālam*) to formulate syllogism in an order other the fixed one entails a *nigrahasthāna* called *aprāptakāla* This is the reason why the author takes pains to justify it . Note Udyotakara's remarks here : *Śāstravākyāni arthasañgrahārtham upādīyante* | etc which intend to insist on the necessity of the fixed order of syllogism. Our author appears to refer to some such remarks of an earlier author in the sentence : *anena , . . na doṣaḥ* |

27. *Lit. saṅkṣepamūlāspadam.*

[f. 1 b] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः साध्यधर्मो। इदं स्थापयितुं हेतुरुच्यते प्रत्ययोद्भवाद्[28] इति। हेत्वादिप्रत्ययैः सम्भूय जायमानत्वात् प्रतीत्य-समुत्पन्न इति नाम्ना उच्यते। [यः] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः [स] प्रत्ययाभिव्यक्तः[29]।

विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय[30] वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः स्थाप्यते। विपक्षाभावात् प्रति-

---

28 Nāgārjuna establishes *Śūnyatā* on the argument of *nissvabhāvatva*, Vig vyāvartini 1 21, 22 Haribhadra uses as reason *ekānekasvabhāvarahitatva*, Abh Āloka, p 394 However on p 556 he adopts a similar *prayoga* as herein which may be worth notice here :

ये प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्ना एते परमार्थतोऽविचाररमणीयाः। तद्यथा मायाकारनिर्मिताः करभादयः। तथा चामी सर्वे रूपादयो भावा इति स्वभावहेतु। यथादर्शनं प्रतीत्योत्पाददर्शनान्नासिद्धो हेतुः। सपक्षे भावान्न विरुद्ध। पूर्वप्रबन्धेन (p. 385) विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणादर्शनात् अनैकान्तिकश्च न भवति।

29. The author has made some distinction between *abhivyakti* and *vikāra* of *kārya* on f 13b below. But here we find *utpatti* and *abhivyakti* as synonyms I doubt concetness of the Chinese text here

[30] Lit *vipakṣapratiṣedhāya* cf Pramāṇavārtika vṛtti, III, 18 · *vaidharmyavacanena vipakṣe hetvabhāvah kathyate* । Poussin has made these remarks · Le sense de l'expression *tcho yi p'in, vipakṣapratiṣedha* (?) [Dans Tucci's Index, Pre Diṅnāga, *pratiṣedha* est traduit en Tibetain par l'equivalent de *asattva*] est determine par notre texte, 269 3,3 Meme expression 274.2 [?] qui n'est pas clair.

According to Dharmottara *pratiṣedha* is an equivalent of *abhāva*, his comment on Nyāyabindu, II, 19 But *vipakṣapratiṣedha* on f. 6a (Chin) below must be taken into *vipakṣe hetupratiṣedha*, not *pratiṣedha* of *vipakṣa* itself

पेक्षार्थः सिद्ध इति नोच्यते[31]। विवादकाले[32] प्रज्ञप्त्या विपक्षमुक्त्या अनुमान-व्यवस्थापनेऽपि नास्ति दोषः।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते। उच्यते। चक्षुरायतनं तत्त्वतःस्वभाव-शून्यम्। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः सर्वेऽपि तत्त्वतः स्वभाव-शून्या इति आगोपालाङ्गनाजनानामपि[33] ज्ञातम्।

यथा कश्चिद्विशिष्टमन्त्रौषधिबलाधिष्ठितैः[34] तृणवृक्षमृत्पिण्डादि-पदार्थैः प्रत्यक्षदृश्यानि स्त्रीपुरुषहस्त्यश्वराजकुलारामनगरजलाशयादि-लक्षणानि मूढजनमोहनानि नानामायावस्तूनि सृजति। यदि तेषां स्वभावः कश्चित् वस्तुसन्, न विपर्ययः स्यात्। अतो भगवानाह। सर्वे धर्माः अचक्षुर्दृश्यस्वभावाः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः निःस्वभावाः। यः पण्डितः[35] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं पश्यति स धर्मतां पश्यति। यः पश्यति धर्मतां [f 4a] स पश्यति शून्यताम्। यः पश्यति शून्यताम् स पश्यति बुद्धम्[36]। अथावोचत।

---

31. Dignāga Nyāyamukha ad 5 : *yadi anitya iti pakṣaḥ | ākāśādyasattva vādinam prati nāsti vipakṣaḥ | yadi nāsti saḥ | tatra na vartate iti sutarām asandigdha ityadoṣaḥ* (Sanskrit is mine) Tucci, Eng trans p 27 Pra vārtika III 25 *Tadabhāve ca tanneti vacanādapi tadgatiḥ |* Vṛtti *avastuni tu vastusattā virudhyate nivṛttis tu yuktā | ataḥ sa dharmiṇam antareṇāpi tanmātrato'pi gamyata eva |* Ślokavār, Nirālam 27 *Vipakṣābhāvatastasmāt vyatireko na kathyate |* Haribhadra, Abh Āloka p 385 makes clear how the reason is not *sandigdhavyatireka* in the absence of *vipakṣa* Vyaktiviveka Kasi ed p 395

32 Nāgārjuna distinguishes *vigrahakāla* and *vyākhyānakāla*, Mad. IV, 8 9

33 M Vṛtti pp 260 14, 418 12 Madhyamakāvatāra, my Skt text p 22 Abh Āloka p 387

34 Read in Chinese *pei* (R 145) for *pi* (R 60) as in p 11b, l 2

35 =*Jñānin*

36 Śālistambasūtra my Sans text, p 2 cited also in Vig vyāvartinī, 22, *ad* 55, M vṛtti, p 160

यः प्रत्ययै र्जायति स ह्यजातो न तस्य उत्पादु स्वभावतोऽस्ति ।
यः प्रत्ययाधीनु स शून्य उक्तो यः शून्यतां पश्यति सोऽप्रमत्तः[37] ॥ इति अत्र सर्वे अशून्यवादिनो दूषणमाहुः । सर्वे संस्कृताः शून्या इति यदि साध्यते तदा रूपादिर्न स्यात् । शशशृङ्गालम्बनप्रत्यक्षज्ञानोत्पत्तेर्न्यायतो-ऽसिद्धिवत् रूपाद्यालम्बनाकारप्रत्यक्षबुद्धिरपि[38] नोत्पद्येत । स तु वस्तुसन् इति प्रत्येकमनुभूयते । तस्मात् तत्र पक्षः धर्मताविलोमकः[39] प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-बाधदुष्टः साधारणप्रतीतिबाधदुष्टश्च[40] । सर्वैर्गोपालादिभिः सर्वं भासमानं चक्षुरादिरूपं नास्तीत्यपहारात् ।

पण्डितैः पक्षपातविष[41] मुत्सृज्य तटस्थमतिभिः सञ्चिन्तनीयम्-मम प्रतिज्ञा किं स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणबाधिका किं वा परसन्तानोत्पन्न-प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणबाधिका । [f 4b] यदि स्वसन्तानोत्पन्न प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणबाधिका । प्रत्यक्षबुद्धयः परमार्थतः स्वभावशून्याः, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् अवस्तुप्रत्यक्ष-स्वप्नप्रत्यक्षबुद्धिवत् । अतो मम प्रतिज्ञा न स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षबाधिका ।

---

37 This semi prakrit verse from the Anavataptahṛdaya (Nanjio No 437) is cited by Candrakīrti in his M. Vṛtti pp 239, 491, 500 504 (*svabhāvānutpattim sandhāya sarvadharmāḥ śūnyāḥ*) in the M. Avatāra p 229 in Catuḥśataka (Vidhuśekhara) p 294 Bodhicaryāvatāra IX, 2 and Subhāṣita sangraha, fol 23 (Le Muséon) (L. V P). Some similar verse from a Sāstra is also cited by Maitreya in his comment on Bhava Sankrānti, p 37 with notes Poussin further points out that in the above ver second *pāda* reads according to Tib *utpāda-svabhāvatā sti* meaning that which is not originated by causes is *utpattinisvabhāva*

38 Skt = *ābhāsa*, also *ākāra*, the latter term is more suitable here

39 Bod pañjikā, p 431 *dharmatāṁ ca na vilomayati tad Buddha-vacanam*

40 Haribhadra also raises some similar three fold *bādhā* to this proposition · (1) *Pratyakṣabādhā*, (2) *Anumānabādhā*, (3) *Pratītibādhā*. Abh Aloka p 387.

41 Lit *pakṣagrahana*

यदुच्यते परसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षबाधिकेति। अविशुद्धचक्षुष्कस्य[42] त [च] क्षुप्रतिभासः—[यथा] तैमिरिकस्य दृष्टोऽसत्केशोण्डुकचन्द्र [द्वया] दिमिथ्याप्रतिभासः प्रत्यक्षं बाधते इति न्यायतो युज्यते। अतो न मम प्रतिज्ञा परसंतानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षबाधिकापि।

यदि सामान्यत उच्यते यथा मूढजनादिसर्वव्यवहारोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षमिति। इदं सांवृतं न बाध्यते इति न बाधप्रसङ्गः[43]। साधारणप्रतीतिबाधदुष्ट इति वचनमपि न युक्तम्।

यदुच्यते स्वशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इति। [तदपि] न न्याय्यम्। स्वशास्त्रसंमतत्वात्, स्वशास्त्रविरोधे स्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधेऽपि नैव साधारणप्रतीतिविरोधदोषः।

परशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इत्युच्यते चेत् [5a] न युक्तम्। सर्वशास्त्राणां परसाधारणज्ञाननिराकरणार्थत्वात्।

गवाजपालादिसाधारणप्रतीतिविरोध इति चेत् तदपि न न्याय्यम्। जिनौरसाः साधयन्ति क्षणिकाः[44] सर्वसंस्काराः अनात्मका निःस्वभावाश्च सर्वधर्माः इति। वैशेषिकाः[45]—द्रव्यभिन्नो रूपादिः भावभेदो द्रव्यादिरिति॥ साङ्ख्याः—बुद्धिरचेतना, निष्क्रमसत्त्वञ्च सर्वं द्रव्यसदिति। एवमादिप्रकारेण सविस्तरं स्वपक्षप्रतिपादनं सयुक्तिकमपि साधारणज्ञानबाधकं नाम

---

42 It appears that Poussin's text differs from ours, since he has translated *vismṛta* for *aviśuddha*.

43 The same reply in Abh Āloka, p 888 Note on p 68 the verse :

निर्भासते हि यद्रूपं नैव तत्प्रतिषिध्यते। विद्यमानस्य नो युक्तं क्वचित् प्रतिषेधनम्॥ इति न्यायात्।

44. Lit *kṣaṇaniruddha*.

45 Poussin translates : rūpas etc sont des espèces de dravya. Les dravyas, etc. sont des espèces des bhāva. They say that *rūpa* is a separate category. So I put it accordingly.

वक्तव्यम्। तथा तु नाभ्युपगम्यते। नह्यत्र परमार्थसत्यत धर्माणां परीक्षा आगोपालादिसाधारणानुबन्धिनो[46]। प्रतिज्ञायाश्च परमार्थसत्यावच्छेदस्य साधितत्वान्न यथोक्तविरोधदोषप्रसङ्ग। ततश्च नास्ति स्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोष[47] ॥

अन्य पुनराह। परमार्थतश्चक्षुरायतन शून्यमिति स्वभावशून्यतावादिनो धर्मी न सिध्यतीति पक्षदोष। आश्रयो न सिध्यतीति हेतुदोषश्चेति। एतन्न युज्यते। आगोपालादि [5b] [जन] साधारणप्रतीतिप्रसिद्ध-चक्षुरादिसामान्यस्य पक्षत्वात् तद्धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोक्तत्वात् धर्म्यसिद्धिपक्ष-दोषाभासोऽयम्। आश्रयासिद्धिहेतुदोषाभासश्च ॥

अत्रन्नैयायिका इदं दूषण कुर्वन्ति। यदि चक्षुरादि परमार्थत शून्यम्, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वाद् इति। चक्षुरादीनां शून्यत्वे कथ प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वम्। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वे कथं शून्यत्वम्। एव प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधात् पुन प्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोष[48] सिद्ध।

एतत्प्रतिज्ञादोषव्युत्थाने[49] प्रयोग हेतो साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभावम् असिद्धि-

---

46 Cp Candrakirti s remarks *Tattvavicārakāle tu lokasya apramānatvāt na tena bādhā śakyate kartum* M vrtti p 153 13

47 Ibid p 27 7ff where this argument has been criticised by Candrakirti

48 See N Sūtra V 2 4 N Vārtika *ad* 1 2 6 Kumārila raises this objection against Vijñānavādin Slokav Nirālam 154 5 with comment p 254

49 This is an obvious reference to Diṅnāga who holds the same view Nyāyamukha ad 1 Tucci p 8 All three commentators on Slokav *attribute this prayoga to* Sānkhyas and its criticism to Buddhists ie Diṅnāga See Nirālam 154 5 It is sometimes attributed to Śābdikas Tucci Nyāyamukha n 12 A long discussion on this *prayoga* see Pram Vārtika IV 173 188 with vrtti pp 475 481

दोषं वा ख्यापयति। यथा शब्दः नित्यः सर्वानित्यत्वात् इति। अयं प्रयोगः "असर्वत्वादिति हेतुं ख्यापयन् (न) प्रत्याययति[50] हेतोरसिद्धिदोषम्। शब्दस्य सर्वस्मिन् संग्रहात्[51]। समदृष्टान्तोऽपि [वा] नास्ति कतमन् नित्यम-सर्वञ्चेति। इति।

नैतद् युज्यते। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतोः मायावदिति दृष्टान्तस्य च सर्वसाधारणं ज्ञातत्वात् हेतुदृष्टान्तौ सिद्धौ। तस्मात् भवतां दूषणं न विदुषां मनस्तर्पयेत्॥

[6a] स्वभाववादिनः पुनर्दूषणमाहुः। भवता प्रत्येतव्यं [यत्] चक्षु-रिन्द्रियं सस्वभावं सकारित्वात्। निःस्वभावा न सकारित्रा यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः। चक्षुश्च सकारित्रं चक्षुर्विज्ञानजनकम्। यथोक्तसकारित्रत्व-हेतुना चक्षुस्सस्वभावं निश्चीयत इति। यदीदं साधयति सं यः विना शिक्षां सिद्धः गवाजपलादिमतिज्ञातः स्वभावः, संवृतितः साधयति चक्षुरादिसंस्कृतं सस्वभावमिति। तत्र सिद्धसाधनम्। यदि परमार्थतः, नास्ति साधर्म्य-दृष्टान्तः। केवलं विपक्षप्रतिषेधेन स्वार्थसिद्धिर्न युज्यते। यथा नित्य-शब्दवादिनो वदन्ति—शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात्। घटादिरनित्यः अश्रावणः, शब्दस्तु श्रावणत्वात् नित्यस्वभाव इति। तथापि लोकसाधारण्येन ज्ञाते समदृष्टान्ते सन् कृतकत्वादिति विरुद्धहेतुः साधयति चक्षुरादि सर्वं लोक-व्यवहारसंगृहीतस्वभावमिति॥

50 *ming liao* Poussin says that the phrase is normally *pațu* v. Kośa, XXII, 362, XX, 10a 2, Siddhi, IV, 17b 7, 20b 5. But I have put it *pratyāyaya*, or *prakāśaya*, which is also met with a Chin texts. Our Chinese text adds here a negative particle *pu*, before *ming liao* which is unnecessary and incorrect. It appears Poussin's text does not have it

51 Diṅnāga adds : *sādhyaikadeśatvāt asiddhir nāma hetudoṣaḥ*।

अन्ये[52] पुनर्दूषणमाहु । सस्कृता शून्या इति हेतुं वा दृष्टान्तं वा [सर्वं] अन्तर्भावयति तुल्यजातीयत्वात् [6b] इत्यनुमानन्यूनतादोष[53] इति । श्लोकेऽस्मिन् प्रमाणफले[54] सामान्यत उक्ते । परीक्षायां[55] प्रमाणे साध्यमाने ■ चक्षुरादि एकैक पक्ष पृथक् स्थाप्यते । अतो नाय दोष । सर्वसस्कृतस्य पक्षत्वेन सामान्यत स्थापनेऽपि नाय दोष । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतुरुभयपक्षसम्मत इति नासिद्ध । यत्तूच्यते चक्षु शून्यं स्वभावशून्यत्वादिति [55a] [तदा]

---

52 Poussin has noted that the following objections have been put by Buddha himself Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 166 167 Le Bodhisattva ne doit pas établir la proposition (*pratijñā*) Tous les dharmas sont non produits vides sans nature propre (*anutpanna śūnya asvabhāva*) Il y aurait *pratijñāhāni* car le proposition fait partie de tous les dharmas car la proposition a pour raison d etre les dharmas Le Bodhisattva doit enseigner que les dharmas existent á la maniere des mag ■ et des reves (*māyāsvapnavad bhāvopadeśa*) Cp Bod avatāra IX 139 141 Grousset *Philosophies Indiennes* 263 278 298 Garbe *Sāṅkhya-philosophie* 203 (ad 1 44 47 refutation des Mādhyamikas) etc

53 *nyūnatā* a nigrahasthāna N Sūtra V 2 12

54 = *yathādarśanam*

55 An answer to the above objection seems to be this Though the distinction between the source of knowledge and its result ■ not possible for the advocate of *Sarvaśūnyatā* yet it may be possible if we take things in general as current in common parlance Such distinction can be made when we are engaged in a logical discussion and in assertaining the source of knowledge The author has stated more than once that things should be taken into account in their general sense as current in the world when one is to formulate syllogism see p 42 1 above *ad* and 11*b* 12*b* below We may read profitably here Kumārila s l ne *sāmānyasya ca hetutvam na syāt pakṣaikadeśitā* l (Ślokav Nirālam 27) with Kāśikā

55*a* As stated in Vig vyāvartanī , see note 28 above

अस्य यथोक्तहेतोरसिद्धिःस्यात्। नापि दृष्टान्तो नास्तीति। मायादे- [दृष्टान्तस्य] सत्त्वात्। यदि यथोक्तं दृष्टान्ते साधयितुं मायादिः पक्षः स्वीक्रियते। तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषगौरवं स्यात्॥

केचिदन्यथा इदं दूषणमाहुः। सर्वं संस्कृतं स्वभावशून्यमिति यदि स्थाप्यते। हेतोः संस्कृतत्वात् तत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्यः। तदा हेतुरसिद्धि-दोषवानिति। अयमसिध्याभासः न तात्त्विकासिद्धिः। यथा जिनपुत्राः साधयन्ति सर्वसंस्कारा निरात्मकाः सहेतुकत्वादिति[56]। अयं हेतुः संस्कारे-ष्वन्तर्भूतः निरात्मकत्वाच्च असिद्धिदोषवान् इति दूषणमस्त्येव।

सांख्याः पुनःस्थापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वरजस्तमस्स्वभावाः चेतनभिन्नत्वात्[56a] इति। अयं हेतुर्व्यक्तेष्वन्तर्भूतः [7a] सत्त्वादिस्वभाववत्त्वाच्च असिद्धि-दोषवानिति अस्त्येव दूषणम्।

वैशेषिका अपि स्थापयन्ति शब्दः अनित्यः कृतकत्वादिति [अत्रापि] अयं हेतुः शब्दप्रयोगात्मकः अनित्यत्वाच्चासिद्धिदोषवानिति दूषणमस्ति। एवमादिप्रकारेण प्रतिवादिनः महतापि यत्नेन वादिनि दोषं स्थापयितुं यतन्ते। यथोक्तन्यायो नास्मत्तं परवादं भङ्क्तुं शक्नोति। अस्ति चेदयं न्यायः, कुत्र कः स्थापयेदनुमानं स्वाभीष्टमुक्तयुक्तिभञ्जकम्॥

पुन केचिद्दूषणमाहुः। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादित्ययं हेतुर्न साध्यार्थं साध-यितुं शक्नोति। स्वभावशून्यत्वात्। वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवदिति। अयं हेतुः[57]स्वतोऽसिद्धिदोषवान्। यत्तूच्यते परपक्षाभ्युपगतो हेतुर्भवतीति। तदपि न युज्यते। परपक्षत उक्तस्य स्वभावशून्यत्वादित्यस्य[58] कोऽर्थः।

---

56. *Nāstiha sattva ātmā vā dharmāstvete sahetukāḥ* | cited in Vimśikā bhāṣya, p 5, M. vṛtti, p 355, 4

56a. The same *prayoga* is mentioned in Pram. vār. vṛtti *ad* III, 186, p 353.

57. = *svapakṣataḥ.*

58. Lit. *avasthitārthaḥ*

यद्यविद्यमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः [तदा] नास्ति हेतोरसिद्धिः । [हेतोरेव] अविद्यमानत्वात् । यदि मिथ्याप्रतिभासमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः । तदा वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दस्यात्यन्तमसत्त्वाद् अयं दृष्टान्तः [7 b] साधनधर्मविकलः । निर्मितशब्देनानैकान्तिकदोषश्च । स हि अप्रमाणानां सत्त्वानां शिक्षकः हितकरत्वात् । किञ्च न परपक्षमात्रसम्मतो[59a] हेतुः परपक्षासंमतहेतुवत् साध्यं साधयति अन्यतरासिद्धत्वात् । विरुद्धानुमानबाधितत्वाद् अतिप्रसङ्गदोषानुगतत्वाच्च[59] ।

यथा साध्यते[60] प्रज्ञादयो न चित्तसंप्रयुक्ताः संस्कारस्कन्धान्तर्भावात् नामकायादिवत् । आकाशादयोऽनित्या गुणाश्रयत्वात् पृथिव्यादिवत् । आत्मा अचेतन अप्रकाशवृत्तित्वात् प्रधानवद् इति । सर्वपक्षविनाश्ययं प्रकारो दोषानुपाती । अत उभयपक्षसम्मतो[61] हेतुरास्थेय इति स्थितम् । अनेन न्यायेन यथोक्तो दोषो न प्रसज्यते ॥

अन्यः पुनरसन्नैयायिकः पक्षदोषमाविष्कुर्वन्नाह । यदि स्वभावशून्यं साध्यं, साधनं न सिध्यति वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवत् । साधनं [8 a] संस्कृतेऽन्तर्भूतमिति तत्साध्यसमं स्वभावशून्यम् । सर्वशून्यत्वात् साध्यं साधनं सर्वं न सिद्धम् इति । [यदेव] साध्यसाधनधर्मनिराकरणं तदेव धर्मिस्वलक्षणनिराकरणमिति पक्षदोष आविष्कृतः । तस्य[62] हेतोः स्वपरयोरसिद्धत्वात्, अनैकान्तिकत्वात्, दृष्टान्तदोषात् समनन्तरपूर्वोक्तवच्च न

58a Cf Pramā vārtika, IV, 1-2 with vṛtti

59. Lit *Mahādoṣa*

60. This *prayoga* seems to have been made by Sautrāntikas

61. Theory of Dinnāga, Nyāyamukha *ad* [illegible], Pramāṇav vṛtti p 293, n [illegible], M vṛtti p 35 n 2

62 This refers to *svabhāvaśūngatva* mentioned in the previous section.

युज्यते [इदं दूषणम्] । इदं [दूषण] प्रमाणान्तरमपि न स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहते ॥

अन्य. पुनः प्रयोगान्तरमभ्युपगम्य स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहमान एवमाह । परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्या इत्युक्तप्रतिज्ञावचनस्य कोऽर्थः[63] । यदि परमार्थतः सर्वेऽपि संस्कृताः अभावद्रव्याणि[64] इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः । इदं वचनमपि पुनः संस्कृतेऽन्तर्भावात् संस्कृतसममभावद्रव्यं स्यात् । इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थमनस्तीति स्ववचनविरोधो नाम पक्षदोषः । यथा सर्वमुक्तं मृषा[64a] इति साधनम् । यदि तत्त्वतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा[65] [8b] इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः । तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवाद. । एवं च साध्यं मिथ्यादृष्टिपतनम् । इति ।

अत्र यथोक्तम् ।

आत्मा हि आत्मनो नाथः को नु नाथः परो भवेत् ।
आत्मना हि सुदान्तेन स्वर्गं प्राप्नोति पण्डित.[66] ॥ इति ।

तत् व्यवहारतश्चित्तमात्मा[67] इत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु नैरात्म्यं साध्यते

---

63 Lit *artho na jñātaḥ*

64 Or *asad bhūtāḥ* Some similar objection by Udyotakara, N. vārtika, p 481

64a Cf Nyāyamukha *ad ver* I.

65 Or *atyantāvidyamāna pu-wu so-yu*

66 Quoted in Bod Pañjikā p 489 (*Gāthāyām uktam*) Poussin compares Dhammapada, 160, Udānavagga XXIII, Kośa, I 74. See M. vṛtti, 354, along with one more verse to the same effect, ie proving the existence of an empirical soul even for Buddhists

67 Cp Bod Pañjikā p 481 · *cittam evāhankārāsrītatayā asyātmopadeśena uktam*

इति न स्ववचनविरोध प्रतिज्ञादोष । इदमप्येवम् । सांवृतस्वभावत अक्षरादिकमस्तीत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु तच्छून्यं साध्यते । अतो नास्ति दोषः ।

किञ्च यथोक्तम् । सर्वे उत्पत्तिधर्माणो मरणप्रतिशरणा इति । मुनिनोक्तं न मृषा । आभ्यन्तरं बाह्यं ह्युत्पन्नं मरणप्रतिशरणं युज्यते, अव्यभिचारित्वात्[69] । सा साध्यप्रतिज्ञा स्वप्रत्यायिकापि मरणप्रतिशरणा इत्यभ्युपगमात् नास्ति स्ववचनविरोध. प्रतिज्ञादोष । एवमिदमपि । परमार्थत संस्कृताः शून्याः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञावचनं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं सत् स्वभावशून्यं[69] युज्यते अव्यभिचारित्वात् । इदं प्रतिज्ञावचनं स्वप्रत्यायकमपि स्वभावशून्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् न स्वयं [९a] प्रतिज्ञाभङ्गदोषः ॥

यथा ब्राह्मण आह । सर्वं भगवन मे न क्षमते[70] इति । भगवानाह । इदं वस्तु ब्राह्मण ते क्षमते न वा । अत्र ब्राह्मण आह इदं [चेत] वस्तु क्षमते [तदपि] सर्वं मे न क्षमत इति । तद्वचन [71]स्वप्रतिज्ञातवस्तुविरोधीति स्वोक्तबाधदोषो भवेत् । न तु सवत्रायं दोषोऽस्ति ।

अन्यत्र चाह भगवान् । अनात्मकाः[72] सर्वसंस्कारा इति । पुनरन्यत्राह । अनित्या. सर्वसंस्कारा उत्पादव्ययधर्मिण[72a] इति । तथा नो चेत् बुद्धोऽपि संस्कारान् "अनात्मका" "अनित्या" इति वदन् यथोक्तदोषवान् स्यात् । न [illegible] स दोषोऽस्ति । यथा संस्काराणामात्मत्वनित्यत्वप्रतिषेधकं प्रतिज्ञावचनं[73] तद्वदेवानात्मकमनित्यम् इत्यधात । एवमिदं संस्कृताः शून्या

---

68 *pu hsiang li* : Poussin has suggested *avyāvṛtta* for this.

69 See Vig vyāvartanī, *ad* 22 for similar answer

70 M Nikāya, Vol I Dighanakha Sutta p 497. ll 8 10.

71 Or abhyupagata = *so hsü*

72 *Anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ styāgamāt* M vṛtti p 65, 9, M. Sutrālaṅkāra XVIII. 101

72a Cited in M vṛtti, p. 39 11

73 *tung pi* = *tatsama*

इत्यभिधायकं प्रतिज्ञावचनमपि स्वभावशून्यमिष्टम्। तत्तु स्वाभ्युपगतार्थमनुकूलयेत्[74]। तस्मात् भवदुक्तः "इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थं भिनत्ति" इत्ययं हेतुरसिद्धः॥

किञ्च यथा साङ्ख्याः स्थापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वादिस्वभावा इति। व्यक्तं सत्त्वादिस्वभावञ्चेत्, प्रतिज्ञावचनेना [9 b] पि तत्सत्त्वादिस्वभावेन भवितव्यम्। साध्यप्रतिज्ञावचनं न तत्स्वभावञ्चेत्, व्यक्तमपि तत्स्वभावं न स्यात्। इति दूषणे सत्यपि प्रतिज्ञा नैवं दुष्टा। यथा संस्कृता अनित्या अनात्मका इति साधनं न तथोक्तप्रतिज्ञादोषवत्। एवमिदमपि नोक्तदोषवत्। इत्याशयस्य इष्टत्वात्।

किञ्च स वादी साध्यमप्रसाध्य पुनर्दूषणमाह। यदि परमार्थतः संस्कृता अवस्तूनि, 'उक्तं संस्कृतावस्तुत्ववचनमपि अवस्तु स्यात्। इति। इदं दूषणं न स्वपक्षदोषमपाकरोति। किन्तु मिथ्या वदसि परपक्षः तथादुष्ट[75] इति। यथा लोके कश्चिन्मुग्धस्तेन आवृतस्तस्मेक्षिक आत्मशोधनासमर्थः परस्मिन् दोषमारोपयितुं युक्तिं स्थापयति त्वमपि स्तेन इति वदति। नायं परीक्षोचितो ग्रन्थः॥

अपि चोक्तं तेन। यदि तत्त्वतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः। तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवादः। एवञ्च साध्यं मिथ्यादृष्टिपतनमिति[76]। तत्र प्रतिज्ञार्थः यथा पूर्वं विस्तरश उक्तः शून्यश्च निस्स्वभावः-मिथ्याप्रतिभास इति पर्यायाः[77] इति। न सर्वथा [10a] पि नास्तीत्यपोद्यते। तस्माच्च भवतैवं दूषणं कार्यम्॥

अन्ये पुनः केचिदाचार्याः प्राज्ञंमन्याः इदं दूषणमाहुः। यदि परमार्थतः

---

74 Vig. *vyāvartanī*. p. 11. *ad* 22

75. This is a kind of *nigrahasthāna* called *matānujñā*, N. Sūtra. V, 2, 20, with Bhāṣya. N. Kośa

76. See p. 48 above, the second alternative under *pratyārtha*.

77. See p. 36 above.

संस्कृताः मायादिवत् शून्याः निस्स्वभावाः, तदा न सन्ति। असत्त्व-स्वीकारात् सुतरामभावदृष्टिर्भवति। इति। ते स्वपक्षदोषप्रच्छादनेच्छया अपवादं नाटयन्ति उभयोर्दुष्टत्वेऽपि मा शून्यवादिनः साध्यं प्रमाणेन सिध्यतु इति। परमार्थसत्यापवादस्य अविदुष्टत्वात्। इदं नास्तीति वचनं प्रसक्तार्थप्रतिषेधकम्[78]। तद्वचनं विधिप्रधानं गृह्णासि। अहन्तु वदामि प्रतिषेधप्रधानमिदं वचनम्। अस्य नास्तीति वचनस्य केवलसत्ताप्रतिषेधेन शक्तिरवसिता, नार्थान्तरप्रकाशनव्यापारः। यथा लोक आह। नास्ति शुक्लः पट इति। न ग्राह्यमिदं वचनं कृष्णं पटं प्रकाशयतीति। [येन] वक्तुः प्रतिज्ञादोषं कुर्यात्[79]। नास्ति शुक्लः पटः इति वचनस्य शुक्लपटप्रतिषेधेनैव शक्तिरवसिता, नास्ति व्यापारान्तरं कृष्णपटं रक्तपटं नीलपटं वा प्रकाशयितुम् ॥

शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् परमार्थतः संस्कृतधातौ शाश्वतदृष्ट्यन्तपरिहाराय [10ᵇ] भावस्वभावः प्रतिषिध्यते। एवमन्यत्र उच्छेददृष्ट्यन्तपरिहाराय[80] अभावस्वभावस्य प्रतिषेधः। अन्तद्वयपरिहाराय च भावाभावस्वभावौ युगपत्प्रतिषिध्येते। अवशिष्टमिथ्याग्रहदोषपरिहाराय यावत् सर्वचित्तगोचराः प्रतिषिध्यन्ते। यदा गोचरा निरुद्धाः, चित्तं समनुनिरुध्यते।

अन्यत्राह [भगवान्] आनन्दम्। यदा भावस्वभावग्रहः तदा शाश्वतान्तपातः। यदा अभावस्वभावग्रहः तदा उच्छेदान्तपातः। एवमन्यत्राह काश्यपम्। अस्तीति [काश्यप] अयमेकोऽन्तः, नास्तीति

78 Or abhilapita = prasajyapratiṣedha The same is repeated in the Chap. II, f. 7b, l 10. Cf. M. vṛtti, p 393, 10-13 :

na vayam asyāsattvam pratipādayāmaḥ l
kim tarhi, paraparikalpitam sattvam asya nirākurmaḥ l etc.

79. Or vaktari pratijñādoṣakaram...vacanam. l

80. Cf. M. vṛtti, p 427, 10 : Tataśca bhāvābhyupagame sati sa eva śāśvatocchedaprasaṅgo durnivāro bhavatām...l

[काश्यप] अयं[81] द्वितीयोऽन्तः । एवमाद्यागमात् उक्तवदुन्यायाच्च मम प्रतिज्ञा यथादूषितमभावदृष्टिदोषगन्ध [मपि] न स्पृशति ॥

केचित् [अन्ये] स्वपक्षे न्यायदूषणसमुदायमविभाव्य[82] निपुणमाच्छादयन्तः पुनरेतद्वदन्ति । स्वभावशून्यतावादी नित्यमविकल्पज्ञानं[83] प्रार्थयमानोऽपि सदा विकल्पयति सर्वे संस्कृता असंस्कृताः स्वभावशून्या इति । एवं परिकल्पितमिथ्याविकल्पस्थापनेन स्वेष्टप्रतिज्ञां हन्तीति । ईदृशस्यापि [दूषणस्य] प्रतिषेधाभासोऽयं दोषः ॥

[11ᵃ] अन्ये पुनराहुः उक्तः शून्यहेतुः यदि वा संवृतितः अथवा परमार्थतः स्वतः परतश्च हेतुरसिद्धः[84] । इति । उभयपक्षसाधारणाभ्युपगतः उत्पत्तिविशेषणसामान्यलक्षणधर्मगुणेन[85] हेतुरिति नैयायिकैरभ्युपगतत्वात् भवता साधितं दूषणमसिद्धिदोषाभासः[86] न सांख्यकासिद्धिः । यथा वैशेषिकाः साधयन्ति शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । शब्दनित्यत्ववादी तं दुष्टं वदन् हेत्वर्थं विकल्पयति कण्ठादिना कृतः उत दण्डादिना कृत इति । एवं विकल्पिता हेत्वसिद्धिः ॥ यथा वा सांख्या वदन्ति श्रोत्रादीनि पञ्च

---

81. Cf. Sam N. II, p 17 · *sabbam atthīti kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto sabbam natthīti ayam dutiyo anto*, etc M vṛtti, p. 270, 7 and Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 90, § 60 : *astīti kāśyapa ayam ekontaḥ | nastīti ayam dvitīyontaḥ |* (L. V. P.). Cp M vṛtti, p. 358, 10.

82. Lit *kṣamayā adṛṣṭvā*

83 Or *nirvikalpikaprajñām.*

84. Ie *yadi saṃvṛtitaḥ, parato asiddhaḥ | yadi paramārthataḥ, svato 'siddhaḥ |*

85. Candrakīrti refers to what our author intends to convey in this passage, M. vṛtti, p. 28-29, where the reference is made in connection with the proposition (pratijñā) It is also equally to be applied to sādhana and *dṛṣṭānta*. Cf. p 54 with note 95 below.

86. See Nyāyamukha *ad* 2.

सत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाणि न रूपारब्धानि[87] इन्द्रियत्वात् मनइन्द्रियवत्। चक्षुरादि-पञ्चेन्द्रियाणां रूपारम्भवादी तं दुष्टं वदति। इन्द्रियत्वादिति हेतुः यदि महाभूतस्वभावः उत सत्त्वादिस्वभाव इति। एवं विकल्पितो हेतुः स्वतः परतश्च असिद्धः। तद्विविधमपि वचनमसिद्धिदोषाभासदोषो न तात्त्विका-सिद्धिरित्यतो न युज्यते। एवमिद [मस्मद्वचन] मपि॥

अन्ये पुनराचार्याः प्राज्ञंमन्याः स्वपक्षस्नेहान्धीकृतप्रज्ञाचक्षुष्काः [11 b] सदुपदेशरत्नस्वयाद[88]क्षुद्रचीरणयोर्लोमहानिधिशेषमविवेचयन्तः मृषाप्रकल्पितं-साध्यदृष्टान्तदोषा आहुः। मन्त्रौषधिबलाधिष्ठिताः पुष्पफलमृत्पिण्डादि-पदार्था विविधहस्त्यश्वशशादिरूपनिमित्तोपदर्शकाः स्वभावशून्या इति नास्मत्पक्षाभ्युपगतम्। तदा साध्यदृष्टान्तविकलः [तव पक्षः], साध्याभावात्। अथ यदि मायाहस्त्यश्वादिनिमित्तानि [तद] न्यवास्तविकहस्त्यश्वादि-स्वभावयुक्तानि न भवन्ति इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्त इति। चक्षुरादिकमपि तथा अन्यस्वभावरहितत्वात् स्वभावशून्यं भवेत्। तदा पक्षदोषः, सिद्ध-साधनत्वात्। इति तद्दूषणं न युज्यते। मन्त्रौषधिबलाधिष्ठितान् पुष्पफल-मृत्पिण्डादिपदार्थान् प्रतीत्य समुत्पन्नानि हस्त्यश्वादिनिमित्तानि [तात्त्विक] हस्त्यादिस्वभावशून्यानि दृष्टान्तत्वेन उच्यन्त इत्यतः साध्यार्थः सिद्धः। अथ यदि पुनर्वदसि मायाकृतहस्त्यश्वादिवस्तूनि यद्यपि अन्यतात्त्विक-हस्त्यश्वादिस्वभावानि न भवन्ति, तथापि न वक्तव्यं तत्स्वभावशून्यत्वात् एतत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्य[89] इति। [ये] तल्लक्षणाकारा[90] दृश्यन्ते [ते] तथाविधपदार्थस्वभावाः कथं न भवन्ति। यथा भवताभ्युपगताः पुष्प-फलादिपदार्थाः। तथा चेत् मायानिमित [12 a] हस्त्यश्वादिवस्तूनि

---

87. *[illegible]* Poussin suggests . *upādāyarūpa.*

88. Dirty weeds

89. This part of objection is made cleair in the next section.

90. More convenient expression : *ye yallakṣaṇākārāḥ* etc.

तात्त्विकतथाभूतहस्त्यश्वादिस्वमानि स्युः। किन्तु न तात्त्विकानि इत्यतः सर्वाणि मायाकृतहस्त्यश्वपश्वादिवस्तूनि स्वभावशून्यानीति ज्ञायते। तस्माद्यथायथयोक्त[91] दृष्टान्तेन साध्यार्थः सिध्यति। नापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः। चक्षुरादिसंस्कृतानां स्वभावशून्यत्वेन शून्यत्वस्थापनात् ॥

अन्ये पुनः केचित् शून्यान्तरमतयो[92] दृष्टान्तदोषं प्रत्यवस्थापयन्ति। यद्यपि मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषा इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते। तथापि ते मायापुरुषा न स्वभावशून्या अभूतप्रतिभासिपुरुषलक्षणरूपेण सत्त्वात्। अनया युक्त्या साध्यपदार्थासिद्धिः, दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः इति। इदानीं ते प्रष्टव्याः किमिमानि अभूतप्रतिभासिमायापुरुषलक्षणरूपाणि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानि उत नेति। ते प्रतिवदेयुः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानीति। तथा चेत्कस्मात् पुनरभूतानि नाम। यतो यथा प्रतिभासोनि न तथा सन्ति। न चास्ति ननु चक्षुरादिकमपि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं, यथा प्रतिभासि न तथास्ति चेति। [एवं] समदृष्टान्तस्य सिद्धत्वात् स्वभावशून्य [12 b] ता सिध्यतीति भवतास्थयम् ॥

ते वदन्ति नास्त्येव [मिद]म्। यतो मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषवत्संभावनीयाः[93]। तान् तात्त्विकपुरुषानपेक्ष्य इमे अभूता इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते। न भवतां सिद्धं पूर्वोक्तचक्षुरादिसंस्कृतान् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादिसंस्कृताः सन्ति इति यान्[94] सम्यक् संभावनीयान् अपेक्ष्य इमे चक्षुरादिसंस्कृताः

---

91. *vastubhūta, vastutaḥ* or *yathāvat* shih-yu.

92. =*i-kung-hua-che* Or *visparita* Poussin gives *tsiao* for *kung* and says that *i-tsiao*=vidagdha (*i*=*vi*, *tsiao*=*dagdha*, a translation of Tib. word); and giving a variant *kung* for *tsiao*, he suggests to correct into *hoei*, intelligence. But our text has *kung hua* both together making the suggestion inadmissible.

93. I follow here the Chinese punctuation. Poussin has done differently.

94. Lit. *tan*=*pi*.

स्वभावशून्या इति वचनमास्थीयेत इति। यद्यपि उक्तानिमान् चक्षुरादीन् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादयो न सन्ति। तथापि ईदृशस्वभावशून्यत्वप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादयो साध्यसाधनभावौ सिद्धौ। केवलमनेनोदाहरणेन उदाहार्यार्थं प्रदर्शयितुमलम्। यदि दृष्टान्तधर्मान्तर विकल्पयसि तदा [95]विकल्पसमजाति दोष सिध्यति [य] प्रतिवादिन स्वप्रज्ञालाघव प्रदर्शयेत्। यथा वैशेषिक आह शब्द अनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटादिवत् इति। [तत्र] घटादि मृत्पिण्डचक्रादिना निष्पादित पक्व उपलभ्यते मुसलनाश्योऽनित्यश्च। शब्दस्तु न तथा, नानित्य इति वचनं न दूषण स्यात्। [एव] मस्यापि दृष्टान्त धर्मान्तरविकल्पत्वात् विकल्पसमजातिदोष सिध्येत्। अत [13 a] आस्थेय चक्षुरादय स्वभावशून्या इति। स्वभावशून्यताया प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद हेत्वव्यभिचारात्। यथा दृष्टलक्षण प्रतिषिद्धपूर्वस्वभावम्, तथा इदमपि स्यात्। तस्मात् भवता वचन न स्वपक्षदोषोपालम्भान्निवर्तितुमलम्॥

साङ्ख्या एव दूषयन्ति। अस्माभि स्थाप्यते महदादिपरिणामा व्यक्ता [अत] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वहेतोरसिद्धि। सर्वस्यापि सत्त्वरूपत्वात् इन्द्रियाणा सर्वायतनव्यापित्वात तस्मिन् मायापुरुषेऽपि [96]एतद्रूपमस्तीति स्वभावशून्यमिदमिति स्थापनस्य नास्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त। इति॥ अत्र रूपबुद्धिरादाय परीक्ष्यते। तथाहि रूपबुद्धय न प्रत्ययाभिव्यक्ता तदन्य प्रत्ययानुसृत्य विकृतत्वात्। यथा मृत्पिण्डदण्डचक्रकुलालमनइच्छा

---

95 N Sūtra V 1 4 N Kośa p 630 It is now clear that in setting forth any proposition no particulars should be taken into account of the *sādhya sādhana* and *dṛṣṭānta* This is what is meant by *utsṛṣṭaviśeṣana* stated previously see p 51 above with note 85 Nyāyamukha gives the same example for this *jāti* see *ad* 32

96 A similar objection viz reality of this example is raised in the Abh Āloka p 385 from the view point of Vijñānavādin Cp Pram vārtika III 162 f where the Sāṅkhyas are said to plead for the fact that many exist in the form of one *bhāva* = *pradhāna*

सत्त्वादिविभिन्नप्रत्ययाननुसृत्य घटकपालादयो महान्तोऽल्पा वा भवन्ति। एवं [ये] चक्षुरादिनानाप्रत्ययाः,ताननुसृत्य रूपबुद्धयो नाना विक्रियन्ते। यतः चक्षुषस्तमःप्रकाशावनुसृत्य बुद्धेस्तैक्ष्ण्यं मान्द्यं वा। 'नीलादिरूपविषयविशेषाननुसृत्य [13 b] नीलाद्याभासबुद्धिः स्पष्टं विक्रियते[97]। दृश्यते हि लोके यदभिव्यक्ताः[98] पदार्थाः न तत्प्रत्ययविशेषविरहिताः। यथा विविधाः कङ्कणकुण्डलादिपदार्थाः प्रदीपौषधिरत्नसूर्याद्यभिव्यक्ताः। न तथा रूपबुद्धिः। यथा रूपबुद्धिः परीक्षिता। तथा चक्षुरादिरपि। अयमर्थं सिद्ध इति वस्तुतो लोकसाधारणं ज्ञायते। अतः उक्तहेतोर्नासिद्धिदोषः।

किञ्च भवता उक्तं सर्वं सर्वरूपात्मकमित्यादि। किमभिव्यक्तिवृत्त्या[99] किंवा तिरोहितवृत्त्या। यद्यभिव्यक्तिवृत्त्या सर्वं सर्वस्वरूपं गृहीष्यसि। यथा घटप्रदेशे घटाभिव्यक्तिवृत्तिरस्ति। तथा कपालप्रदेशेऽपि एतद्घटाभिव्यक्तिवृत्तिः स्यात्। विभुस्वरूपत्वात्। योऽयमुक्तो घटः सोऽप्रमाणशतसहस्रयोजनान्यपि व्याप्नुयात्। घटादिप्रदेशेऽपि कपालाद्यभिव्यक्तिर्युगपत् स्यात्। न च घटाभिव्यक्तेस्तिरोहितत्वात् कपालाद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि तिरोहिता। महत्परिमाणत्वात्। महत्परिमाणं [वा] तिरोहितमहत्परिमाणं परिणतं स्यात्। घटाद्यभिव्यक्तेः कपालाद्यभिव्यक्तितिरस्कृतत्वात् सर्वदेशकालयोर [14 a] नुपलम्भः स्यात्। तस्मादभिव्यक्तिवृत्त्या सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति भवत्पक्षो न युज्यते।

यदि तिरोहितवृत्त्या सर्व सर्वात्मकमिति ग्रहीष्यसि। एवं गृहीतं विस्तृतविचारेण[100] परिज्ञेयमिदं सत्यमसत्यं वेति। ग्रन्थपरिक्लेशभयेन[101] न विस्तरशः परीक्ष्यते।

---

97 *Hsien-hsien* : "To become modified perceptably"

98 *So-hsien*.

99 *Chu* "According to"

100 Lit. *vicāram apekṣya*

101. *Wen fang* "Trouble of composition"

भवत्पक्षेऽपि अभ्युपगम्यते मायापुरुषाभिव्यक्तिप्रदेश तात्त्विकपुरुषाभिव्यक्तिशून्य इति। मया स्थापितदृष्टान्तस्य नासिद्धिदोषः। तस्मात्साध्या स्वभावशून्यता सिद्धा।

भवान् साङ्ख्याचार्योऽपि नोत्सृष्टाश्रयः,[102] नेन्द्रियाण्यपि सर्वायतनव्यापीनि।[103] साधिष्ठानत्वहेतोः। यथा इन्द्रियमाश्रयाश्रितम्। तथा सत्त्वरजस्तमोमोहा भवन्ति बुद्धिकारकत्वहेतोः[104] इत्यादिना बहवो विविधज्ञापकहेतवः सविस्तरं वक्तव्याः। इन्द्रियाणां सर्वायतनव्यापित्वभङ्गात्। मायापुरुषे नेन्द्रियरूपाणि [इति] न साध्यशून्यता साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभावश्च। तस्मादेवं भवान् वितथविकल्पं कृत्वा पिशाचपीडितचेष्टां[105] करोति॥

[106]योगाचारा एवमाहुः। भवान साधयति तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्याः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति। [14 b] संस्कृतधर्माः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः न स्वयंभावाः, उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावा इति ते शून्याः साध्यन्ते इत्ययमर्थः, तदा प्रसिध्यति योगाचाराणामर्थः न्यायसंवादीति। तथा चाह "येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात् इति[107]। एवं शून्यता शास्त्रा देवमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्तम्। अस्योपदेशस्याशयः परिचायित-

---

102. *Chu* place, *tou chi* "to throw and transmit" Poussin connects this sentance along with the previous one My punctuation is according to the Chinese one

103 *Yu so* So is to be taken in the sense of place, *adhiṣṭhāna*

104 Poussin interprets quite differently these sentences

105 *Wang liang* demon à la forme d'un petit en fant de couleur brune, aux yeux rouges et aux longues oreilles (L V P.)

106 Lit *yogaśāstrācārya*.

107 This is from *yogaśāstra*, Wogihāra, p 47,—says poussin.

गृहीतः परतन्त्रस्वभावो भूततोऽसन्, अतत्स्वभावत्वात्। यथाभिधान[108]-मभिधेयस्वभावाभावात्, यथाभिधेयश्चाभिधानस्वभावाभावात् परतन्त्रस्वभावे परिकल्पितगृहीतस्वभावः प्रकृतितोऽसन्। येन शून्यं [तत्] मिथ्याकल्पितं वस्तु तत्सत्स्वभावः। यच्च शून्यं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं वस्तु तत्सत्स्वभावः। यदीदमसत्, तदा नोच्छेदो निरोधो वा, किं केन [109]शून्यं भविष्यति। [यत्] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं वस्तु तदेव परतन्त्रस्वभावं नाम। ततो रूपवेदनासंज्ञादिस्वभावविशेषोपचारात्मिका प्रवृत्तिर्भवति।[110] यदीद-[111]मसत्, प्रज्ञप्तिधर्मोऽप्यसन्। [15 a] [तदा] नास्तिकः अकथ्यो भवति असंवास्यः [सब्रह्मचारिणाम्]। स्वयं दुर्गतौ पतति। परानपि पातयति। एवं परिकल्पितगृहीतस्वभावः शून्यः परतन्त्रस्वभावश्च सन् इति सिद्धि निपुणं व्याख्या।

परतन्त्रस्वभावोऽप्यविद्यमानत्वात् शून्य' साध्यते। इति यद्ययं वचनार्थः, तदा यथोक्तदोषपाते पतितोऽसि भगवदुपदेशापवाददोषश्च साधितवानसि। इति॥

तत्र अन्ययानप्रस्थानिकैः तीर्थ्यैश्च सद्वचनाकांक्षिभिः निर्मत्सरैस्सह भूयसा निराद'। क पुनर्वाद प्रकयानप्रस्थितैराचार्यः। वादस्य प्राप्त काल-

---

108 Astitva with regard to *paratantra* aspect and *nāstitva* with regard to *parikalpita* aspect M vṛtti p 274 5

109 Lit *kutra kim śūnyam ucyeta* ?

110 *Chsa-lṭ-hsin = upacārātmikā* The phrase is suggested by Poussin

111. Partly identical with these passages of Yogaśāstra (Wogihara p 46):

तेषां प्रज्ञप्त्यधिष्ठानस्य वस्तुमात्रस्याभावात् नैव प्रज्ञप्तिः सर्वेण सर्वं न भवति।... प्रज्ञप्तितत्त्वापवादाच्च प्रधानो नास्तिको वेदितव्यः। स एव नास्तिकः सन् अकथ्यो भवति, असंवास्यो विज्ञानां सब्रह्मचारिणाम्... (cited by Poussin)

त्यादिदं किञ्चित्संप्रधार्यते। यथा [112]तत्त्वामृतावतारे विस्तरेण विकल्पितत्वान्नाधिकं विचार्यते। वचनविस्तारसंत्रस्तानामप्रीतिकरत्वात्[113]।

संस्कृतधर्माः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः न स्वयंभावा, उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावा इति ते शून्याः साध्यन्ते इति वचनस्यास्य कोऽर्थः। यदि चक्षुरादिसंस्कृताः परतन्त्रे अहेतुसमुत्पन्नानां सदा अनिरुद्धानां चक्षुरादिस्वभावानामत्यन्तमसत्त्वात् शून्या उच्यन्ते इत्ययमर्थः। [15 b] तदा सिद्धसाधनम्। सजातीयसांख्यवैशेषिकादिपक्षेष्वपि [तथा] अभ्युपगतत्वात्। उच्यते तु चक्षुरादिसंस्कृतकः स्वभावशून्यः शून्यत्वात्[114] इति। वक्तव्यश्चानुत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावत. शून्य इति। न वक्तव्यमुत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावतः ते शून्या इति। यदि तेषूत्पद्यमानेषु[115] परमार्थत [116]उत्पत्तिस्वभावोऽस्ति। कथमुच्यते उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभाव इति। यदि नास्त्युत्पत्तिर्वस्तुत। तत्स्वरूपस्यैवाभावाश्च वक्तव्या चित्तमिमात्रता। तथा चेत्स्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोष। यदि परतन्त्रं स्वयमुत्पत्तिस्वभावशून्यमविद्यमानमित्यतः शून्यमुच्यते।

---

112 This seems to be a treatise of this author, Bhavya Poussin remarks the following : Cet ouvrage n'est pas signalé, semble t il dans les Catalogues Chinois, mais le Siddhānta de Mañjughoṣahāsavajra, II, 107b 1, attribue à Bhavya un *dbu ma sñiṅ po rtsa ḥgrel de ñid bdud rtsir ḥjug pa* = *Madhymakahṛdayavṛtti tattvāmṛtāvatāra* Je ne pense pas que ce soit un autre nom de Tarkajvālā (Cordier, 300) que l auteur du Siddhānta nomme par son nom, *rtog ge ḥbar ba*

113 Poussin has included this para in the section of *Pūrvapaksin* Following the Chinese punctuation I have put it in the section of *Siddhāntin*

114 *The sense is intended to be conveyed* as in the previous passage · *yadi cakṣurādisaṃskṛtāḥ* I Poussin interprets otherwise

115 Lit *utthiteṣu* or *pravṛtteṣu*

116 Lit svabhāva utpattiḥ = *svabhāvataḥ utpattiḥ*

तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषः। तथा परेभ्यः [117]प्रत्ययेभ्य उत्पन्नस्य [परतन्त्रस्य] वस्तुत अशून्यत्वात् न शून्यता नाम स्यात्। मम तु न तथा। कथं [118]प्रलपसि योगाचाराणामर्थः [119]सिध्यतीति।

किञ्च यथोक्तम्। "येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात्" इत्यादि। यदि हेतुप्रत्ययबलेनोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः सर्वलोकसाधारणं वस्तुसन्तः स्वीक्रियन्ते। [120]बाला बुद्धज्ञानगोचराः स्युः। सांवृतं सत्स्वभावाभासं प्रदृश्यमानं [16 a] परमार्थसत्यबुद्धज्ञानपर्येषणया मायापुरुषवदत्यन्तमसत्स्वभावम्। तस्मादुक्तं "येन शून्यं तदसत्स्वभावात्" इति शाश्वतान्तदोषपातप्रतिषेधार्थम्। शाश्वतान्तदोषपरिहाराय तदसत्स्वभाववचनवत् उच्छेदान्तदोषपातपरिहारायापि वचनं तत्सद्भावात् इति। तथाहि हेतुप्रत्ययबलोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः संवृतिसत्यपरिगृहीताः सत्स्वभावा न खपुष्पवदत्यन्तासत्स्वभावपदार्थाः। तत्त्वतः परं तान् शून्यान् साधयामः। तस्मादुक्तं "यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात्। इत्येवं स्वभावशून्यता शास्त्रा देवमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्त" मिति। एतदर्थकं परतन्त्रः सत्स्वभाव इति यदि वदसि तदा साधूक्तं भवति। ईदृशस्वभावस्य मयापि स्वीकृतत्वात्। [121]लोकानुवर्तनवचनसंगृहीतत्वात् पुण्यज्ञानसंभाराश्रयस्य, संवृत्युपचारत

---

117. Cp. M. vrtti, p 444 · Vijñānavāde'pi *kalpitasvabhāvasya śūnyatvam, apratītyasamutpannatvāt, taimirikadvicandrādidarśanavat* I

118 *Shu* Shanghai ed reads *mi=bhrāmyasi*, which is adopted in Taisho ed. as Poussin says.

119. This is the remark of *Siddhāntin* against *Pūrvapakṣin*, repeating the latter's own words expressed at the commencement of *pūrvapakṣa*, see p. 56, para 3 above. So there is no need of unnecessary assumption as done by Poussin

120. *Chiao=Buddha=Pratibuddha.*

121. Cp. Lokānuvartanagāthās in Mad. Avatāra, my Skt. text, p. 40, and M. vrtti, p. 548.

आश्रयस्य सत्त्वस्थापनात् प्रज्ञप्तिधर्मोऽपि सन्। तथा च "यदीदमसत्, प्रज्ञप्तिधर्मोऽप्यसन् तदा नास्तिकः अकथ्य" इत्येवमादिदोष. सर्वो न सिध्यति।

किञ्च यदि साधयसि परतन्त्रं [16 b] संवृत्या सत्स्वभावम्, तदा सिद्धसाधनम्। यदि तं परमार्थतः सत्स्वभावं साधयसि, साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तहानिः। यथा ऐकान्तिकसत्स्वभावग्रहः प्रतिषिद्धः [तथा] ऐकान्तिकासत्स्वभावोऽपि प्रतिषेधयितव्यः। तस्मात् नोत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यामुक्त-[122] परतन्त्रस्वभावस्यापवादः स्यात।

यदि वदसि अनभिलाप्यस्वभावानां मायादीनां समदृष्टान्तत्वाभावात् मम प्रतिज्ञा न साधयेत् [साध्यम्] इति। अनभिलाप्यस्वभाव[त्वे] युक्त्यसिद्धया नास्ति दोषः। तथा चेत् तीर्थिकैः परिगृहीतमनभिलाप्यस्वभावमात्मादिकं कः प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्नुयात्। यतः तेऽपि वदन्ति सत्स्वभाव आत्मादि. न बुद्धे नापि वचसो गोचर[123] इति।

यदि प्रत्ययबलोत्पन्नः सर्वः परतन्त्रस्वभावः परमार्थतः सत्स्वभाव इति।

---

122 Poussin compares this with two passages, one from the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Wogihara, p 48 · *na bhūtam apavadati nādhikam larcti na nyūnikaroti na utksipati na praksipati* I and the other from Nāgārjuna · *Nāpaneyam atah kiñ cit niksептavyam na kiñcana* (Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, I, p 387, 394) This verse is also cited in the Buddhagotra of Vasubandhu, see his ad notes, p 145 The source of this verse is now found to be Abh Alankāra of Maitreya, V, 21, cited in the Āloka, p 499

123 This is a plain reference to the Advaitic doctrine of the soul of ineffable character It follows that the Yogācaras hold things magically created to be of ineffable nature (cp M Sūtrālankāra, XI, 15 30), which theory appears to be similar to the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* theory of Advaitins Haribhadra says that the conception of *Śūnyatā* has been extended even to the Nirvāṇa, lest it should incur a *pradeśikaśūnyatā* like that of the Tirthikas , Abh Āloka, 144. Cf passages of Prajñāpāramitas cited in Bod pañjikā, p 379.

मायापुरुषस्तात्त्विकपुरुषस्वभावः स्यात्। [स] अन्यस्वभाव इति चेन्
न च युज्यते। यदि यद्देशस्वभावायोगात्। कृतकाकृतकस्वभावौ
सद्भावासद्भावौ सस्वभावनिःस्वभावौ चोभौ युगपत्संगृह्येयाताम्। एवं
[भवतः] साध्यं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तविहीनं सिद्धसाधनं वा इति दोषद्वयोपलि-
प्तम्। अतो न युज्यते।

किञ्च [17 a] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नान् संस्कृतधर्मान् परमार्थतः
सस्वभावान् यदभ्युपगच्छसि। कृतकत्वहेतुः तान् स्वभावशून्यान्
प्रदर्शयन् तेषां सत्स्वभावं निराकरोति। अतः साध्यप्रतिज्ञाविरोधोऽनुमान-
दोषः। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः संवृतितः सस्वभावाः सर्वसाधारणं ज्ञाताः, यदि
परमार्थसन्तः परिगृह्यन्ते। अनेन न्यायेन तत्प्रतिज्ञाभङ्गः स्यात्। नैवं वादं
ते परिगृह्णीयुः। परमार्थतो द्विविधस्यापि विकल्पस्यान्याय्यत्वात्।

किञ्च यथाभिधानमभिधेयस्वभावाभावः यथाभिधेयमभिधानस्वभावा-
भाव इति यथोक्तम्, अत्र न विचिकित्सन्ते प्रतिवादिनः। अतः प्रतिषेध-
वचनस्य सिद्धसाधनदोषः। यथोक्तत्वात्परतन्त्रस्वभावे परिकल्पित-
गृहीतस्वभावः प्रकृतितोऽसन् इत्यत्रापि परवादिनो न विचिकित्सन्ते।
अतः प्रतिषेधवचनस्यापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः। अभिधानाभिधेयपरिकल्पित-
स्वभावग्रहबलात् संक्लेशा जायन्ते। अतः प्रतिषेध आवश्यक इति चेत्
तदपि न युक्तम्। न हि पशुपक्ष्यादयो जानन्त्यभिधानाभिधेयसंसर्गम्।
विषयस्य योनिशोऽग्रहणमेव[124] हि [17 b] संक्लेशजननम्। अतः
सन्ति विविधा अतिमनोरमाः [न्यायाः]। सन्ति च विविधानि सूक्ष्मा-
प्यार्थवचनानि। [तेषु] परिकल्पितस्वभावशून्यतोपदेशः अल्पांशेन
हितकरः न सर्वशः। अतो न केवलमहं तं शून्यं साधयामि। [किन्तु

---

124. = *Ayoniśo manaskāra*, cf. Pratītyasamutpādasūtra cited in M. vṛtti, p 452, 7.

परतन्त्रमपि ।] इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन ।[125] प्रकृतं विचारयामः ।[126] एवं यथोक्तन्यायेन साधितं चक्षुः स्वभावशून्यमिति ॥

अन्ये पुनराचार्या भावस्वभावप्रतिषेधस्यास्यैवं दूषणमापादयन्त आहुः । यद्यदीदं [चक्षुः] वस्तुसत्, प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, हेतोरनैकान्तिकासिद्धिः । यद्वस्तुसत् निःस्वभावमेव, असिद्धं दूषणम् । इति । तदपि न युक्तम् । यथा भगवानाह । जानीहि सर्वं ब्राह्मण यथोक्तं सत्यमसत्यमिति । अहं वदामि न सत्यं[127] न मृषा इति । अनेन वचनेन उक्तवक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिभिश्च परमार्थतः सत्यमसत्यमिति न व्यवसितम् । अतो नैवं यथोक्तदोषः । [18a] किञ्च भवदाशयेन उक्तयुक्तिप्रतिषेध्याभावात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति ।[128] न च प्रतिषेधेऽसति प्रतिषेध्यं पुनरस्ति । किन्तु प्रतिषेध्यस्य प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावत्वात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति । प्रतिषेधः केवलं विचार्य ज्ञापयति[129] प्रतिषेध्यं प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावमिति । न नाशयति प्रतिषेध्यस्य स्वभावम् । यथाह । न बोधिसत्त्वः शून्यतया सर्वधर्मान् शून्यान्[130] करोति । अपितु सर्वधर्माः प्रकृतितः स्वभावशून्याः । इति यावद्विस्तरः ।

---

125 Lit tiryagvāda

126 Lit vicārayema prakṛta (or ṛju) vādam The expression is repeated in the second chap on f 7b, 1,7 (Chin. text)

127. Cf. Vajracchedikā, 37. *na satyam na mṛṣā* . Ratnāvalī in M vṛtti, p 359 · *Dṛṣṭaśrutādyam muninā na satyam na mṛṣoditam* (L V P).

128 Cf the line in Abh. Āloka, p. 51 : *Niṣedhyābhāvataḥ spaṣṭam na niṣedhyo'sti tattvataḥ* l (L V. P.) Cf also Vig. vyāvartinī, 64.

129 Ibid, vṛtti *ad* 65

130 Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 94, § 63 *na śūnyatayā sarvadharmān śūnyān karoti, dharmā eva śūnyāḥ* , cited in M. vṛtti, p 248 , (L V.P.) , M. Avatāra *ad* VI 34 Cp. Prajñāpāramitā · *Bodhisattva...evam pratyavekṣate* l *na rūpaśūnyatayā rūpam śūnyam* l *rūpam eva śūnyam* l cited in Bod. pañjikā, p 416, f

किञ्च यथा प्रकाशयित्रा प्रकाश्यानां प्रकाशने न चक्षुः शुक्लं प्रकाश्यानां घटपटादीनामभावात् प्रकाशयितापि नास्तीति । [तथा] न च चक्षुः शुक्लं प्रकाश्यपदार्थाः प्रकृतितोऽसन्तः इदानीं सन्तीति ।[181] मम च साध्यं प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं साधनं दूषणं[182] सविपर्यासमविपर्यासं सर्वं संवृतिसत् । यदि साध्यं साधनञ्च प्रतिषेधयसि, तदा स्वप्रतिज्ञाबाधः ।

इदं प्रतिषेधवचनमसाधनं युज्यते असत्स्वभावत्वात् वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवत् । [इति चेत्] भवानेवानुमानं साधनमिति स्वीकरोति । ममापि तथा स्यात् संवृतिसत्त्वात् । पूर्वोक्तरीत्या विपुलविवादा निराकृताः । विपुलवक्तार्थो दुर्ग्रहत्वात् भयसंत्रासकाः ।

[18 b] एवं पूर्वोक्तानुमानस्य न दूषणावरणानि सन्तीत्यतः प्रतिज्ञा तत्त्वतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वभावशून्यमिति न्यायसंसिद्धा । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् इति साध्यहेतुः संक्षेपोपलक्षणम् । चक्षुरादीनां वस्तुस्वभावप्रतिषेधाय अन्येऽपि हेतवः सन्ति यदुत विनाशित्वात् अनुप्रत्ययं विभक्तत्वात् अभिनिर्वृत्त-त्वात् भावे सति नृपाज्ञानोत्थापकत्वात् इति । एभिर्हेतुभि यथायोगं प्रतिपक्षमनुसृत्य निपुणं प्रतिषेद्धव्यम् ।

अन्यः कश्चिदाह । चक्षुः वस्तुतः सत्स्वभावम्, तल्लक्षणहेतुफलानां दृष्टत्वात् न स्वभावशून्यम् । [यत्] प्रत्यक्षलक्षणादिकं, [तत्] प्रत्यक्षं दृष्टम् । चक्षुरादीनां लक्षणादीनि च प्रत्यक्षं सन्ति । तस्मात् चक्षुरादीनि न स्वभावशून्यानि । इति । अस्य परमार्थतः समदृष्टान्ताभावात् सत्स्वभाव-[ता] [183]न सिध्यति । यदि सांवृतज्ञानत सत्स्वभावम्, तदा सिद्ध-

181 Cp. Udyotakara's remarks · *na hyayam vyañjakasya dharmo yad vyangyam vastu karyāt* I *apitu anyato bhūtam hetur vyanakti* I *na hi pradīpo' santam artham janayitvā prakāśayati* I N' Vārtika, ■ 513

182 Or khaṇḍana.

183 Similar objection and answer have already been made on p. 43, para 3

साधनम्। समदृष्टान्ते हेतुसिद्धि विरुद्धा। समदृष्टान्तस्य संवृतिमात्र-स्वभावत्वात्।

यथा तत्त्वतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वभावशून्यम्, तथा श्रोत्रघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनो-रूपशब्दगन्धरस [192] स्पर्शायतनधर्मायतनानि च स्वभावशून्यानि। इत्येवं योगाचारी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत्।[184] सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां तत्त्वतः सिद्धानि स्कन्धधातुप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्मृत्युपस्थानसम्यक्प्रहाणऋद्धिपाद-इन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गपारमितासत्यसमाधिधारणीमुखप्रत्ययप्रतिसंविद्दशबलवैशार-द्यावेणिकधर्मादीनि सर्वज्ञानानि[185] च स्वभावशून्यानि इत्येवं योगी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत्।

तीर्थिकपरिकल्पिताः महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियमहाभूत[186] द्रव्यगुण-कर्मादयः संस्कृतपदार्थाः सर्वेऽपि द्वादशायतनान्तर्गताः, तल्लक्षणत्वात्। इत्येवं योगी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत्॥

एवं [योगी] चिन्ताबलात्[187] स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि भावना-बलविकलः[188]। यथा पक्षिणः जन्मारम्भे पक्षं प्रयोक्तुमसमर्थाः इत्यतः पुनस्त्वरितं प्रयोगबलमभ्यस्यन्ति[189]। यथा वा तैमिरिकः तिमिरनि-

---

184. *Wu-ju* = *praveśa* Poussin has rendered it "pénétrer—comprendre" (*avakram*, *pratiskand*)

185 Cf Bod panjikā, p 379 : (*Bhagavatyām uktam*) ... *sa cet nirvāṇādapi kaścid dharmo viśiṣṭataraḥ syāt, tam api aham māyopamam svapnopamam vadāmi* 1 with note thereon

186 *Ken shih* = *Indriya, dravya* Poussin is wrong in taking these terms for *mūlabhūta* and *tattva* respectively

187. Second aspect of the Prajñā, cintāmayī effected by *yukti-nidhyapti* (= anumāna), Sthiramati, Trimśikābhāṣya, p 26

188 Third aspect, *bhāvanāmayī* effected by *samādhi*, Ibid. Poussin refers to the Kośa VI, 143

189 Or *bhāvanābalam abhyasyati* [*yogī*]

राकारि मैत्र्यात् प्रतिपक्षात् लब्धचक्षुःप्रसादः महास्थूलकेशमशकादीन्-[140] पोह्य [19 b] विषयान् सम्यक् पश्यति । तथा स्वचित्तं भावनाबलाभ्यासात् संस्कृतनिमित्तग्रहमलविचित्तमिथ्याज्ञानानि निराकरोति ।

तत्त्वयोगी[141] अभिमुख्यारम्भे[142] अपरप्रत्ययं परमप्रीतिसुखं वेदयमानः सर्वसंस्कृतनिमित्तग्रहविरहात् सर्वदेयदायकप्रतिग्राहकग्रहविरहात् सर्वदायकप्रतिग्राहकदानफलग्रहविरहाच्च त्रिविधत्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धः[143] अप्रमाणद्विविधपुण्यज्ञानसंभार[144] भारसंग्रहं समारभते । दृष्टादृष्टफलानध्यवसितः दृष्टयस्तु भाविफलानभिरतः पूज्यान् दुष्टान् गुणिनो नानादेशांश्च निषेवमाणः गुणः कर्ता, आत्मा कर्ता महेश्वरः परमाणुः स्वभावादि [र्वा कर्ता] इति मिथ्याग्रहरहितः सदा अभ्यस्यति महात्यागम् । ईदृशादि वस्तु सर्वं उक्तवक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिभिः साक्षात्करोति सर्वसंस्कृतासंस्कृतप्रपञ्चखण्डन-धर्माणां स्वभावशून्यत्वात् ।

---

140 Lit *keśa maśaka pataṅga*. cf. M vṛtti p 350, 8 : *taimirikopalabdhakeśamaśakādi*

141. Or *Tattvayogacāri*

142 The sixth stage of the ten bhūmis to which the whole 6th Chap of Madh Avatāra has been devoted

143. Siddhi, 626, 629 Abh Āloka, p 198, Prajñā in 100 000, p 92 : *anupalambhayogena dānasya, dāyakasya pratigrāhakasya ca trimandalapariśuddhyā dānapāramitā paripūritā bhavati*, Lalita, p 217 (Bib. Ind), Śikṣāsamucca 183 Bodhicaryāvatāra p 45 With regard to second triad, it is not found as such in any text but it might be meant by *adi* in this passage *dātṛdeyapratigrāhakādiitritayānupalambhena* Bod Pañjikā, p 445 (L V P) Cp M Sutrālankāra *ad* XIII, 30 : *pratipattuḥ pratipattavyasya pratipatteśca avikalpanā trimandalapariśuddhir veditavyā* 1

144 Dāna, śila and kṣānti constitute *punyasambhāra* and dhyāna etc jñāna- which are characterised as *saugatapadasādhanopāyabhūta*, Bod Pañjikā, pp 344-5 and 343

यथाह भगवान् । न भवितव्यं बोधिसत्त्वेन दानप्रतिपत्तौ सुप्रतिष्ठितेन[145] अत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितेन दानं दातव्यम् । [20a] इति यावद्विस्तरः । किञ्च भगवानाह । [येषां] बोधिसत्त्वानां सत्त्वसंज्ञा प्रवर्तते न [ते] तात्त्विक-बोधिसत्त्वव्यपदेश्याः । इति । आह च भगवान् । यत्किञ्चनभावधर्म-विगतः[146] बोधिसत्त्वयानप्रस्थानकुशलो नाम । बोधिसत्त्वाः पुनर्न परिनिर्वाणाकाङ्क्षया ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति । परं प्रीताः खलु[147] त्रैधातुके संसारे । इति ।

एवं सर्वे संस्कृताः स्वभावशून्या इति सम्यक् भावनां भावयित्वा पुनः सम्यक् भावयेत् यस्य[148] नास्ति स्वभावः तस्य नास्त्युत्पादः । यस्य नास्त्युत्पादः तदतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नम् त्रिष्वध्वसु अप्रतिघम् इति । [एवं] त्र्यध्वविशुद्धलक्षणं[149] सम्यक् भावयित्वा, पूर्वोक्ताविपरीतयुक्त्या-श्रयेण त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । यथा पृच्छति । कथं मञ्जुश्रीः बोधिसत्त्वो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । उत्तरमाह । यथा ब्राह्मण बोधिः[150] स्यात् । पुनराह । कथं नाम बोधिर्भवति । उत्तरमाह । इयं ब्राह्मण नातीता नानागता यावत्प्रत्युत्पन्ना । इति । तस्मात् बोधिसत्त्वः त्र्यध्व-विशुद्धलक्षणं भावयित्वा त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छेत् ॥

[20b] महायानकरतलरत्ने प्रथमखण्डः ॥

---

145 Vajracchedikā *na vastupratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam* (L V P) Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, extract in the note 143 above

146 Well pointed out in Prajñāpāramitā cited in Bod Pañjikā pp 427-429, M vṛtti p 289 3 and Samādhirāja Sūtra Ibid ll 5 14

147 Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, XVII, 49

148 This is an abridged statement of Kāśyapaparivarta, § 102, p 149 Cp Ratnacūḍa cited in the Śik Sam p 234, l. 16-17

149 Lit *trīn adhvano viśuddhalakṣaṇān* or *nimittān*

150 Bodhi is given as simile in this line *yathā bodhis tathā hyeṣā śānta śuddhā prabhāsvarā* | Bod Pañjikā p 522, cp. Abh Āloka p 430

महायानकरतलरत्नम्

II

[असंस्कृतपरीक्षा]

एवमुक्तं योगी सामान्यतः संस्कृतात् स्वभावशून्यात् प्रविशेत् इति । न तु असंस्कृतात् स्वभावशून्यात् प्रविशेदिति । [1]अप्रदर्शिते प्रवेशो न संभवेत् । अप्रवेशे निर्विकल्पप्रज्ञाप्रवेशो नैव सिध्येत् । प्रदर्शनार्थं पुनराह ।

असंस्कृतास्त्वसद्भूता अनुत्पादाः खपुष्पवत् ॥

अत्र प्रतिज्ञावचनव्यवच्छेदकं पूर्वोक्तं तत्त्वत इत्येव । व्यवच्छेदावश्यकता-तात्पर्यं च यथापूर्वं ज्ञेयम् । तत्त्वतः असंस्कृताः शून्याः साध्यन्ते, न संवृतितः । न संस्कृता असंस्कृताः, संस्कृतविपरीता असंस्कृतपदार्थाः । त एवाकाशं प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्तथता च । यदुत निराकृतपूर्वधर्मा-यतनैकदेशः ।

आकाशस्य स्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशः पूर्वं प्रदर्श्यते । [1 b] प्रदर्शनस्य सुकर-त्वात्, [2]अप्रतिघद्रव्याभावमात्रस्याकाशनाम्ना लोकसाधारणं स्थापितत्वाच्च । [3]एतद्दर्शितासंस्कृतस्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशस्य द्वारं भवेत् । लोकज्ञातः आकाशस्तत्त्वतः शून्यः असत्स्वभाव इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा । एतत्साध्यं तत्त्वत

---

1. Lit. *yadi apradarśitam, jo-pu-kas-she*

2. Cp. Note [illegible] below. The theory of Sarvāstivādins on Ākāśa, Poussin's Document d' Abhidharma, BEFO, 1930, p. 274, 2. & 4. Note also Yaśomitra's remark : *svamatan tu sapratighadravyābhāvamātram ākāśam ityabhiprāyo lakṣyate* I. 28.

3. Lit. *anena.*

असद्भूत आकाश इति । [4]पक्षद्वयाभ्युपगतः अनुत्पादात्, प्रज्ञप्तिसिद्धानुत्पाद-
धर्मत्वाद्वा इति हेतुः । खपुष्पमसद्भूतमनुत्पन्नञ्चेति समदृष्टान्तः सिद्धः ।
विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः स्थाप्यते इत्यतो नोच्यते इति यथा-
पूर्वं ज्ञेयम् ।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते । तथाहि आकाशस्तत्त्वतोऽसद्भूतः,
अनुत्पादात् । [ये] अनुत्पन्ना [स्ते सर्वेऽपि] असत्स्वभावाः खपुष्पवत्
इति मूढा विद्वांसश्च सम्यं जानन्ति । अनुत्पादादित्ययं साध्यहेतुरुपलक्षणम्[5] ।
अन्येऽपि हेतव सन्ति अकृतकत्वात् अकारित्रत्वात् अनिरुद्धविनाशित्वात्
इति । एवमादयो हेतवः असंस्कृतस्वभावं व्यवह्रियमाणं प्रतिषेधयन्ति ।
तस्माद्यथायोगं हेतुत्वेन लभ्यन्ते । यथा [2 a] काकेभ्यो[6] दधि रक्ष्यता-
मिति वचनं रक्षणीयस्य [दध्नः] अनुपघातत्वात तज्जातीयबिडाल-
मूषिकादीनपि प्रतिषिध्यात् ।

वैभाषिकाः सर्वे इदं दूषयन्ति । असंस्कृतोऽसत्स्वभावोऽभावपदार्थ
इति यदि प्रतिज्ञा साध्या । तदा आकाशायतनसमापत्तिर्निरालम्बना[7] सतो
कथमस्तीति लभ्येत । तथा "आकाशमनावृति "[8] इति तु लक्षणमस्ति । इति ।

एवमनुमानप्रयोगः आकाशायतनसमापत्ति र्वस्त्ववलम्बना द्रव्यसद्वि-

---

4 Poussin wrongly construes this phrase along with Ākāśa [illegible] Sādhya is admitted by both parties, there is nothing to be proved Such proving will incur *Siddhasādhanadoṣa*

5 *Lueh chü ming-hsiang.* (Lit *Saṅkṣipya nāmalakṣana uddharana*) The same expression is used in the first chap in the same context. v p 63, para 3, above

6 This is the well-known example for *upalakṣana* given in the śastaic literature ~ Chinese will read literally thus · *bhavatā kara* [stha] *midam dadhi rakṣyatām kāko mā upasarpatu iti* 1

7. The first of the ārūpyas, v Kośa viii, 143, 209, 213 (L. V. P.)

8 Kośa, Tib I. [illegible] *Tatra ākāśam anāvṛtiḥ.*

यथा वा। एतत्समापत्तित्वात्, एतत्समापत्त्यालम्बनविषयत्वाद्वा, यथान्याः समापत्तयः, यथा वा तदालम्बनम् इति। अन्याः समापत्तयः तदालम्बनञ्च संस्कृतत्वात् स्वभावशून्या विचारिता एव, तदा समदृष्टान्तविरहः।

अयं परमार्थत आकाशलक्षणविचारः। यदि संवृत्यापि साध्यम् आकाशमसद्भूतम्, अनुत्पादात् खपुष्पवत् इति। अनेनानुमानेन [9]तद्वयस्थापितः-सद्भावो न सिध्यति। अनेन च मदुक्तहेतुना भवदुक्तः समापत्त्यालम्बनविषयत्वादिति हेतुः विरुद्धाव्यभिचारि [2 b] दुष्टः। तस्मान्मया पूर्वं साधितोऽर्थःसिद्धः। बाधकाभावात्।

स्वपरनिकायिन इदमाहुः। यदि तस्यैत आकाशमसद्भूतमनुत्पादात् इति। अनेन वचनेन उत्पन्नं सर्वं सद्भूतम् इत्यर्थादापद्यते[10]। यदि वदसि उत्पन्नमप्यसद्भूतमिति। तदायं हेतु र्न सर्वसपक्षव्यापीति हेतुस्यासिद्धिः। इति॥ अयमर्थापत्तिसमजातिदोषो [नाम] असिद्धिदोषाभासः। अनुत्पन्नानि सर्वाणि असद्भूतानि इतीदं निर्धारितम्, न तु निर्धारितम् असद्भूतानि सर्वाणि अनुत्पन्नानीति। प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वं सर्वसपक्षाव्याप्यपि[11] हेतुः स्वीक्रियते। तस्माद्यमदोषः॥

अन्यः[12] कश्चिद् वदति। आकाशं सत्स्वभावम्, लोकसाधारणं ज्ञातत्वात्।

---

9. = Vaibhāṣika

10 = *arthāpatti* s *chun*

11. It does not exist in the *vidyut*, lightning, which is *sapakṣa* to the *pot*, *ghaṭa*. Similarly composite thing is non substance, yet it is originated through causes and conditions

12 Some philosophers like Sabarasvāmin and Kumārila, etc who hold the realistic view of the Universe, v. Śabarabhāṣya I, (*nirālambana vāda*) and Kumārila's Tantravārtika, *ad jātyadhikaraṇa*, Udyotakara, Nyāyavārtika, p 340

पुष्पमपि सत्स्वभावम् उत्पलादेर्लोके[13] प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। आकाशं पुष्पञ्चोभे असंयुक्तेऽपि न निःस्वभावे। अतः खपुष्पदृष्टान्तेन न साध्यं सिध्यति। इति। इदं दूषणं न युज्यते। अयं खपुष्पदृष्टान्तः षष्ठीतत्पुरुषाश्रयेण व्याख्यायते [३ a] खस्य पुष्पं खपुष्पमिति। तस्यासत्त्वात् न दृष्टान्तस्याभावः॥ अनया युक्त्या योगी आकाशस्वभावशून्यतामवतरेत्। [तथा] प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधादित्रिविधासंस्कृतानां स्वभावशून्यतानयोऽप्यवतार्यः॥

वैभाषिकाः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधासंस्कृतस्य [शून्यता] मक्षममाणा इदं दूषणं पुनः कुर्वन्ति। भगवानवोचत्। अस्ति प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः संस्कृतप्रतिपक्षः। अतो निस्सरणं नाम। यद्यपवदसि नास्तीति,। तदा भवतां समयविरोधः। किञ्च भगवतोक्तम्। नन्दिरागसहगतायाः तृष्णायाः[14] क्षयो निरोधः शान्तं प्रणीतं[15] निर्वाणं नाम। इति। कथं वदसि नास्तीति॥

तत्र भगवता संस्कृतविषये विनेयानामुद्वेगभावनां[16] प्रवर्तयितुं असंस्कृतविषये प्रीतिमनुकूलयितुं च संवृतित उक्तम्। अस्ति प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो निस्सरणं[17] शान्तं प्रणीतं निर्वाणमिति। यथा भगवानाह सन्ति निर्मितसत्त्वा[18] इति। तथैवाह अस्त्यसंस्कृतं निर्वाणमिति। [एवं] तदस्तित्यस्याकारात् न प्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोषः।

तत्त्वतस्तु प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः प्रतिषिध्यते। अतो भगवानाह। [३ b] [ये] सत्त्वा निर्वाणं भावतः पर्येषन्ते [तान्] अहं वदामि मोहपुरुषान्

---

13. *Wen. po. lo.*

14. Taisho ed. reads : *vedanā* (L. V. P.). So also reads Shanghai Ed.

15. = Wei- (= miao). Cp. M. vṛtti, p. 525 : *yo 'sya nandirāgasahagatāyāḥ tṛṣṇāyāḥ kṣayaḥ*, etc , Ma]. I, (64) p. 436, 3.

16. Or *nirveda*.

17. = *visaṃyoga* of Kośa, I.

18. Kośa, IX, 258 (L. V. P.).

तीर्थिकपुत्रान्[19] इति । पेयालम् । किञ्चाह । संसारं तथागत न निर्वाण-पर्यवसन्नं[20] पश्येत् । निर्वाणवचनं प्रज्ञप्त्या स्थापितम् । तत्रात्यन्तं नास्ति निर्वाणस्यभावः इति । पेयालम् । नाप्यार्यसत्यापवाददोषः । सुखदुःखयोरत्यन्तानुत्पादेन निःसरणं निर्वाणं शान्तं प्रणीतमविपरीतमिति संवृतित उक्तत्वात् । न तु परमार्थतो वचनं सुखदुःखयोरत्यन्तानुत्पादेन प्रकृतिशान्तं निरुद्धं निरोधसत्यं नाम इति । अनेनागमेन[21] उक्तयुक्त्या च नास्ति परमार्थतः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः इति वचनस्य नास्त्ययं दोष[22] ॥

अन्येऽसन्नैयायिका एवं दूषयन्ति । असंस्कृतास्त्वसद्भूता इति साध्य-प्रतिज्ञा । असंस्कृतं असदिति साध्यासिद्धिः, आश्रयासिद्धिः, खपुष्पस्या-सत्त्वात् [दृष्टान्त] धर्म्यसिद्धिश्च । इति साध्यहेतुदृष्टान्ताः सर्वेऽपि दुष्टाः । इति । इदं दूषणं न युक्तम् । संज्ञाप्रज्ञप्तिबलेन सप्रतिघद्रव्या-भावमात्र[23] [4a] माकाशं स्थापयामः । प्रज्ञया प्रतिसंख्यया उत्पन्नक्लेशा-भावमात्रं प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधं साधयामः । सर्वप्रत्ययवैकल्येन उत्पत्ति-धर्माणामभावमात्रमप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधम् । सर्वप्रदाभावमात्र[24] तथताम् । संज्ञाप्रज्ञप्तिबलेन आकाशादयः संवृतिसिद्धाः[25] सन्ति इत्यभ्युपगमात्[26] ॥

---

19 Cf. Sūtra cited in M. vṛtti, 541 *Tad ime bhagavan mohapuruṣā [ye] svākhyāte dharmavinaye pravrajya tīrthikadṛṣṭau nipatitāḥ nirvāṇam bhāvataḥ paryeṣante | tad yathā tilebhyaḥ tailam kṣīrāt sarpiḥ | atyantaparinirvṛteṣu sarvadharmeṣu ye nirvāṇam mārganti tān aham abhimānikān tīrthikān iti vadāmi |*

20 Poussin - "Le Tathāgata ne voit pas le Saṃsāra et le Nirvāṇa."

21. *Shen-chiao* = Āryaśāsana = āgama

22 = Samayavirodha

23. Cf. Note 8 above

24 Poussin suggests with query : *sarvopalabhyanāstitva*

25 = *Chia-li* : Or *aupacārika*.

26 My punctuation is according to the Chinese text Poussin connects this sentence with the following one

अप्रकाशितविशेष साधारणाभ्युपगमबलेन सामान्यतः सिद्धो धर्मी । विशेषप्रतिषेधः साधारणाप्रतीतः प्रतिज्ञाधर्मः[27] । अनुत्पादादयः साधारणं प्रतीताः पक्षधर्माः । तस्मान्नास्ति प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषः । उक्तं खपुष्पं असदपि अनुत्पादादिधर्मको धर्मी । निःस्वभावत्वात् । अनेन साध्यसाधनभावः सिध्यति । अतो नास्ति धर्म्यसिद्धिदोषः ॥

वैभाषिकाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । इदमप्ययुक्तम् । प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः वस्तुसन्[28] मार्गालम्बनत्वेन क्लेशान्निरोधितवत् । नावस्तुधर्मो यतद्वत्तः स्यात् । इति । साधमाभवचनमिदं, विपक्षप्रतिषेधात्[29] [4b] आकाशस्य सत्स्वभावहेतु[30] प्रतिषेधवत् पूर्वमेव खण्डितमिति न युक्ततरं ग्राह्यम् ॥

सौत्रान्तिकाः सर्वे[31] आकाशादयोऽसत्स्वभावा इति स्थापने इदं वदन्ति । ईदृशानुमानं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । सप्रतिघरूपाभावस्वभावात्मका इति यदि वचनम्[32] । न सिद्धसाधनम् । तत्स्वभावस्य विवादात्[33] इति । असंस्कृता असद्भूता इति [मम] प्रतिज्ञावचनमिदं सत्स्वभावग्रहं सम्यङ्निराकरोति असत्स्वभावग्रहमपि निराकृत्यापवदति ॥

---

27. = *Sādhyadharma*, lit *pakṣadharma*

28. *Or dravyasan Cp Kośa*, V. 8a 1 (L V. P)

29. In criticising the *prayoga* of Ākāśa being a reality, lack of Samadṛṣṭānta was pointed out (v p [illegible] para 1 above), but here in criticising the reality of *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* lack of *vipakṣa* has been revealed When *probandum* is *sad vipakṣa* will be *asad*, viz *nirmiti*(?) which has a specific function even though it is *asad*

30. *Ku* which I have taken in the sense of *hetu*

31. This clearly shows that there are some minor divisions amongst the Sautrāntikas Poussin refers their opinions to Kośa, I, 279

32. Lit *vacanārthah*

33. *Psen* to argue', "quarrel about".

ताम्रशाटीयाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । छिद्ररूपमाकाशमुच्यते । तदस्ति संस्कृतम्[34] अतो भवतोऽसंस्कृतनिराकरणं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । इति । संस्कृतस्वभावस्य यथापूर्वं निराकृतत्वात् न युक्तम् ॥

वात्सीपुत्रीया वैभाषिकैः सह बहुषु वादेषु[35] समानाः त इव निराकरणीयाः ॥

योगाचारा इदं वदन्ति । परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति । तथतैव [5a] धर्माणां परमार्थ इत्यतः परमार्थतस्तथता शून्यमिति[36] वचनं न्याय्यम् । नतु पुनस्तथता न सत्स्वभाव इति । कथं लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं [37]तत्पृष्ठलब्धविशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानञ्चासंस्कृतविषयालम्बनं युज्येत । इति । नेदं वस्तुतो न्याय्यम् । यथोच्यते[38] इदं ज्ञानमसंस्कृतविषयालम्बनं न युज्यत इति । तथा इदं ज्ञानं संस्कृतविषयालम्बनमपि न युज्यते । न तथता शून्यसती इति ग्राहो युक्तः । अस्या वस्तुसत्तायाः दुस्साधनत्वात् । तथता-

---

34 See Kośa, I, 49. (L V. P.)

35 Lit *graha*, or *grāhya* Cf Kośavyākhyā, I, 5 : *Nirvāṇa* is only an *asaṃskṛta* for Vātsīputrīyas

36 Poussin remarks : "Dans une étoffe, il n'y a pas une second étoffe". Le sens paraît être : "on peut dire que le Paramārtha (= Tathatā) est vide, parce qu'il n'y a pas une Tathatā de la Tathatā". Les Yogācāras expliquent tout autrement la vacuité du Pariniṣpanna (ou Tathatā), Siddhi, 543, Yogasutra, 76, p. 719, 3.

37. On the two jñānas and their objects, Siddhi, 583-590 , Dharmapāla on Centuries, 247, 1, 18, 248, 3. 8. (L V. P.).

38. Shenghai ed. and probably Taisho ed. also read : *'shih*, = *laukika* for *tzu* = *idam*.

लम्बनं ज्ञानं न तत्त्वतो लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं, सालम्बनत्वेन[39] संस्कृतत्वात्। एतदालम्बनज्ञानवत्[40]।

तस्मात् सूत्रमाह। किं मञ्जुश्रीः प्रज्ञाचक्षुः पश्यति। आह। अत्यन्ताभाव [रूपं] प्रज्ञाचक्षुर्येन[41] पश्येत्। पुनराह। कतमन्मञ्जुश्रीः परमार्थसत्यम्। आह। यत्र[42] ज्ञानस्याप्यप्रचारः। कः पुनर्वादोऽक्षराणाम्। पुनराह। तथागतो ब्राह्मण न बोधिमभिसमेति। किञ्चाह सूत्रम्। कतमन्मञ्जुश्रीः सत्यदर्शनम्। आह। यत्र धर्मस्यादर्शनम्[43]। एतज्जातीयसूत्राणामाशयगृहीतारो [५ᵃ] न स्वीकुर्युरिदं निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानमभिसमेति तथतालम्बनञ्चेति।

किञ्च सा तथता न परमार्थः आलम्बनत्वात्, रूपादिवत्।

यदुक्तं भवता परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति इति। यद्यनेन वचनेन अस्मिन् तदभावात् [इदं] शून्यमिति[44] शून्यसमाख्या, घटे न पुनः घटोऽस्तीति गवाजपालाद्योऽपि सामान्यतो जानन्ति। तेऽपि तत्त्वदर्शिनः स्युः[45]। किञ्च मिथ्यादृष्टिविपक्षत्वात् एवं शून्य[तो]पदेशः। परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्तीति तज्जातीयमिथ्यादृष्टिसमायोगस्यासंभवात्

39 Or *Sālambanatvāt*

40 Same difference of reading as noted in the note 38 above. Poussin says that he would translate the phrase into Skt: *lokālambanajñānavat* I would, however, suggest a more idiomatic Skt *laukikālambana*

41 = *So chịan* I See Śatasāhasrikā, p 295 (L V. P)

42 Lit *atra*

43 See the discourse of Bhagavant to Mañjuśrī in Āryadhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra, M vṛtti, 295-298 in what manner one should see the truths (L V P)

44 Poussin suggests the phrase : *tatra tadabhāvāt [tat] śūnyaṁ ucyate*. I 'Mais la premier *Kòng* fait difficulté'.

45 Laṅkāv sutra, 292 : *Sarve syuḥ tattvadarśinaḥ* I

तत्प्रतिषेधको न स्यात् एवं शून्य[तो]पदेशः। सा तथता च न सत्स्वभावा पूर्वोक्तानुमानविरोधात्॥

न तथागतः पश्यति संसारं यावन्निर्वाणम्। संप्रजानाति च भावविपर्ययोत्पन्नक्लेशविगतं प्रकृत्यात्यन्ताजातिस्वभावम्[16]। एवं संप्रज्ञानस्वरूपं प्रकृत्यात्यन्तमसंप्रज्ञानं नचासंप्रज्ञानमिति। अनेनागमेन तथता सर्वविकल्पोपशममात्रं[47] [6a] न सत्स्वभावा इति ज्ञेयम्। नान्वयतो[48] न व्यतिरेकतः सत्स्वभावस्तथता आश्रयपरावृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मकायः[49] सिद्ध्यति। शून्यतादर्शनेन[50] प्रतिपक्षमार्गलाभात् सर्वविकल्पपरिकल्पितयोजाश्रये विपाकविज्ञाने[51] विकल्पादिबीजानि निरवशेषमुपशामयन्ति। हेतुप्रत्ययाभावादत्यन्तानुत्पादः

---

46. Cp. Satyadvayāvatāra, M vṛtti, p 374 Mañjuśrī explains to Devaputra : *yatsamā paramārthataḥ tathatā dharmadhātuḥ atyantājātiśca tatsamāni paramārthataḥ pañcānantaryāṇi*...!

47 Or *nirodhamātram*

48. *fei-li-fei-yu. shih-hsin* Poussin translates the first part, *fei li fei yeou* "Tathatā—non pas à part d'être, non pas être" and connecting the second part *che sing* along with the next word reads *bhūtatathatā*. I have rendered it as above following the Chinese punctuation Further his rendering *fei li* (=*fei li yeou*) into "non pas à part d'être" is far from correct. *li* means simply separation', 'absence of anything', not 'partly separation', etc. since *li* is used in contrast with *yu*, I have put them *vyatireka* and *anvaya* respectively

49. Siddhi, 606. *Āśrayaparāvṛttim anutpādam vadāmi aham*—Laṅkāvatāra, 202 (comp 266, 275, 284, 322, 338, L. V. P.).

50. Poussin remarks : 'Dans Abhidharma, le chemin "contrecarrant" qui est la vue des quatre vérités, expulse la passion ; il est suivi d'un chemin de délivrance, *vimuktimārga* : délivrance qui résulte de l' expulsion, Kośa, Index, p. 84.

51. Another name of *Ālayavijñāna*, Siddhi, 166.

प्रकृत्यानुत्पाद प्रकृत्या सदास्थिति[52] नाम तथागतः आश्रयपरावृत्तिः धर्मकाय इति। यथोक्तं सूत्रे[53]। तथागत इति मञ्जुश्रीः अत्यन्तं प्रकृत्याजातिपदम्। नित्यमनुत्पत्तिधर्म इदमुच्यते तथागत इति॥

यदि वदसि तथता व्यवहारविनिर्मुक्तापि सत्स्वभावा इति। तदा तीर्थिकानामात्मानमेव तथता इति संज्ञाविशेषेण व्यवहरसि[54]। यथा सा तथता सत्स्वभावाऽपि परमार्थतोऽसिद्धसदादिविकल्पा। तथात्मापि। तेऽपि हि मन्यन्ते-आत्मा विभुर्नित्यः कर्ता मोक्तापि विकल्पमुक्त, अभिलाप-गोचरानात्मवत्वात् विकल्पबुद्ध्यनालम्बनत्वाच्च विकल्पमुक्त इत्याख्यायते। इति। उक्त हि तदागमे[55]। [6b] [यत्र] वाक् न प्रवर्तति चित्तं मनश्च न पश्यति स आत्मा इति। तल्लक्षणे आत्मनि पुनर्वदसि तथतालम्बन-ज्ञानान्मुक्तिं लभते नात्मालम्बनज्ञानात् केन विशेषेणेदम्। सर्वथा[56] नास्तीत्युच्यते। [उभयोः] सत्स्वभावत्वात्। केवलं पक्षपातेन एवं वदसि। अतो नाहं सश्रद्धं स्वीकरोमि। एवं तथता आत्मसरूपा वस्तुसती नास्तीत्यलं विवादेन। तस्या विपुलग्रन्थार्थोद्भिन्ना दुर्मर्हत्वात्। [57]तत्त्वामृता-वतारे ■ [58]विचारितपूर्वम् [इदम]।

52 = *Prakṛtinitya* of Siddhi, 701 (L V P)

53 Comp Vajracchedikā · *Tathatā iti subhūte bhūtatathatāyāḥ anutpādadharmatāyāḥ dharmocchedasya atyantānutpannasya etadadhivacanam* ।

54 Cp. Laṅkāvatāra 77, where one sees that the doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha is similar to Ātmavāda (L V P).

55 Cp Kaṭha up VI 12 *Naiva vācā na manasā prāptum śakyaḥ*, etc Kena I, 4 6 , Bṛhadāraṇyaka III, 7, 17, 20

56 = *Pin wu* Shanghai ed reads *ping wu*

57 This work is already mentioned by the author, see note 112 in the first chapt p 58.

58 Lit *vikalpitam*

केचित्स्वयूथ्या हीनयानिनः पुनरेवं वदन्ति। द्वादशायतनसंगृहीताः संस्कृतासंस्कृता नियमेन सत्त्वमानाः। यस्मात् कश्चित् दुःखादिषोडशाकारकचतुरार्यसत्ये दर्शनभावनामार्गद्वयं प्रयोगेनाभ्यसन् दर्शनभावनाहेयान् सर्वत्रैधातुकसंगृहीतान् क्लेशाग्रहीन् निरुन्धानः उपशमितसर्वत्रैधातुकदुःखो भवति। इति। सर्वधर्माः स्वभावशून्या इति यदि न संदर्शयेयम्। कस्त्यजेदिमं[59] दोषम्। को वा पुनरभ्यसेदिमं गुणम्।

यानत्रये संभारेन्द्रियस्वभावा-[7a] विमुक्तिविभिन्नेऽपि अभिसमयः आर्यमार्गश्चाभिन्न.[60] इति तु सर्वं वयं श्रद्दधामहे। क्लेशावरणप्रहाणस्येष्टत्वात्[61]। संवृतिनयेन स मार्गो विभिन्नः। यदि धर्मनैरात्म्यावतारमपाकरोषि ज्ञेयावरणस्याप्रहाणात् शास्ता प्रादेशिकविमुक्त.[62] स्यात्।

ननु[63] मुक्तिर्मुक्तेरभिन्नेति किं नोपदिष्टम्। सत्यमुपदिष्टम्। क्लेशावरणविमुक्तिसाम्यादेवमुक्तम्। न तु सर्वप्रकारेण। यथा रोमकूपो महाकाशेन तुलितोऽपि नाभिन्न.[64]। तथा नो चेत् [65]विशिष्टफलक्रियानारम्भिका,

---

59 Lit *evam*.

60 This is the remark of Hinayānists, Vasumitra, Traite des sectes, Masuda, V, 37, IX, 22, X, 3, Siddhi, 702 (L V P.)

61 On the two āvaraṇas see Siddhi, 564 (L V P.)

62 Poussin translates "Dans ce cas, le Grand Maitre devrait enseigner une delivrance partielle" But *Ch eng* means 'to accomplish', not 'to teach' etc

63 Poussin puts this and the previous sentence in one para under the remarks of Hinayānists My punctuation is based on the Chinese one in the present edition of the text

64 Cp. Varṇanārhavarṇana F W Thomas, Ind. Ant 1903, (vol 32), 346 at Hoernle, MSS Remains, 78 —
रोमकूपशुषिरच्छिद्रेण यद्यथा प्रतिबिम्ब्येत्, etc.

65 See Kośa VI, 197, 277, on *viśeṣamārga*.—Ascetic obtains vimuktis successively. (L. V. P.).

ऋद्धयभिज्ञा[66] स्यात्। साक्षात्कृतञ्च न तत्त्वपर्यन्तं स्यात् इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन। प्रकृतं विचारयामः॥

योगी स्वसमयकल्पितमाकाशादिकं शून्यं प्रविष्ट इव परसमयकल्पितान् प्रकृतिपुरुषपरमाण्वीश्वरकालदिग्जीवादिपदार्थान् शून्यान् प्रविशेत्।

तत्र [67]प्रकृतिपुरुषवादिन इदं दूषणमाहुः। अस्मत्पक्षे त्रिधातवः सर्व [7 b] [68]खपुष्पवत्परिणता [इति] नासत्खपुष्पम्। तस्य सत्त्वेन सम-दृष्टान्तो न सिध्यति साध्यविरोधात्। इति। इदानीं [69]पर्यनुयोक्तव्यम् [यत्] त्वयोक्तं त्रिधातव सर्वं खपुष्पवत्परिणता इति। किमेकं त्रिधातु [मयं] खपुष्पमस्तीति। तव पक्षस्य साधारणप्रतीतिबाधात् न युज्यते। यदि वदसि त्रिधातु [मयं] खपुष्पं नास्तीति। तदा न सिध्यति समदृष्टान्त इति तव मूलपक्षस्य हानिः।

यदि वदसि न हानिः। खपुष्पमसत्स्वरूपम्[70]। उक्तत्रिधातूनां

---

66 Poussin construes this along with the next word and translates Ce qui est realisé par ṛddhi abhijñā ne serait pas vraiment définitif He further remarks the translation is doubtful He refers to Aṅguttara II, 274 'la vijñā- [na] et vimukti sont sacchikatavva par l abhijñā. My translation is based on Chinese punctuation and syntax

67 Note this is an early Sankhya school prior to the classical Sankhyas mentioned in the next section

68 Or khapuṣpākāram, or — ābhāsam

69 Or *paryanuyoga* Poussin refers to Kośa XXV, 5a 8, Nyāyabindu, 74, N Kośa

70 See additional Notes for explanation Poussin taking this word along with the next one translates "parce que la fleur du ciel a la nature des trois dhātus designés par le mot *abhāva*, inexistence". This interpretation stands unconnected with *paryanuyoga* raised in the next sentence So following the Chinese punctuation I have interpreted it so as to suit with the context.

सस्वभावत्वात्। तदापि विचारणीयम्। किमाह भवान् अहं वदामि खपुष्पं नास्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त इति। किं वा खपुष्पमस्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त इति। यदि आह भवान् अहं वदामि खपुष्पं नास्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त इति। दुष्टो विचारः[71]। खपुष्पस्य साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तत्वेन कथनात्। यदि वा वदामि खपुष्पमस्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त इति। तदा न त्रिधातु [भयम्]। न वक्तव्यं त्रिधातूनां भावत्वात् तदपि भाव इति। इदं वचनं तव स्वप्रज्ञालाघवं प्रकाशयति। [72]प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेधप्रधानः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषिध्य चरितार्थः[73]। [8 a] न पुनः प्रतिषेध्यव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञापयितुं समर्थः[74]। एवं वचनदूषणं [75]पूर्वमेव व्याख्यातम्। अतः प्राज्ञैर्न श्रद्धेयम्॥

साङ्ख्याः पुनरेवं वदन्ति। न वयं यद्यपि साधयामः प्रधानं पुरुषं वा [76]साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षेण। तथापि साधारणप्रतीत्या विकारगणप्रयोगेन[77] तं

---

71. Or *parīkṣā*. The sense requires a word which would suggest the idea of *anuvāda*

72. =*prasajyapratiṣedha*, see N. Kośa, 1st chap n. 78 above, p.50.

73. Lit. *Kṛtakṛtyaḥ* !

74. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika, III, *Na cāpi śabdo dvayakṛt*, with vṛtti. Ṭippaṇī: *na tu ekaḥ śabdaḥ vidhipratiṣedhakṛt*. See Ibid, p 350 the distinction between *paryudāsa* and *pratiṣedha*.

75. See chap. I, p. 50, para 1.

76. *Ch'in-hsien* = Intimately showing, etc. *chin* means sometimes 'one's own self = *sva* : in this case it may be put as *svapratyakṣa*.

77. See Sāṅkhyakārikas, Suvarṇasaptati, ver. 15, five prayogas with regard to Pradhāna, ver 17 another five prayogas for Puruṣa.

वस्तुसन्त साधयाम । तथा हि । व्यक्ता [78]सद्धेतुका साजात्यात् । सर्वे सजातीया भावा सत्ताहेतुका दृष्टा । यथा चन्दनखण्डादय[79] । व्यक्ताश्च सजातीया इति सत्ताहेतुका । एव व्यक्तानि समोत्कृकानि । उपभोग्यत्वात् । उपभोग्यानि सर्वाणि समोत्कृकानि दृष्टानि । यथा ब्राह्मणोपभोग्यमन्नपानव्यक्तम् उपभोग्यत्वात् समोत्कृकम्[80] । इति पूर्वोक्तानुमान[81] प्रतिप्रमाणबाधितम् । इति ।

इदं स्वृत्या[82] यदि सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि सत्ताहेतुकानि साधयसि । न विशेष विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम्[83] । यदि व्यक्तानि [8 b] [84]सुखादि-हेतुकानि साधयसि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्त[85] । हेतुरपि न सिध्यति ।

---

78 *Sattā pradhānākhyā* see Pramānavārtika vṛtti *ad* III 186 c d Poussin gives reference to Siddhi I 27 (Theory of Vaiśeṣikas) He also suggests for *sajātiya satprakāra* with query Here *sajātiya* is the same as *samanvaya* of the Sāṅkhyakārikā 15

79 This whole *prayoga* including the example is the same as *bhedānām samanvayāt* (= *samasvabhāvatvāt*) in the Suvarṇasaptati ver 15 p 21

80 The same *prayoga* is intended in *saṅghātasya parārthatvāt* Suvarṇasaptati ver 17 with comment where the same example is given Ibid p 25

81 Poussin has included this sentence in the section of *siddhānta* which fact is due to wrong punctuation in his text

82 Lit *Idam sāmvṛtam* or *Samvṛtitah* etc

83 *Sattāsāmānyasya anisiddhatvāt* Cf Pramāṇavārtika vṛtti III 189 c-d

84 Sattvādiviśeṣitasattā Cf Pram vār vṛtti III 188 c d 189 a b

85 = *Hetuḥ ananvayaḥ* Ibid also p 353 Tippaṇi 6 *Atha sattāyāh sāmānye sādhye siddhasādhyatā ato viśeṣah sādhyaḥ* l *tatra ananvayāt sādhyatānyo vṛttāntāh ato na sattā* l The same is the opinion of Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga, Ibid IV 32 39 pp 426 429

सुखादिजाते[86]हमयानभ्युपगमात्। यदनुमानेन[87] हेतुं साधयसि। चत्वारः स्कन्धाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकाः[88]। एतत्स्कन्धस्वभावत्वात्, वेदनास्कन्धवत्। इति। उक्तो मोहो न वेदनास्कन्धान्तर्गत इति समदृष्टान्तासिद्धिः।

किञ्च तव पुरुषो नानारूपाणां संश्रितार्थ एव [स] एव सङ्घातार्थः। अनेन पुरुषहेतुसिद्धिरनैकान्तिकी।

तव सुखादिः प्रत्येकमुभयपक्षयो र्न [89]संभवति। एतत्स्कन्धस्वभावत्वादिति हेतुता न सिध्यति।

[90]यद्य परमार्थतोऽस्ति चन्दनखण्डः सत्ताहेतुक इति। [तद्] न साधारणाभ्युपगतमित्यतो दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः।

किञ्च संवृत्या सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि स्रोपभोक्तृकानि साधयसि। न विशेषं विचारयसि। तदा सिद्धसाधनम्। भोक्तृभावस्य लोकप्रतीतत्वात्। यदि साधयसि व्यक्तानि नित्यविभुचेतनस्वभावभोक्तृकानि साधयसि। समदृष्टान्तासिद्धिः। एवंरूपग्राहकाणां साधारणानभ्युपगमात्। यदि परमार्थतः, समदृष्टान्तोऽसिद्धः। अन्नपानभोक्तुः तत्स्वभावस्य [9 a] साधारणानभ्युपगमात्। [अतः] पूर्वोक्तानुमानं न सबाधकप्रतिप्रमाणकम्॥

---

86 Ie Sukhādyātmakasañjñatyahetuh This remark is also intended in the *heturanavayah* of Dharmakirti, see previous note

87 Pram vār vṛtti *ad* III 18 b c d where *acetanatvādi* is to be employed for the same purpose

88. = *Sattvarajastamas* in the terminology of Sāṅkhyas.

89 *Wu neng* Poussin has interpreted in a slightly different manner "ils (Sukha, etc.) ne peuvent pas, pris à part, [etre le sujet de] proposition distinctes, parce qu' ils sont des skandhas" He seems to ignore *er* "two". The author intends to point out the said reason, *etatskandhasvabhāvatva* is not proved because the character, sukha, etc. can not be existent individually for both parties.

90 Lit *yadi*

वैशेषिका पुनरेवं वदन्ति। प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारा-दिलिङ्गानि[91] नियतलिङ्गीनि। लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]वत्। इति। संवृत्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तानि लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि। न विशेषं विचारयसि। तदा सिद्धसाधनम्। संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-[92]भावस्या बाधात्। यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविभुसुखाद्या-श्रयात्मलिङ्गीनि। तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः। साध्यस्य बाधात्। यदि परमार्थतः। तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोषः। अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगा-काशादयः प्रतिषेध्याः॥

पुनर्वैशेषिका एवं दूषयन्ति। परमाणून्[93] मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः। शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति [94]स्वतोऽसिद्धः। यथाह इमाणुमौ संस्कृतान्तर्गतावेति। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः [95]परतोऽसिद्धहेतुः। इति शून्यतावतारः प्रादेशिकः[96] स्यात्। इति॥

यदि मनः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति।

---

91. See Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, III, 2, 4, Abh. Kośavyākhyā I, 5, Ui, Vaiseṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text Poussin says that editions, Sung, Yuan, and Ming have *ming, jīvana* for *ling* of our text, of Taisho and Shenghai eds

92. *It is worth noticing of* Vijñānabhikṣu's *remark to the same* effect in his Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya I, 138 : *Naivam puruṣasya sādhanam apekṣitam* | *Cetanāpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktari ahampadārthe sāmānyato Bauddhānām api avivādāt* | *dharma iva* | *dharmo hi sāmānyato Bauddhairapi svīkriyate* | (Bl. p. 93)

93. See Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 140, 147.

94. *Svatah* by itself.

95. *Paratah* from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view.

96. *Poussin suggests mandabhāgīya* which is improbable. The phrase has alreaby been found twice : see, pp. 61, l 21, and 77, l. 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम्। साध्यतां मनः तथापि नासंस्कृतम्। ज्ञानजनकहेतुत्वात् रूपादिवत्। एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्वभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्यादयोऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः। परमाणवोऽपि नासंस्कृताः आरम्भकहेतुत्वात् तन्त्वादिवत्। एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंख्यासामान्यादिहेतवो यथोचितं [हेतुत्वेन] वक्तव्याः। द्व्यणुक[97] जन्यं वा स्थूलपदार्थः न नित्यहेतुः। जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत्। एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात् सहेतुकत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः। अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्याकल्पिता मनःपरमाणवश्च स्वभावशून्याः। तस्मान्नास्ति यथोक्तदोषः॥

पूर्वोक्तसांख्यवैशेषिकशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानायुक्तिवत् अचेलकादि[98] शास्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साधयितव्याः॥

[10ᵃ] एवं दूषणानि निराकृत्य योगी सम्यगनुमानबलेन स्वपरोभयसमयकल्पितानसंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत्।

श्रुतसिद्धागमद्वारबलेन स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टभावनाबलविकलो न ज्ञेयावरणं समुच्छेत्तुं शक्नुयात्। अतः पुनस्त्वरितं विशिष्टभावनाबलमभ्यसेत्[99]॥

यद्यत्र संस्कृतासंस्कृतनिमित्त[100]मेकाकारवत् सान्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

---

97. Or it may read syntactically *dvyaṇukārabdhas sthūlapadārtho na nityahetukaḥ* ! But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binnary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on Ālambanaparīkṣā, pp. 23, [illegible] with note 10. Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 129, 131.

98. The commentary says: The naked-bodied Tīrthika [illegible] Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or, *lakṣaṇa*.

वैशेषिका पुनरेवं वदन्ति। प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारादिलिङ्गानि[91] नियतलिङ्गीनि। लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]वत्। इति। संवृत्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तानि लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि। न विशेषं विचारयसि। तदा सिद्धसाधनम्। संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-[92]भावस्या भावात्। यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविभुसुखाद्याश्रयात्मलिङ्गीनि। तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्त। साध्यस्य बाधात्। यदि परमार्थतः। तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोष। अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगाकाशादयः प्रतिषेध्याः॥

पुनर्वैशेषिका एवं दूषयन्ति। परमाणून्[93] मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः। शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति [94]स्वतोऽसिद्धः। यदाह इमावुभौ संस्कृतान्तर्गताविति। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः [95]परतोऽसिद्धहेतुः। इति शून्यतावतारः प्रादेशिकः[96] स्यात्। इति॥

यदि मतः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति।

---

91 See Vaiśeṣika Sutras, III 2, 4, Abh Kośavyākhyā I, 5, Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text Poussin says that editions Sung, Yuan, and Ming have *ming, jivana* for *ling* of our text, of Taisho and Shanghai eds

[illegible] It is worth noticing of Vijñānabhikṣu's remark to the same effect in his Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya I 138. *Naivam puruṣasya sādhanam apekṣitam I Cetanāpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktari ahampadārthe sāmānyato Bauddhānām api avivādāt I dharma iva I dharmo hi sāmānyato Bauddhairapi svīkriyate I* (BI p. 93)

,93 See Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp 140, 147

[illegible] *Svataḥ* by itself

95. *Parataḥ* from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view

96 Poussin suggests *mandabhāgīya* which is improbable The phrase has alreaby been found twice see, pp [illegible] l 21 and 77, l 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम्। साध्यता मनः तथापि नासंस्कृतम्। ज्ञानजनकहेतुत्वात् रूपादिवत्। एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्वभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्यादयोऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः। परमाणवोऽपि नासंस्कृताः आरम्भकहेतुत्वात् तन्त्वादिवत्। एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंख्यासामान्यादिहेतवो यथोचितं [हेतुत्वेन] वक्तव्याः। द्व्यणुकं[97] जन्यं वा स्थूलपदार्थः न नित्यहेतुः। जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत्। एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात् सहेतुकत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः। अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्याकल्पिता मनःपरमाणवश्च स्वभावशून्याः। तस्मान्नास्ति यथोक्तदोषः॥

पूर्वोक्तसांख्यवैशेषिकशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानायुक्तिवत् अचेलकादि[98] शास्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साधयितव्याः॥

[10a] एवं दूषणानि निरस्य योगी सम्यगनुमानबलेन स्वपरोभयसमयकल्पितानसंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत्।

श्रुतचिन्ताज्ञानद्वारबलेन स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टभावनाबलवियुक्तो न ह्यावरणं समुच्छेत्तुं शक्नुयात्। अतः पुनस्त्वरितं विशिष्टभावनाबलमभ्यसेत्[99]॥

यद्यत्र संस्कृतासंस्कृतनिमित्त[100]मेकाकारवत् सान्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

---

97. Or it may read syntactically *dvyanukārabdhas sthūlapadārtho na nityahetukaḥ* | But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author. It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on Ālambanaparīkṣā, pp. 23, 60 with note 10, Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp 129, 131.

98. The commentary says: The naked-bodied Tīrthika i. e. Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or, *lakṣaṇa*.

समुदाचरति। तदा तत् स्वभावशून्यं योनिशो भावयित्वा तन्निमित्तं निराकृत्यानभिव्यक्तं कुर्यात्। धर्माणा विविक्तस्वभावत्वात् तत्प्रकृतिशून्य- [ता] प्रविशति। प्रकृतिशून्यत्वात् असिद्धनिमित्ता अनिमित्ता भवंति। अनिमित्तत्वात् अप्रणिहिताः सन्तोऽप्रणिधाना भवन्ति। विविक्तनिमित्तमत्वात् विविक्ताः। विविक्तनिमित्तत्वात् तत्प्रतीत्य जातानां क्लेशानामत्यन्तमजातत्वात् शान्ताः। अनुत्पन्नस्वभावत्वा- दनुत्पन्नाः। अनुत्पादात् नानित्या न दुःखा नापि निरात्मकाः। [10b] अनुत्पादाश्च न सनिमित्ताः। अनिमित्तत्वात् अनिमित्तैकलक्षणचर्यया सर्वधर्मान् भावयित्वा अद्वयेऽवतरति। एतल्लक्षणचर्यया [101]भावनाविशेष- मभ्यसन् एवमभिवृद्धभावनाविशेषबलत्वात् स्थूलनिमित्तं निराकृत्य अनभिव्यक्तं करोति। अनेन अनाचरितमाकारं करोति यदुत संस्कृतास्या- संस्कृतस्य चाकारग्रहः। यथा तैमिरिकः स्थूलतिमिरमपहाय विशुद्धनेत्रः आगतपूर्वान् ग्राह्याकारान् न पश्यति ॥

यद्यपि अत्र लब्धाप्रतिष्ठानौ [यांगी]। तथापि शून्यतादिविकल्प- समुदाचारेण [102]साभोगचित्तसन्तानं पुनर्वर्तते। अलब्धाचलज्ञानः[103] शून्यतादिविकल्पसमुदाचारावृतलोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पप्रज्ञो भवति। सनिपुणं सम्यक्प्रहाणं प्रहातुमेवं प्रत्यवेक्षेत। परमार्थेन स्वभावशून्येऽर्थे शून्यता-

101 Similar expression on pp 34, l 5 83, l 13.

102 Functioning and running toward an object

103 *Wu tung lvao-chih* The first two characters are *akṣobhya*, *āniñjya* in the M Vyutpatti The sense is that the ascetic has not yet obtained the eighth stage, acala bhūmi Siddhi, 616 (L V P,) But Poussin leaves untranslated the last two characters Ascetic has not yet obtained the motionless state *of mind*, because it is still *sābhoga*, running towards an object.

द्विविकल्पोऽपि न वस्तुसन्। प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् मायादिवत्। एवं भावनया पुनः शून्यतादिविकल्पं निराकरोति। तन्निराकरणात् शून्याशून्यताद्यन्तद्वयविविक्तः[104] न पुनः शून्यताद्याकारेण [11a] धर्मान् प्रत्यवेक्षते।

यथोक्तम्, [105]प्रज्ञापारमितायाम् समुदाचरन् रूपं[106] न समनुपश्यति नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति, न समनुपश्यति सुखमिति न दुःखमिति। न समनुपश्यति आत्मेति न अनात्मेति। न समनुपश्यति शान्तमिति नाशान्तमिति। न समनुपश्यति शून्यमिति नाशून्यमिति। न समनुपश्यति निमित्तमिति नानिमित्तमिति। न समनुपश्यति प्रणिहितमिति नाप्रणिहितमिति। न समनुपश्यति विविक्तमिति नाविविक्तमिति। एवं ... वेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारविज्ञानानि सर्वं रूपशब्दगन्धरसस्प्रष्टव्यधर्माः सर्वाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनांसि, [107]दानशीलक्षमावीर्यध्यानप्रज्ञापारमितास्स्मृत्युपस्थान[108] सम्यक् प्रहाणर्द्धिपादेन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गमार्गाङ्ग[109]

---

104. See Kośa, VIII, 188, *Śūnyatāśūnyatā-samādhi* succeeding to *Śūnyatā-samādhi* (L. V P)

105 See Śatasāhasrikā, pp 765-872 where the formula goes : *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran arūpe carati* | *na rūpasya nimitte carati* | *na rūpam nityam iti carati* | *na rūpam anityam iti carati* | *na rūpam sukham iti carati* | *na rūpam duhkham iti carati* | etc. The formula is repeated with regard to each of the following items · *vedanā*, *samjñā*, etc upto *mahākarunā*. Cp passages cited in the *Bodhicar*. pañjikā, p 427 : *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran rūpam bhāva iti na bhāvayati* | etc. Cp. *Bhūtapratyavekṣā* described in Kāśyapap pp 83-85

106. Lit *Rūpe*.

107. Prajñāp has also included 18 dhātus, 6 dhātus, *pṛthivī-dhātu*, etc. and 12 nidānas.

108 Ibid. After this 18 Śūnyatas are mentioned.

109. Ibid. Mentioned as *aṣṭāṅgamārga*.. After this 4 truths are mentioned.

ध्याना[110] रूप्यसमापत्त्य[111] मित्रा[112] दशब[113] लवैशारद्यसर्वप्रतिसंवि-[114]दावेणिकाबुद्धधर्मसर्वसमाधिधारणीमुखसर्वज्ञानानि[115] न समनुपश्यति नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति। इति विस्तरः।

य एवमन्तद्वयविविक्त ■ चिरं मध्यमायां [प्रतिपदि] साधु चरति। अयमन्तद्वयरहितो [11 b] मध्यममार्गनय.—यथापूर्वमुक्तानुमानद्वयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतरूपराश्यभावात् अरूपो नामोच्यते। अरूपित्वेन भावादि-सर्वविकल्पानामभावात् नास्ति कश्चिद्धर्मः यादृशः स, तादृशोऽयमपीति मिथो निदर्शनार्हः। अतोऽनिदर्शनो नाम। अभावस्वभावत्वादा-श्रयाश्रयिभावाप्रसिद्ध्या प्रतिष्ठा नास्तीत्यतोऽप्रतिष्ठो नाम। यदि संस्कृतलक्षणमसंस्कृतलक्षणं वा, यदि विकल्पितमविकल्पितं वा, यदि विकल्पकमविकल्पकं वा इत्येवमादिनिमित्तप्रज्ञानं न समाचरतीति अनाभासो नाम। सर्वभावनिमित्ताभावनिमित्तविविक्तविषयकविज्ञान-स्यानुत्पन्नत्वात् अविज्ञप्तिको नाम। अरूपत्वादमूर्तत्वाद्दिग्भागनिकेताभावाद्-निकेतो नाम[116]।

यथा भगवान् काश्यपमाह। नित्यमिति [काश्यप] अयमेको-ऽन्त। अनित्यमिति [काश्यप] अयं द्वितीयोऽन्त। यदेतयोर्द्वयो-

---

110 Ibid After this come apramaṇas

111. Ibid After this come 2 more items : *na vimokṣeṣu carati* , .. *nānupūrvavihārasamāpattiṣu carati* .... । *na śūnyatānimittapraṇihita vimokṣeṣu carati* .. . ।

112 Ibid After this come samādhis and dhāraṇīmukhas

113 Ibid Mentioned as *Tathāgatabala*.

114 Ibid After comes *na mahākaruṇāyām carati*...... ।

115 Ibid This is not included in the list

116 Poussin draws attention to the last passage in the text not identified in the Appendix to Mah Sūtrālaṅkāra (ed S Levi) where the *nirvikalpajñāna* is so qualified as *madhyamā pratipat* here Cp Ratnakūṭa cited in the Sikṣā p 234 e 2 · *Cittam hi Kāśyapa arūpam anidarśanam apratigham avijñaptikam apratiṣṭhitam aniketam* ।

[नित्यानित्ययो] मध्यं तदरूपि अनिदर्शनमनाभासमविज्ञप्तिकमप्रतिष्ठमनिकेतम्। इयमुच्यते [काश्यप] मध्यमा प्रतिपद् धर्माणां भूतप्रत्यवेक्षा। [12 a] यावत् अस्तीति [काश्यप] अयमेकोऽन्तः। नास्तीत्ययं द्वितीयोऽन्त इति विस्तरः[117]।

किञ्चाह भगवान् काश्यपम्। विद्याविद्या च द्वे न स्तः, द्वयविशेषेऽत्र न संप्रज्ञानम्। इयमुच्यते [काश्यप] मध्यमा प्रतिपत्[118]।

[य] एवमन्तद्वयविवेककुशलः [तस्य] अद्वयसंज्ञायां विहरमाणस्य समुत्पन्नोऽ द्वयसंज्ञाविकल्पः। [त] मपि जानाति लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानस्य शान्तविहारस्यावरणमिति। [अतो] यथोक्तहेतुमाशु समुच्छेदयति। तत्समुच्छेदात् [119]इदमेवमिति नास्ति विकल्पः, सर्वो द्वयवचनमनोजल्पश्च शाम्यति। साक्षात्करोति धर्माणां भूतस्वभावमनाभोगमनाभासमनिमित्तं प्रपञ्चविनिर्मुक्तम्। एतदालम्बनेऽनाभोगसाक्षात्कारं प्रविश्य स्वलक्षण-[120]ज्ञानस्रोतसि विहरति॥

अविपरीतशून्यताभावनामभ्यसन्नपि नैव शून्यतां साक्षात्कुर्यात्। तदा परमार्थध्यानं [121]नामोच्यते।

---

117. Kāśyapaparivarta ed Stael-Holstein, pp 86-90.

118 This passage is not traceable in the Kāśyapapar, as such. I however, suppose that this may be an adaptation of § 58 : *Bhūtacittam iti...... । abhūtacittam iti ..... । yatra Kāśyapa na cetanā na mano na vijñānam । iyam ucyate .....* ।

119. Lit. *evam evam.*

120. Or *jñānasrotasswalakṣane viharati or pratitiṣṭhati* ।

121. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p 370 · *na Bodhisattvena Mahāsattvena śūnyatā sākṣāt kartavyā* Cp Daśabhūmika, Rahder, 61. (L V. P.) Cp. also passages in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p 379 : *Bodhisattvo...na śūnyatām sākṣātkaroti* । *nānimittam sākṣātkaroti......* ।

प्रथमादिग्रहे [183]निरुद्धे, [184]ज्ञातव्यानिमित्तविषयतापि [185]प्रतिपत्ति-विहीना। हेतुप्रत्ययवैकल्यात्। अन्यद् ज्ञान [मपि] न जायते प्रतिपत्त्य-भावात्। तस्मात् [186]यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिरित्युच्यते।

[14ᵃ] यथाह भगवान्। कतमा यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः। यद्धर्माणाम-त्यन्ताप्रतिपत्तिः इयमुच्यते यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः। किञ्च यथाह सूत्रम्। तथागतो बोधिमत्यन्तं नाभिसमेति[187]। यथा [हि] मञ्जुश्रीपरिपृच्छा। सत्यदर्शिभिः कतमद्द्रष्टव्यम्। आह। न को ऽपि धर्मो द्रष्टव्यः। कस्मात्। पृथग्जनदृश्यं सर्वं मृषा। [188]यददर्शनं तत् सत्यदर्शनम्। यथा

---

183 Poussin construes this phrase along with the previous sentence. This is not admissible.

184 See above p 89, l 2

185 *Hsing chieh* The exact equivalent of this phrase in Sanskrit is not known I have done it '*pratipatti* in the sense of *kāritra* according to the explanation given in the Chinese Ency Dictionary (Chinese edition) p 1081, col 1. The Dictionary explains by quoting some authority "It is some sort of functioning of the mind," etc (*citta-kriyāviśeṣa*, this Skt phrase is mine) It goes further: "Function is called *hsing chieh*" Image is called aspect (*pratibimbam ākāraḥ*) Cp Pram vār vṛtti, IV, 160, p 467 · *arthānām apratipattiḥ*. Poussin makes these remarks: Mouvement—intellection, *hing-kiai*—Expliqué ci dessous comme synonyme de *satyadarśana*, *abhisamaya*, figure dans deux lexiques de Rosenberg, associé aux dix *śraddhas* (state préliminaire aux terres), glose de Siddhi, X, 14b 15a : "Avant l'entrée dans les terres le pense fait *hing kiai*, par conséquent distingue les deux vides, à la suit de *hing-kiai*, les images apparaissent. .."—Ci dessous *kiai* se place entre *samādhi prajñā*, et *jñāna-sākṣātkāra*—*kiai hing*, *adhimukti caryā*, *che-kiai*, *nirūpana*, *cheng kiai*, *pratipādana*, *kiai ou*, *sampratipatti*

186 *Cheng-shih bhūta*, *satya tattva*, etc

187 Same quotation on p 74, l 6

188. Lit. *dṛśyamāna* See p 74, 3 7, the same idea emphasized

पुनः पृच्छति। कथमभिसमये[139] योगः करणीय। आह। यद् ज्ञाने नास्ति कोऽपि धर्मः चेतना[140] विकल्पः इति। एवमभिसमये योगः करणीयः। पुनः पृच्छति। कतमः[141] साक्षात्कृताभिसमयः। आह। [142]यः सर्वधर्मसमतां पश्यति। पुनः पृच्छति। किमस्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शी। आह। नास्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शी। यद्यस्ति [143]यद्दर्शनम् तदसमतादर्शनं स्यात्। यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः सत्यदर्शनमभिसमयश्च सर्वं समानार्थकम्। इति।

योगी तस्मिन् समये चित्ते मनसि विज्ञाने ज्ञाने[वा] अचरन् निर्विकल्पकप्रज्ञां सम्यक् [144]चरतीत्युच्यते।

[14b] यदैव [145]अगोचरे चरति तदा तथागतादर्हतः सम्यक्संबुद्धात् तत्त्वव्याकरणं लभते। यथाह सूत्रम्। कथं भगवन् बोधिसत्त्वः अनुत्तमां सम्यक् संबोधिं भावयित्वा तथागतेभ्योऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धेभ्यस्तत्त्वव्याकरणं लभते। बोधिसत्त्वो ब्राह्मण यदस्मिन् समये न जातौ चरति न निरोधे चरति। न कुशले चरति नाकुशले चरति। न लोके चरति न लोकोत्तरे चरति। न सास्रवे चरति नानास्रवे चरति। न सावद्ये चरति न निरवद्ये चरति। न संस्कृते चरति नासंस्कृते चरति। न योगे

---

139 No case ending in Chinese.

140. *Szu-wei* = *cetanā*

141. *It may be done . katham But the sense requires katamaḥ*

142 Lit *Yadi*

143 Lit *Yadi asti dṛśyam tadā asamatādarśanam sidhyet.*

144 Poussin suggests , *samyakpratipanna.*

145. Poussin notes that *so hsin* is normally gocara, Vyutpatti, 19, 8 , Kośa, XVIII, 13 a 6 grāhya XXVI, 12b1 'On serait :" Il se meut sans avoir de lieu où il se meuve" Comp Prajnā en 8000, p 353 : *Yo bhagavan evam carati sa na kvacit carati* !—Mais dans Laṅkāvatāra, 158 (Suzuki, Studies, 404) le jñānasamudācāravarjita, est dit "debarassé de *souo hing*, et cet traduction de *souo hing* "mouvement" *samudācāra*, *pracāra* convient mieux peut etre au texte, ci-dessou p 133'.

सम्यक्प्रहाणर्द्धिपादेन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गमार्गाङ्गपारमितासर्वाभिज्ञादशबलवैशा-रद्यावेणिकबुद्धधर्म [16a] समाधिधारणीमुखानि स्रोतापन्न सकृदागा-म्यनागामी यदि वार्हन्, यानि विद्यन्ते मार्गफलानि [तानि] सामान्यतो विशेषतो वा एकजातीयानि। इति विस्तरो यावत्सर्वज्ञज्ञानम्।

सर्वधर्माणामविपरीतस्वभावं सम्यक् प्रजानातीति प्राज्ञः। [158]पञ्चम्या निमित्तपरित्यागो हेतुप्रत्यय उच्यते। अपरिग्रह इति अपरिग्रहणमदर्शनम्। सैव शुद्धप्रज्ञा परि[159]कल्परहितेत्यर्थः। अनुपादानहेतुना किं साक्षा-त्क्रियते।

प्रज्ञाचारो निर्विकल्पमचरित्वा चरत्ययम्॥

प्रज्ञेति। सैव निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम्। सदा सर्वविकल्पवियुक्तोऽपि बुद्धप्रज्ञा[160]प्रकर्षे प्रकृत्या ज्ञानमिति नाम। अनाकारनिमित्तानभिधानाव-भासी। [161]विषयसमुत्थनिमित्त[162]स्वभावविकल्पस्याप्यभावात् निर्विकल्प इत्याख्या। अप्रतिष्ठितोऽपि अवस्थान्तरेण प्रज्ञप्त्या नाम व्यवस्थाप्यते।

---

158 This explanation of the suffix must come after the explanation of *prātipadika* according to the Sanskrit text This [illegible] it appears due to the order in the Chinese translation

159 Or *arthaparikalparahita*

160 Poussin suggests *sarvavikalpabuddhi-samāropa-vivikta* This is based on wrong punctuation

161 The passage is ill understood by Poussin on account of wrong punctuation

162 According to Vaibhāṣikas three vikalpas *svabhāvavi-*, *abhinirūpaṇāvi* *anusmaraṇavi* See Kośavyākhyā p 67 and the note 129 above

यथा निरुद्धो दीपः निरुद्धोऽर्हन्[163] इति। बुद्ध[164]प्रज्ञाप्रकर्षैः व्यपदेशस्त उक्तः। सन्तानस्यास्य निर्विकल्पक इत्याख्या यथा विकल्पज्ञानं सविकल्पकमिति। तत्र मान[165]सज्ञानमनुत्पन्नमिति यथेत्युच्यते। [16b] अनया ज्ञानचर्यया अदृश्यमानधर्मस्वभावमसाकारनिमित्तत्वात् नान्या पश्यतीति। तदेवादर्शनं तत्त्वदर्शनमित्युच्यते। यथार्थम् साक्षात्कृतत्वात्।

तत्त्वदर्शनक्रियाहस्य लक्षणं, सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्पकं वा तत्त्वदर्शनं सिध्यति[166]। तथा यदि दृश्यस्वभावा, न यत्कथ्यमदृश्य[167]स्वभावेति। यद्यपि संवृतितः समस्तादृष्टिस्तत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यते, तथापि गृहीतव्यमियमसमदृष्टिस्तत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यत इति।

न सर्वाणि दृश्यानि सन्ति। [168]संवृत्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वात्, यथा

---

163 "Le sens ne paraît pas douteux. C'est par métaphore qu'on parle de l'extinction de la lampe, du Nirvāṇa du saint : puisque extinction et Nirvāṇa n'ont aucun rapport avec quoi que soit (comp. Kośa, II, 284) De même on ne peut attribuer la Prajñā à quoi que ce soit (L. V. P.)" This is rather an imposed interpretation. According to the just previous line it is to be interpreted that a *dīpa* does not exist after extinction, yet it is said that *dīpa* is extinguished, so also Arhan.

164 Poussin suggests with query *Buddhasamāropa* "Les idéations adventices, etc." He has not probably well understood the Chinese phrase *chao-hui tseng*. The first two characters mean *buddhajñāna*, buddha in the sense of *prabuddha* "enlightened one" cf Kośavyākhyā, p. 3, 8. This phrase is already used twice I. p. 15b last line and II, p. 16a line 6 (Chinese text) The last two characters I have taken for *prakarṣa* here. Rosenberg Dict. gives *pragṛhīta*. So *Samāropa* is not only an equivalent for them.

165. Lit. *manogṛhīta* (or *upādāna*) *jñāna*

166 This is an objection by Yogācāras

167. *Ke-chien drśya* In the previous clause it is *so-chien*

168 *Chi kai-yin ku*. Here *kai* is for *saṃvṛti*. Note *kai* for *vṛd* in *lokavṛd*.

मरीचिकासु जलम्। [अतः] सर्वाणि दृश्यानि न तत्त्वानि। तथता यदि दृश्यस्वभावा, न दृश्यनिमित्तग्रहस्तत्त्वदृष्टिः सिध्यति। यद्यदृश्या, न वक्तव्यं तथता साक्षाद्दर्शनमिति। दर्शनादर्शनयो[169] कथं नाम साम्यम्। ज्ञानं[170] संस्कृतम् तथता चासंस्कृता इति स्वभाववैषम्यम्। यदि दर्शनम्, विषमदर्शन[171] [मेव] सिध्येत्।

सर्वान् धर्मस्वभावान् पश्यतीति दर्शनमपि, सर्वथा तदा अजातिस्वभावकम्। अत एवमदर्शनमेव प्रज्ञप्त्या [172] दर्शनमुच्यते। इति न वैषम्यम्। सर्वधर्मा अनभिसमया इत्येकक्षणसाक्षात्कार एव सत्याभिसमयो नाम। न दूषयितव्य[172]मात्मसंवेदनमिति। दुःसाधनत्वात्। ज्ञानं ज्ञानस्य[173] तत्त्वासाक्षात्कारकं स्यात्। द्विविधमपि[174] न दृश्यविषयस्वभावम्। अभिन्नत्वाद् युगपत्सर्वसाक्षात्कारः। यदि परमार्थत, विषयनिमित्तावभासो ज्ञानञ्च प्रकृतितोऽजातिस्वभावम्। अतो नाभिसमयो न च प्रतिलाभ[175]।

यथाह सूत्रम्। न त्वया अभिसमयेनाधिगमेन वा तथागते ज्ञानं कार्यम्। अयं कायः सर्वचक्षुर्विषयातीत[176] इति हि ब्राह्मण तथागतो बोधिमूले सुनिषण्णः साक्षात्करोति सर्वधर्मान् अधिगम्यान् सर्वमिथ्या-

---

169 Lit *adṛśya* Poussin renders this passage thus : "Voir ce qui n'est pas visible, est-ce-là ce que vous nommez adequet ? But this is not the sense intended in the sentence

170 Ie *derived from darśana*

171. See question to this effect on p 91, 5

172 Or *prakāśana, darśana*

173 This is not clear even from the comment which introduces it simply *wei, tathā hi* Poussin puts it "Le savoir ne peut pas realiser la vrai nature du savoir". My rendering is strictly according to the Chinese syntax

174. *Jñāna* and *viṣaya*, according to the comment

175 Or *adhigama*

176 M. *vṛtti* p 541, 3 6 *na Yogācāraḥ ... kasyacid dharmasya prāptim icchati na abhisamayam* 1

विपर्याससमुत्पन्नक्लेशसमुच्छेदम्। एवमादि सूत्रमपि सर्वथा अनुसर्तव्यम्। इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन। प्रकृतं विचारयामः॥

चरणं[177] नाम भ्रमणम्। चरणं नास्तीति अचरितम्। प्रतिपत्तिविहीनम् नार्याभिनिर्वृत्तम्। निर्विकल्पकप्रज्ञोऽनिमित्तं चरन्नेव चरति[178] इत्यतोऽचरित एव चरतीत्युच्यते। अनेन[179] तु संक्षिप्योक्तं पूर्ववत् [17b] प्रहाणसंसिद्धफलम्॥

योगाचार एवमविकल्पप्रज्ञाचारित्वात् अचरन्नपि चरति, चरन्नेव न चरति। सर्वालम्बनमनस्कारविविक्तः सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितः तद्यथाकाशः[180]। सर्वपरिकल्पापगतो विशुद्धः शान्तो निरोधसमापत्तिप्रविष्ट इव सर्वधर्मस्वभावान् पश्यति।

बुद्धानां धर्मकायोऽचिन्त्यः अपरिच्छिन्नः[181] अद्वयः अनालयः अलक्षणः अद्वयः अविक्षिप्तः अनुत्पादः अनिरुद्धः, अनुदयव्ययः[182] परिशुद्धः शान्तः निर्विशेषः[183] अविषयः[184] अनाभासः सर्वमलावरणविगतः[185]। सर्वबुद्धिप्रज्ञाभिलापविषयमार्गातीतः[186]। एवं पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति यत् किञ्चन। अपश्यन्नपि पश्यति पश्यन्नेव न पश्यति॥

---

177. *yā ls.* Poussin : "déplacer-fouler"

178. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 765 : *na carati rūpe rūpanimitte* | *na rūpam nityam iti carati* | *yo rūpe carati sa nimitte carati ...* | Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 401 , *asya samudācārā na pravartante* | *ya evam carati sa na kvacit carati* |

179. Lit. *idam.*

180. Poussin : *Tadyathā-kāśe.*

181. *Kośa, V, 1 b 10, Siddhi, X, 16b 5* (L. V. P.).

182. *Nirutpatti kṣaya* (L. V. P).

183. Omitted by Poussin.

184. Another reading : *animitta*—Shanghai and Taisho eds. This reading is supported by the comment.

185. "Defaut-souillur" (L. V. P.).

186. Or *Buddhaprajñā* as on p. 95, 1.

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिगृहीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिवर्धयति अनन्तं प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति। [187]विशुद्ध्येकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति भैषज्यराज इव सर्वं [18 a] सम्यक्प्रार्थना[188] प्रणिधानबहुलः।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यगवलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्तादर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते। सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः। सर्वधर्मा निष्प्रपञ्चाः सर्वाभिलापसंप्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक्। सर्वधर्मा अकृतकस्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोभिस्तद्धेतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक् कर्मान्तः। सर्वधर्मा [189]अनुदया अव्ययाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभाव उदयो व्ययश्च [स] सदानुत्पन्नः [इति] सम्यगाजीवः। सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति [190]वीर्योपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः। सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षादर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननविगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग् ध्यानम्। एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा आर्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति। अर्थोऽयं विस्तरेण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र देशितः॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलमार्याष्टाङ्गमार्गमभ्यस्यति [18b] संक्षिप्योक्ता षट्पारमिता अपि परिपूरयति। [191]अप्रयोगोऽपि यस्त्वस्ति। कथमयमर्थः। [191]तथा हि। सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विसृजति सर्वक्लेशांश्चोत्सृजति इतीयं नाम दानपारमिता॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति। अनुपलम्भभावनां मनसिकरोति। इयं शीलपारमिता॥ सर्वालम्बनानां वेदनां न क्षमते।

---

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment

188 Lit *prārthita*

189 *Tseng, vṛddhi, upacaya, chien, hrāsa apacaya* Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax

190 *yong mong—vīra* according to Rosenberg. Poussin puts it "energie" – *vīrya*

191—191. This portion is left out by Poussin

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गश्च सर्वचर्या निस्सरति। इयं वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम्। इयं ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां अप्रपञ्चानुत्थानं द्वयनिमित्तविविक्[ता] इयं प्रज्ञापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तरशो यथा प्रज्ञापरि[192]पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र तत्र देशितः।

एवं [193]सुविहारोऽप्रमाणद्वारं भवति। अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता विस्तरेणोक्तम्। महार्थैर्हितफलैः [194]समृद्धो भवति। [इति]। ज्ञानिनो यथातत्त्वं जानीयु प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारभेरन्[193] ॥

[इति] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[समाप्तम्]

— [o]:—

192 Śikṣāsamuccaya 125, Mdo (Csoma) 18 —Compare la pratique des Pāramitās dans Śraddhotpāda 3, 2 13b (L V. P.)

193—193. Left out by Poussin

194 *Jae* I have suggested *samṛddhi* tentatively

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिगृहीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिवर्धयति अनन्तं प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति। [187]विशुद्धैकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति भैषज्यराज इव सर्वं [18 a] सम्यक्प्रार्थना[188] प्रणिधानबहुलः।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यगवलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्तादर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते। सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः। सर्वधर्मा निष्प्रपञ्चाः सर्वाभिलापसंप्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक्। सर्वधर्मा अकृतकस्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोभिस्तद्धेतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक् कर्मान्तः। सर्वधर्मा [189]अनुदया अव्ययाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभाव उदयो व्ययश्च [स] सदानुत्पन्नः [इति] सम्यगाजीवः। सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति [190]वीर्योपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः। सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षाद्दर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननविगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग् ध्यानम्। एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा आर्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति। अर्थोऽयं विस्तरेण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र देशितः॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलमार्याष्टाङ्गमार्गमभ्यस्यति [18b] संक्षिप्योक्ता षट्पारमिता अपि परिपूरयति। [191]अप्रयोगेऽपि वस्त्वस्ति। कथमयमर्थः। [191]तथा हि। सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विसृजति सर्वक्लेशांश्चोत्सृजति इतीयं नाम दानपारमिता॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति। अनुपलम्भभावनां मनसिकरोति। इयं शीलपारमिता॥ सर्वालम्बनानां वेदनां न क्षमते।

---

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment.

188 Lit. *prārthita*

189. *Tseng, vṛddhi, upacaya, chien, hrāsa apachya.* Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax.

190 *yong mong—vīra* according to Rosenberg Poussin puts it "energie"—*vīrya*.

191—191. This portion is left out by Poussin.

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गञ्च सर्वचर्या निस्सरति। इयं वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम्। इयं ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां प्रपञ्चानुत्थानं द्वयनिमित्तविविक्त[ता] इयं प्रज्ञापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तरशो यथा ब्रह्मपरि[192]पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र तत्र देशितः।

एवं [193]सुविहारोऽप्रमाणकारं भवति। अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता विस्तरेणोक्तम्। महार्थहितबहुलैः [193]समृद्धो भवति। [इति]। ज्ञानिनो यथातत्त्वं जानीयुः प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारभेरन्[194] ॥

[इति] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[समाप्तम्]

—:[o]:—

192 Śikṣāsamuccaya, 125, Mdo (Csoma), 13.—Compare la pratique des Pāramitās dans Śraddhotpāda, 3, 2, 13b (L V. P.)

193—193. Left out by Poussin

194. *Jao-s.* I have suggested *samṛddhi* tentatively.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

P. 34, n. 6 Kośavyākhyā, I, p 2, l 23 :

श्रवणं क्रमेण श्रुतचिन्ताभावनामयप्रज्ञोत्पादनार्थम्। तदुत्पादनं क्लेशप्रहाणार्थम्। तत्पुनः सर्वदुःखोपशमलक्षणनिर्वाणार्थम्। इति प्रयोजननिष्ठा॥

Ibid, p 9, l 14 :

तत्र श्रुतप्रयोगजा श्रुतमयी। युक्तिनिध्यानप्रयोगजा चिन्तामयी। भावनाप्रयोगजा भावनामयी। etc.

P 39, 5 Cp Pramāṇavārtika, II, 355 :

मन्त्राद्युपप्लुताक्षाणां यथा मृच्छकलादयः। अन्यथैवावभासन्ते तद्रूपरहिता अपि॥ वृत्ति—अन्यथा सुवर्णादित्वेन।

P. 39, 10-12. Read in Maj. 28, Mahahatthipadopama Sutta :

वुत्तं पनेतं भगवता :— यो पटिच्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति। स धम्मं पस्सति। यो धम्मं पस्सति सो पटिच्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति। p. 190

P. 44 2 *Anumānanyūnata* is explained differently in the Pramāṇavārtika

P. 47, 14 n. 67. The same in the Kośavyākhyā, I, p. 26, 8 :

आत्मशब्दो हि चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यत इति वक्ष्यते।

Cp Ibid, p 77, 20

(भा-) अहङ्कारसंनिश्रयत्वात् चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यते। (व्या-) अहङ्कारसंनिश्रय आत्मेत्यात्मवादिनः संकल्पयन्ति।

• Cp this statement in the Kaṭhopaniṣad, III Sāṅkhya doctrine

P. 48, 15-16. Cp Maj Vol I, p 227

P. 57, 10 Cp Sthiramati's Triṃśikābhāṣya :

विज्ञानं पुनः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् द्रव्यतोऽस्तीत्यभ्युपेयम्।

p 2 l 16

P. 61, 19. Abh Kośa, Bhāṣya III, 27, p 43, 15 :

अयोनिशो मनस्कारहेतुका अविद्योक्ता सूत्रान्तरे इति। and p 44, 15. अन्यः पुनराह (=भदन्तश्रीलाभः) अयोनिशो मनस्कारो हेतुरविद्याया उक्तः सूत्रान्तरे।

P. 62, ■ This idea is well expressed in the Suttanipāta 843 :

सच्चं ति खो ब्राह्मण किं वदेय्य, मुसाति वा सो विवदेथ केन ।
यस्मिं समं विसमञ्चापि नत्थि स केन वादं पटिसंयुजेय्य ॥

P. 69, 14 Cp Nyāyamukha *ad* ver. 7, Tucci, Translation, ■ 30.

■ 71, 2 Cf —

निर्वाणस्य महायाने प्रतिपिद्धत्वात्—

Abhis. Āloka, p 57.

P 71, 14 —

तथताभावस्तथता इत्यत एव निर्देशस्य हस्तत्वमित्याचार्यवसुबन्धुः ।

Abhis. Āloka, p 369

P. 77, 10 Cp. another explanation in Abh. Kośavyākhyā II, 44, p. 83

(भा-) कथं पुनर्भंगवानुभयतो भागविमुक्तः । (व्या-) क्लेशावरणं समापत्त्यावरणञ्चोभयतो भाग. । ततो विमुक्त ।

P 77, 12, n ■ It will be interesting to note the whole context here :

निर्वाणसामान्यगतेस्ततोऽन्यैरपि पुद्गलैः ।
तथागतेषु दधर्मन्तरं सुमहामहम् ॥
शून्यतामात्रसादृश्यात् यदि नाधिक्यता भवेत् ।
रोमकूपाणुकच्छिद्रेणाकाशं प्रतिबिम्बयेत् ॥

P. 78, 12 The Statement : *Khapuṣpa* etc. is rather ambiguous as it stands in the Chinese. The commentary explains it as follows : "If you say it is not lost," etc purports to refute the supporting factor. "If you say it is not lost" is stated towards the Vādin's (= *Śāstra ācārya*) former statement of "the existence of sky-flower being lost " So [Prativādin] now says it is not lost. "Sky-flower-non-existent term" etc explains the factor of its not being lost "The term" (*Śabda*) means the statement of the term That is to say [my] statement of non existent sky-flower can combat the statement of the non-existent sky flower of the Vādin, by explaining that it is the same as the *tridhātu* of the real nature Then the nature (*svabhāva*) of sky-flower is not non existent The Vādin's *samadṛṣṭānta* cannot be established

So my original pakṣa is not lost. This is the re-statement of the supporting factor of the Prativādin by the Vādin.

It appears now that we may construe the sentence here in the Skt. text thus :

असत्खपुष्पमिति शब्दोक्तत्रिधातूनां सत्त्वमावत्वात् ।

If this my reading is accepted, the stop put after *Śabda, Sheng* in the Chinese text must be omitted. The commentary also appears to support this conjucture.

P. 88, 8. n 97. Cp. Pram. Vār vṛtti *ad IV, 157 : Dvyaṇukādi-kramena kāryadravyasaṃyogaparamparayā ca dravyam utpadyate*. *Dvyaṇuka* is sometimes called parent atom. Though it is product, yet it is the same as the original atom in quality, there is nothing newly added and created in the combination of two atoms (Cp. the extract from Kweici's commentary on the Vijñptimātratā-viṃśikā of Vasubandhu in the Vaiseṣika Philosophy, p 129, with note 2) According to Sridhara "a single atom and three atoms have no productiveness, and a *dvyaṇuka* must conjoin with another *dvyaṇuka* to produce any of the things in the world" Ibid p. 130 It appears that our author, Bhāvaviveka wants to disprove some such view of the *dvyaṇuka* atoms in this passage Dr H. Ui draws attention to the fact that Bhāvaviveka does not call single atoms *dravya*, but two atoms and three atoms are so called, (Cp Nanjio, No 1085, Prajñāpradīpa, Pp. 60a, 91 'b) Ibid 131 According to Dharmapāla dvyaṇuka is perceptible, but Śāntarakṣita—Kamalaśīlas take it to be imperceptible, see Ālambanaparīkṣā, p 60 with Note, 10 One may refer profitably to my paper : Saṅkarāchārya on Bud. Idealism, in the Jour. of S V. O Institute, Tirupati, Vol I, part 2, for some discussion on atomic theory

P. 88, 12 n 123 J Masuda points out that the *samyaktva-niyāma* is the first stage of the Darśanamārga The word *niyāma* has been analysed into *nis+āma* āma meaning "rawness", is the passion or that indriya which did not ripe The Āryan path can transcend this rawness, therefore it is called *niyāma* And he says that the *samyaktva* is interpreted to mean *nirvāṇa* or āryan path, see his translation of Vasumitra's Bud. Sects, pp. 27, n 3, and 40 n 9.

P. 89, 8, P. 90, 8 There is only one quotation so far from this Sutra, namely in the M. vṛtti, p 516, 1—4. Some Sutra of this name

in *Nanjio's Catalogue* No 264—265 = No 172 in the Cat the Tib Bud Canons Japan

P 91, 10 Cp Haribhadra's remark :

धर्मतैषा सम्यक् प्रतिपन्नसमाधे. योगिनो बुद्धेर्व्याकरणं क्रियत इति ।

Abh Āloka p 62 and see Aṣṭasāhasrikā p 13 12

P 97, 1 Doubtful passages of the Sutras should be interpreted in the light of the other passages whose imports could not at all be doubtful, this is one of the principles adopted in the science of interpretation Haribhadra informs us that the same has been sanctioned by Buddha himself .

प्रदेशान्तरे भगवताभिहितम्—सूत्रं भिक्षव सूत्रान्तरेण व्याख्यातव्यम् इति । Ibid p. 45.

P 97 5 Cp Similar expression in Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV, 3 23

यद्वै तन्न पश्यति, पश्यन् वै तन्न पश्यति । नहि द्रष्टुः दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते । अविनाशित्वात् ।

This appears to be the same as the ekakṣaṇasākṣātkāra (p 96) of our author

P 98 13 Nothing is known about the Bodhisattvapiṭaka only reference to it is in Rosenberg's Vocabulary p 399, c 3, and the Dictionary of Chin Bud terms by W E Southill and L Hodous where it is simply mentioned

P 99 4 No 158 in the Catalogue of the Tib Bud Canons Sendai Japan 1934 There is No Chinese version known to us

INDICES

TABLE OF INDICES

I

CANONICAL QUOTATIONS

CHAPTER—I

P. 39 9. *Bhagavān āha...* on non—substantiality of dharmas and on *Dharmatā—Śūnyatā—Buddha*

P 40, 1-2 *Yaḥ pratyayair jāyate...*

P. 47, 12 13. *Ātmā hi ātmano nāthaḥ ..*

P. 48 3. *Yathoktam* ..on concomitance of birth and decay

" " 11-13 [M Nikāya] . . A denial does not incur the contradiction of one's own proposition

P. 48 15 Bhagavān ..*Anātmakās sarvasamskārāḥ* !

" " 16 " *Anityās sarvasamskārāḥ*

P. 50, 17-19 Bhagavān...on two *antas*

P. 56, 15 , p 59, 4 *Yena Śūnyam* . on *Śūnyatā*.

P. 62, 8 *Bhagavān*...on denial of true and false

" " 13. On Dharmas not being made void by means of voidness

P. 66, 1. *Bhagavān*...on the method of charity by a Bodhisattva.

" " 3. " ...On worthiness for becoming a Bodhisattva.

" " 4. " .. On Bodhisattva's preference to the worldly service

" " 13. " On Bodhi devoid of time limitations

CHAPTER—II

P 69, 15 *Ākāśam anāvṛtiḥ* from Abh. Kośa.

P. 70, 8 Bhagavān.. on Pratisaṅkhyānirodha.

" " 10. " On Nirvāṇa

" " 14. " On *nirmitasattva*.

" " 17. " On negation of existence to Nirvāṇa.

P 71, 1-3 On Nirvāṇa mere a concept

P. 74, 3 *Sūtram* (= Mañjuśrīpariprcchā ?)...on the wisdom eye

" " 4. " On Paramārthasatya not within the domain of jñāna

" " 6 " On Bodhi not obtainable.

" " 7-8 " On seeing of Truth being an absence of dharma-seeing

P. 75, 3-5 (*Āgama*) On *samprajñāna*

P. 76, 2. *Sūtre*...on Tathāgata, a status of absolute absence of birth.

" 9. *Tadāgame*...on the soul not reached by the mind and speech.

P. 85, 5. *Prajñāpāramitāyām*... (Śatas.) on Bodhisattva's non-conception of any aspect of any thing.

P. 86, 14. *Bhagavān*... (Kāśyapapar.) on *madhyamā pratipad.*

P. 87, 5. " On the same topic.

P. 88, 1. " On Boddhisattva's not taking any object for meditation nor realisation of any goal.

P. 89, 7. *Sūtre.* on Paramārthasatya

P. 89, 8. *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā* on the wisdom-eye.

P. 90, 4, *Bhagavān*...on true intellection (*pratipatti*).

P. 90, 5 *Sūtra*...on Tathāgata's not perceiving *Bodhi*.

P. 90. 6 *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā* on seeing the truth.

P. 91, 10. *Sūtra*...on Bodhisattva's having instruction from Buddhas.

P. 92, 8. " ...On the negation of *dharma* and *kāya* and on the meaning of Āryas' silence.

P. 93, 9. *Sūtre*...on the mind inseparable from discrimination.

P. 96 ; 14, " On Tathāgatakāyadarśana.

P. 98, 13. *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* on true interpretation of eight-fold path.

P. 99, 4. *Brahmaparipṛcchā* on true interpretation of six pāramitas

II

INDEX OF ĀCĀRYAS

Ācāryas whose opinions are cited in the foot notes
(abbreviated below n)

III
SANSKRIT INDEX

The first figure refers to pages and the next to lines.

Ad. N.

ENGLISH INDEX

N B figure refers to pages

V

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following books are consulted in preparing the foot notes and Introduction

Abhidharmakośa with Yaśomitra s Comment Chap I (B B) II III (ed N Dutt).
Abhisamayālankāra by Maitreya (B B)
Abhisamayālankārāloka by Haribhadra (GOS)
Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (B I)
Ālambanaparīkṣā with Dharmapāla s Comment ed N A Sastri (A L S)
Upaniṣads Bṛhadāraṇyaka Kaṭha Kena (A L S)
Upāyahṛdaya—Pre Dinnāga Bud Texts (GOS)
Kāvyālankāra by Bhāmaha ed Naganatha Sastri Tanjore
Kāśyapaparivarta ed Stael Holstein
Tantravārtika by Kumārila (Chowkamba edn)
Triṃśikābhāṣya by Sthiramati ed S Levi
Dighanikāya (P T S)
Nirukta by Yaska poona 1921
Nyāyakośa
Nyāyabindu with Dharmottara s Comment (B B)
Nyāyamukha by Dinnāga (Eng Trans by Tucci and Sanskrit rendering unpublished)
Nyāyavārtika by Udyotakara (Kasi edn)
Nyāyasūtras with Bhāṣya
Pramāṇavārtika by Dharmakirti with Vṛtti ed R Sankrityayana
Bodhicaryāvatāra by Śāntideva with Pañjikā (B I)
Bhavasankrāntisūtra ed N A Sastri (A L S)
Majjhimanikaya (P T S)
Madhyamakakārikā with Prasannapadā (B B)
Madhyamakāvatāra by Candrakirti (Tib B B) Skt rendering partly by N A Sastri
Mahāyāna Sūtrālankāra ed S Levi
Lankāvatāra Sūtra ed Nanjio
Vigrahavyāvartanī by Nāgārjuna ed R Sankrityayana
Vaiśeṣika Sūtra by Kaṇāda (Kasi ed)

Vaiśeṣika philosophy by H Ui
Vyaktiviveka by Kuntaka Calcutta edn 1928
Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (B I)
Śataśāstravaipulya by Dharmapāla (Chinese text)
Śābara bhāṣya (Chowk edn)
Śālistarbasūtra (Restored Skt text by N A Sastri)
Ślokavārtika by Kumārila (Chowk ed)
Sikṣāsamuccaya by Śāntideva ([illegible])
Sāṅkhyakārikā Suvarṇasaptati ed N A Sastri
Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya by Vijñānabhikṣu (B I)
Suttanipāta (PTS)
MSS Remains of Buddhist Literature ed Hoernle Oxford
Pre Diṅnāga Bud Logical texts ed G Tucci (GOS)
Document d' Abhidharma by L V Poussin B E F E O 1930
L Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit par L V Poussin Paris 1923—1931
Mélanges Chinois et Buddhique Vol II ed L V Poussin
Vasumitra s Buddhist Sects trans by J Masuda Asia Major Vol II
A Chinese commentary (anonymous) on The Karatalaratna published by the Sūtra engraving Institute 9th year of Chinese Republic Nankin China
Chinese Encyclopaedia Dictionary (Chinese edition)
An Introduction to the study of Buddhism part I Vocabulary by O Rosenberg Tokyo 1916

KARATALARATNA

Chap. I

P.	N.		P.	N.	
33.	1,	諸有所行	53.	92,	異空慧者
33.	2,	理	53.	94,	彼
33.	3,	喻	55.	97,	顯現異
34.	8,	已入	55.	98,	所顯
37.	24,	假說同故	55.	99,	據
37.	25,	雖令…不可…有	55.	101,	文煩
39.	34,	被 for 彼	56.	102,	處投寄
40.	38,	似	56	103,	有所
43.	50,	明了	56.	105,	蛆蟲
47.	65,	都無所有	57.	110,	假立性
48.	68,	不相離	59.	118,	述……述
48.	71,	所許	59.	120,	覺
48.	73,	同彼	64	134,	悟入
52.	87,	所遣色	64.	136,	根資
53.	91,	宜有			

KARATALARATNA

Chap. II

P.	*N.*	
67.	1,	若不開示
68.	5,	略舉名相
69.	10.	義準
70.	13,	嗢鉢羅
70.	16,	微紗(妙)
71.	21,	聖教
71.	25,	假立
72.	30,	故
72.	33,	辯
73.	39,	世 for 此
74.	41,	所見
75.	49,	非離非有實性……有……
76.	66,	竝無……並無
79.	76,	親現
81.	89,	無能
84.	103,	無動了知
88.	123,	正性離生
90.	135,	行解
90.	136,	眞實
91.	140,	思惟
93	163.	然
95.	164,	堅執增益
95.	167,	可見……所見
95.	168,	起解因故
96.	173,	謂
97.	177,	(遊履)
98.	189,	增……減
98.	190,	勇猛
99.	194,	饒益

Page line

32, 29 Read "innumerable discourses".

41, 2. „ केशमशक as on p. 65, l. 1.

47, 6. After स्यात्, add : यदि उक्तं वचनं नाभावद्रव्यमिति, संस्कृता अपि नाभाव-द्रव्याणि इति......

49, 13. Read परिचोदित for आवृत—

52, 6. Or स्वपक्षरागतृष्णा—

56, 14. Lit. इति चेदयमर्थः .

57, 1. Read परिकल्पितः परतन्त्रस्वभावे......

„ 3,10. „ परिकल्पितस्वभावः

59, 1. „ तदा पुनः सिद्ध—

64, 13. „ चिन्ताप्रविचय—

„ 15. } „ यत्नेन for त्वरितं.
83, 14. }

65, 8. Note some observations on the Buddhist conception of gods by E. J. Thomas, Life of Buddha, p. 208.

66, 6. The Chinese may syntactically read : कथम् for परम्

76, 3. Add विस्तरः after इति।

77, 11. Read विमुक्ति and note Maj. II, 90, p, 129 : एत्थ......न किंचि नानाकरणं वदामि यदिदं विमुत्तिया विमुत्तिम्।

78, 9. After—मयं add : खपुष्पमस्ति उत न। यदि वदसि

84, 17. } सम्यक्प्रहाण = सम्मापधान in Pali.
97, 6. }

96, 11. साक्षात्कार = Anubhava of Advaitins, v. S. Radhakṛsnan, Indian Philosophy, II, p. 510-11.

97, 4. Lit. निमित्तमचरन......

98, 11. After यत्किंचन add : चिन्तनाभावः सम्यक्स्मृतिः। सर्वविकारसर्वधर्मानुपादानेन यत्किंचन

97, 7. Read conveniently यथाभूत

ERRATA

P. L.

2. 32. Read 'enveloped'
4. 19. „ 'converse'
8. 26. „ '*pratijña*'
9. 26. „ '*svavacanavirodha*'
11. 28. „ 'undiscriminative'
12. 24. „ 'gem like'
14. 16. „ 'of' before 'the nature.'
16. 20. „ 'is' for 'in'
20. 9. „ '*Abhimukhi*'
23. 17. „ 'consider'
„ 32. „ 'concomitance'
34. 13. „ 'परमार्थस्य'
„ 7. „ 'साक्षात्कार'
35. 10. „ 'संवृत'
38. 2. „ 'प्रमाणैः'
39. 6. „ 'वधिहृदि—'
43. 12. „ 'पाल'
48. 1. „ 'वस्तुः'
51. 1. „ 'द्वितीय'
52. 13. „ 'रहित'
54. 1. „ 'आस्थीयेत'
54. 13. „ 'ग्रंथस्य'
55. 13. „ 'एक' for वक
60. 13. „ 'आत्मादि'
61. 3. „ 'सम्बध्येयाताम्'
70. 12. „ 'उद्वेग'
80. 1. „ 'सत्ताहेतुक'
82. 13. Insert [9 b] before सद्गता-
88. Read everywhere निधित्य for निधित्स्य